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Abstract
The ongoing disregard for the American vice presidency, and for those who
would and do hold the office, in conjunction with the scarcity of academic research
devoted specifically to the development of the institution, warrants the following study.
Indeed, this study is relatively novel to the existent body of political science research
which ventures to evaluate the vice presidency. Generally, research and publications on
the vice presidency have tended to focus on variables such as ticket-balancing and homestate advantage; critiques of individual vice presidents; and more recently, specific policy
spheres where modern vice presidents have been involved. In contrast, this project is
devoted exclusively to isolating the institutional markers that have increased the broad
utility of the position of vice president of the United States and, in the process, have
augmented the development of the vice-presidential institution. These institutional
markers include augmentation by precedent, statute, and constitutional amendment;
increases in the resources made available to the institution; the addition of institutional
identifiers; and the gradual accumulation of policy portfolios and responsibilities
assigned to vice presidents. Underscoring each of the preceding institutional markers has
been the vital role specific presidents have played in facilitating the development of the
vice-presidential institution; indeed, the form and the substance of the vice presidency
today is almost entirely the product of presidential initiative.
In total, this study represents an interpretive synthesis of the historical record of
the American vice presidency and how that record reflects the development of the
institution. In the end, salient institutional markers have led to the development of a
modern, utilitarian institution, one that is now fully integrated into the executive
i

government. Of equal import, the standing of the vice presidency today, legitimizes the
individual serving in the office, and furthers the influence of the vice president in the
executive government. And, in telling the story of the development of the vice
presidency, it is readily apparent that a combination of anecdotal and empirical evidence
support the thesis of a changed institution, closely integrated with, and dependent upon,
the presidency.
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Preface
In the course of four years research--conducted for this thesis, as well as for three
published articles and a forthcoming book--original source documents, personal
interviews and communications, oral histories, diaries, published notes, autobiographies,
biographies, records of Congress, journal articles, and periodicals have all been utilized
in an effort to comprehensively examine and thus better understand the American vice
presidency. The resources cover a lengthy span of time and include material written in
the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries; for this reason, it is
necessary to address the etymology, as it were, of the words vice president, vice
presidency, and vice-presidential, and how the form these words have taken have varied
over time.
For example, this has included capitalizing both words (Vice President); and
hyphenating and capitalizing each (Vice-President); and has similarly been applied to
commensurate variations for all forms of the words. In addition, hyphenation has been
applied to all forms, even when presented in lower case script (vice-presidency). In order
to remain true to original source documents, all quotations are reproduced as is, hence
reflecting the accepted capitalization and hyphenation for the time period the material
was written. This rule has been adhered to with more recent material, as well; the only
exception being transcripts of the debates between the vice-presidential candidates, which
are originally transcribed only for the exactness of the words spoken in the debate, and
without concern to the preciseness of the written word.
In light of the foregoing considerations, it is impossible to maintain consistency
throughout the thesis, and remain true to original source documents. Oftentimes, such
viii

inconsistencies apply to the various forms used when writing about the president, as well
as other words that, in retrospect, appear to be capitalized at random. For this thesis,
however, the appropriate capitalization and hyphenation for vice president and president
have been used--and in all forms--as delineated by the Chicago Manual of Style, 15th
edition; therefore, these are acknowledged as the correct forms for the words at this time.
Another note on the use of various reference materials: although the temptation is
great for modern researchers to simply gather information from websites whenever
possible, on those occasions when material was initially located via the internet, hard
copies were obtained directly at a university library location, or by way of the interlibrary loan system. Not only does this practice ensure the accuracy of page citations, it
is, quite simply, an antiquated preference of this author to have the actual material in
hand. As it were, whether it was bound copies of long-forgotten journal articles retrieved
from the basement of a library; or a well-worn copy of a manuscript which traveled
across the country, courtesy of a generous lending-library; original hard copies of
reference materials have consistently been accessed, including material from the author‟s
extensive personal collection. And for any material initially retrieved online: thank you,
fittingly, to Vice President Al Gore for inventing the internet.
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1 Introduction: Why Study the Development of the American Vice Presidency?
“Gentlemen, I feel great difficulty how to act. I am possessed of two separate powers; the
one in esse and the other in posse. I am Vice-President. In this I am nothing, but I may be
everything.”1
(Vice President John Adams)
The American vice presidency is unique among political and government
institutions. The office was referenced rarely at the Federal Convention of 1787, with its
inclusion in the proposed United States Constitution certain only in the final days of the
proceedings; and it never garnered much enthusiasm from the Convention delegates, or
when the document was later ratified state-by-state. However, today the vice presidency
is a different institution than the one designed by the Framers. And yet, the fundamental
structure of the vice-presidential institution, in conjunction with the responsibilities
sanctioned in the Constitution for whoever held the office, remain intact, as when
originally established.
If the vice presidency continues to be, in form, essentially the same institution the
Framers envisioned--although, admittedly, it is a stretch to suggest that, when it came to
the vice presidency, the Framers had a vision for the institution--then how is it a changed
institution today? And what specific dynamics are responsible for transforming the vice
presidency?
In order to answer the foregoing questions, it is important to first acknowledge
this point: the American vice presidency has not been a dormant institution. At the same
time, the development of the vice presidency since its inception should not be described
as a matter of institutional evolution. Instead, the vice presidency is an institution that has
1

been affected by specific institutional markers which have then incrementally enhanced
its development. As such, the following narrative traces the arc of development of the
vice presidency, beginning with its inception; and then, by isolating the institutional
markers that have facilitated the development of the institution. These institutional
markers include augmentation by precedent, statute, and constitutional amendment;
increases in the resources made available to the institution; the addition of symbolic
institutional identifiers; and the gradual accumulation of policy portfolios vice presidents
are expected to take on. In the aggregate, institutional markers such as those just listed,
have helped to make the vice presidency a formidable institution; and the individual
serving in the office, an influential figure in the executive government.
Despite the preceding points, of all the areas of politics and government subject to
research and analysis, the vice presidency continues to be among the most overlooked.
And yet gaining an understanding of the American vice presidency is necessary for a
number of reasons, particularly in light of the developed, modern incarnation of the
institution. As will become evident, the vice presidency matters foremost because of the
presidency. Although there are several dynamics that make this so, the most salient
reason for why the vice presidency matters, in relation to the presidency, becomes
apparent when reviewing the presidency in aggregate.
As of this writing, forty-three individuals have served as president. Grover
Cleveland holds the distinction of being the sole individual to win nonconsecutive
presidential terms and so Cleveland is counted as the twenty-second, as well as the
twenty-fourth president. Of the forty-three individuals to have been president, fourteen
were first the vice president of the United States. Of the fourteen, eight ascended to the
2

first office of the land because of the death of the incumbent president, whereas just one
vice president arrived in the Oval Office because of the resignation of the president. In
addition, five other presidents served as vice president prior to winning a term as
president in their own right: John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Martin Van Buren, Richard
Nixon and George H.W. Bush.
Attaining the presidency without the benefit of succession has not been a
guarantee of two terms in office, however; for after winning the presidency, only
Jefferson and Nixon were elected to a second term, and because Nixon resigned in the
midst of the sixth year of his presidency, just Jefferson fulfilled his second term as
president. What is more, of the nine vice presidents to succeed to the presidency, only
four--Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry Truman, and Lyndon Johnson--were
successful in earning the presidential nomination of their party, and then winning their
own term in office.
In the latter part of the twentieth century, the vice presidency proved to be one of
the better indicators of future presidential nominees. Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey,
Gerald Ford, Walter Mondale, George H.W. Bush, and Al Gore all served as vice
president prior to winning the presidential nomination of their party, either while still in
office, or in the case of Mondale, after having been defeated for reelection to the vice
presidency. Even Dan Quayle--who in tandem with Spiro Agnew was one of the two
most hapless individuals to have served as vice president in the twentieth century--was
viewed by some, if only fleetingly, as a prospective candidate for the presidential
nomination of the Republican Party. This transitory movement came just four years past
Quayle‟s failure to win a second term as the vice president to George H.W. Bush. And
3

then, eight years from the time he had left national office, Quayle again organized a
campaign for the presidency; though he eventually opted out of the 2000 presidential
preference primaries when it appeared the son of the president he once served would
likely prevail and capture the nomination for president. As it stands, modern vice
presidents, if presidential succession has not already come into play, are likely to be a
future candidate for president, with a reasonable expectation of earning the presidential
nomination of their party.
But the likelihood of any vice president ascending to the presidency via
succession should not be casually dismissed. In the twentieth century alone, two sitting
presidents were assassinated (William McKinley and John Kennedy); two died of natural
causes (Warren Harding and Franklin Roosevelt); and one resigned from office (Richard
Nixon). Furthermore, there was a concerted attempt to assassinate President Harry
Truman by two Puerto Rican nationalists; two attempts were made on the life of
President Gerald Ford during his brief tenure; and President Ronald Reagan nearly lost
his life when he was hit by a would-be assassin‟s bullet.
Finally, when it comes to the vice president as potential substitute for the
president, presidential inability and determinations of when a president is unable to fulfill
their duties must be taken into account. Although the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the
Constitution established provisions for managing cases of presidential inability, prior to
the ratification of the Twenty-fifth in 1967, there was no constitutional means in place to
respond, should circumstances call for it.2 Again, in the twentieth century, President
Woodrow Wilson was incapacitated by a stroke during his second term in office, which
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by any measure would have called for the temporary, or perhaps permanent,
relinquishment of his presidential powers.
Likewise, the argument has been made that President Calvin Coolidge suffered
from life-long depression, with the illness becoming acute after his favorite son died from
an infection caused by an injury suffered while playing tennis on the White House court. 3
From the time of his son‟s death forward, Coolidge‟s behavior was erratic and he became
broadly disengaged in his stewardship of the government for the remainder of his time in
office.4 Were the Twenty-fifth Amendment in place during the presidency of either
Wilson or Coolidge, their vice presidents--Thomas Marshall and Charles Dawes,
respectively--most likely would have assumed “the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President.”5
Irrespective of the number of times vice presidents have moved up to the
presidency; and regardless of the specific circumstances dictating the ascension of the
fourteen presidents who were first vice president; the vice presidency, as an institution,
has consistently been derided and discounted. Emblematic of the broad disregard for the
vice presidency was the 180 years which elapsed before any mechanism was established
for replacing the vice president, should the vice president succeed to the presidency,
resign from office, or die. Because of this oversight, and again, before the ratification of
the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which finally established a constitutional means for filling
vacancies in the vice presidency, the office remained unoccupied on a number of
occasions for well over three years. And in three instances--after John Tyler and Andrew
Johnson succeeded to the presidency; and when Vice President William King died within
weeks of being sworn in to office--the nation went without a sitting vice president for
5

nearly four years.
What the preceding adds up to is this: the vice presidency has been left vacant
eighteen times, for a combined total of almost thirty-eight years. The sheer number of
days, months, and years the office was unoccupied, as represented by the data in Table
1.1, is sobering. And while the Congress has periodically addressed succession and the
need to manage a possible double-vacancy in the two nationally elected executive offices,
the impression of an expendable vice-presidential institution is plain.
Table 1.1
Vacancies in the Vice Presidency
Vice President

Term

George Clinton
1809-1813
Elbridge Gerry
1813-1817
John Calhoun
1829-1833
John Tyler
1841-1845
Millard Fillmore
1849-1853
William King
1853-1857
Andrew Johnson
1865-1869
Henry Wilson
1873-1877
Chester Arthur
1881-1885
Thomas Hendricks 1885-1889
Garrett Hobart
1897-1901
Theodore Roosevelt 1901-1905
James Sherman
1909-1913
Calvin Coolidge
1921-1925
Harry Truman
1945-1949
Lyndon Johnson
1961-1965
Spiro Agnew
1973-1977
Gerald Ford
1973-1977

Cause of Vacancy Date of Vacancy

Death
Death
Resigned
Succession
Succession
Death
Succession
Death
Succession
Death
Death
Succession
Death
Succession
Succession
Succession
Resigned
Succession

4/20/1812
11/23/1814
12/28/1832
4/4/1841
7/9/1850
4/18/1853
4/15/1865
11/22/1875
9/19/1881
11/25/1885
11/21/1899
9/14/1901
10/30/1912
8/2/1923
4/12/1945
11/22/1963
10/10/1973
8/9/1974

Duration of Vacancy__
Year Months Days
0
2
0
3
2
3
3
1
3
3
1
3
0
1
3
1
0
0

10
3
2
11
7
10
10
3
5
3
3
5
4
7
9
1
1
4

12
9
4
0
23
14
17
10
13
11
11
18
5
2
8
28
26
8

The notion that more than one of every three presidents first served as the vice
president presumably would have prompted numerous assessments of the American vice
presidency--past, present and future. However, the paucity of research and literature
devoted exclusively to the vice presidency is disquieting. Granted, over the years there
6

have been attempts at assessing specifics of the vice presidency, but generally such
inquiries have been negligible, at best, and typically are dismissive in tone.
For instance, at the ninth annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, held in 1912, H.B. Learned delivered an address titled “Some Aspects of the
Vice-Presidency.”6 In his remarks, Learned briefly reviewed the historical disregard for
the vice presidency, in conjunction with a condensed evaluation of the institutional
attributes of the office. Although he emphasized the necessity of having a vice president
in place for succession to the presidency, he also casually concurred with the broad
dismissal of the office and of those who have held it. In this vein, Learned asserted that
there is an assumption,
that the vice-presidency has sheltered a collection of mediocrities, men at any rate
far below presidential dimensions. This sort of blanket criticism is not easy to
disprove…It is easy to recall the Presidents and so very easy, on the other hand, to
forget the vice-presidents. There have been men of small distinction and little
ability in the vice-presidency. 7

Academic considerations of the vice presidency arrived sporadically throughout
the twentieth century, whether by journal articles or scholarly books. With the implosion
of the Nixon presidency, which was preceded by an abrupt ending to the Agnew vice
presidency, there appeared to be renewed interest in the executive officers of the nation,
particularly the vice president. At that time, Hubert Humphrey, who had already served
four years as vice president, noted the second office had “long [been] an ignored or
belittled American political institution, [but] has in recent years received more and more
7

attention from political scientists, politicians and all the American people.” 8 This made
sense with the Nixon administration being the first, and thus far only, in American history
to result in the resignation of the vice president, as well as the president. The outcome of
Spiro Agnew resigning from the vice presidency; followed closely by Richard Nixon‟s
exit from the White House, was the use--twice within thirteen months--of the
constitutional directive for replacing the vice president found in the Twenty-fifth
Amendment.
The significance of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the institutional development
of the vice presidency is detailed in the pages to follow, yet before moving forward, the
preceding point on the scant time to elapse between replacing two vice presidents
demands emphasis. The adoption of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, just six years before it
was first put into practice, proved timely; and with the resignation of President Nixon, the
amendment prevented the spectacle which might have transpired if Speaker of the House
Carl Albert had been moved up to the presidency, per the direction of the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947.9 Even if Albert might have adequately handled the rigors of the
presidency, he was a Democratic congressman from Oklahoma, representing a rural
district with a constituency that was far from a demographic microcosm of the nation.
This matters because not only were Nixon and Agnew Republicans, but their ticket was
overwhelmingly reelected in 1972; Albert‟s capture of the presidency in this way would
have, in effect, nullified “the votes of the 47 million Americans who had cast their ballots
for Richard Nixon.”10 Hence, despite the joint Nixon-Agnew scandals, and because the
Twenty-fifth Amendment was in place, continuity in government was achieved and a
potential crisis in confidence in the American political system was averted.
8

From that era, some notable scholarly studies emerged, including an assortment of
journal articles from political scientist Marie Natoli. Natoli focused on various aspects of
a smattering of different vice presidents and their respective tenures; though occasionally
she ventured into broad considerations related to the institution, such as the Twenty-fifth
Amendment and whether or not the position of vice president should be abolished. 11 In
all, though there was certainly value in her work, Natoli generally offered cursory
evaluations of the topics she addressed.
Besides the scattered works of Natoli, two useful studies came out around the
same time the bulk of Natoli‟s writings were published: Joel Goldstein‟s The Modern
American Vice Presidency: The Transformation of a Political Institution; and Paul
Light‟s Vice-Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White House. Both texts
appeared in the early 1980s, and each provides a perfunctory historical context for
looking at their respective areas of interest; but neither text devotes much attention to the
accumulative institutional markers that have helped to shape the modern vice presidency.
As such, the main emphasis of the Goldstein book is on gauging what variables underlie
the selection of vice-presidential nominees, and their subsequent role in the campaign;
and the primary focus of the Light text is the vice presidencies of Nelson Rockefeller and
Walter Mondale, and measurements of the influence either man had on the presidents and
administrations they served.
One of the rare treatments of the vice presidency to come out in the 1990s was At
the President’s Side: The Vice Presidency in the Twentieth Century.12 As the title
indicates, the text concentrated on a specific timeframe and therefore it failed to address
any institutionalizing attributes of the vice presidency prior to 1900. For that matter,
9

though worthwhile, At the President’s Side lacked a cohesive theme and thus does not
provide an inclusive portrait of the vice-presidential institution; offering instead a
collection of sketches of individual vice presidents. Ultimately, what plagues studies of
the vice presidency produced in the 1980s, up to the mid-1990s, is the inescapable
absence of any consideration of two of the most influential and significant vicepresidential tenures to date--those of Al Gore and Dick Cheney.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, there was a modest increase in
research on the vice presidency. Still, much of that academic work was narrow in scope,
and focused on precise areas of interest, such as the dynamics of selecting vicepresidential nominees; polling on vice-presidential favorability and approval; and the
isolation and assessment of specific policy portfolios particular vice presidents were
assigned. 13 Though the preceding topics of study were examples of individual
contributions to academic journals, the limited range of inquiry on the vice presidency
has not been the sole province of periodicals, as book length treatments relating to the
vice presidency are fairly uncommon, as well.
Across the board, what have been lacking are concerted evaluations of the
expanded vice-presidential institution. Put another way: while there has been extensive
research into the development of political institutions; and the appreciable growth of the
presidency has given rise to an unrivaled body of academic inquiry; studies of the vice
presidency as a political institution are, for the most part, nonexistent; instead, as noted
previously, distinct spheres of activity by vice presidents typify studies of the vice
presidency. For example, one text came out in 2009 which was devoted entirely to the
vice president‟s role in foreign policy; nonetheless, it failed to include the contributions
10

of several vice presidents prior to the forty-second vice president, Walter Mondale. 14
Without question such an approach has merit, yet it is plainly not as inclusive as it might
be.
The development of a foreign policy portfolio for the vice president is not
prominently featured here, but at this juncture another mischaracterization perpetuated by
the aforementioned text should be pointed out. Even if many of the author‟s conclusions,
with regard to the five vice presidents under review, might be sound, the description of
the vice presidency as “semi-institutionalized” is a flawed categorization.15 Frankly, at
this point in the history of the institution, arguing the American vice presidency is in
some way incomplete underestimates the actual state of the institution.
Ultimately, by examining how and why the American vice presidency was
established; and by delineating the institutional markers that have contributed to the
present locus of the modern institution--all of which is underscored by anecdotal
evidence--it becomes clear the vice presidency is a political institution worthy of further
examination. And because the vice presidency has always stood so closely beside the
presidency, understanding the former institution is as important as understanding the
latter.

11

2 The Establishment of the American Vice Presidency
“The only role the Constitution assigns the vice president is to preside over the Senate
and break a tie when necessary. In a strange way, since the vice presidents were in both
branches, they historically had been treated as though they were in neither.” 16
(Vice President Walter Mondale)
In 1908, Woodrow Wilson‟s influential text, Constitutional Government in the
United States, was published. In that book, Wilson had this to say about institutions:
We sometimes attach a very artificial significance to the word „institution.‟
Speaking in the terms of history, and particularly of political history, an institution
is merely an established practice, an habitual method of dealing with the
circumstances of life or the business of government. There may be firmly
established institutions of which the law knows nothing. 17

By Wilson‟s criteria, the American vice presidency is certainly an institution; it
may have been established as a hollow institution, particularly when compared to other
institutions of government defined in the United States Constitution, but it is an
institution, nonetheless. But it is the story of how the vice presidency was established that
makes it a compelling study; for no other institution in the American system was seen as
such a superfluous addition to the Constitution; nor was any such officer as the vice
president so widely unwanted.
The office of the vice president, when it was eventually included in the
Constitution, was remarkable among the institutions of the United States government in
that it comprised just a single officer. Unlike the multiple members of Congress or the
12

group of Supreme Court justices, or even the president--an officer with the power to
make scores of appointments to the federal government, and at the apex of a single
branch of government--the vice presidency was instituted as an office devoid of peers,
authority, and given minimal responsibilities. Even in terms of responsibilities: the vice
president could easily turn those over to the president pro tempore of the Senate, take
leave of the Capitol building, and hardly be missed. Indeed, at one point when Congress
was trying to settle on salaries for the president and vice president, the idea was put
forward to pay the vice president “only on a per diem basis.” 18
It is therefore the structure of the vice-presidential institution that makes it
distinctive among institutions of the American government. And in some fashion, the
vice presidency could be judged a separate, stand-alone institution. What undermines this
depiction, however, is the vice presidency is fused with both the executive and the
legislative branches--to the former by way of national elections, and to the latter because
of the constitutional provision positioning the vice president squarely in the Senate in the
presiding officer‟s chair.
So why was the vice presidency established? Apparently delegates to the Federal
Convention of 1787 were in no hurry to create the office. Debate and discussion on a
variety of proposals unfolded for over two months at the Convention before the prospect
of establishing such an office was broached by delegates, and then solely in reference to
organizing the election of the president.19 As it was, the presidency was of the most
concern to the delegates. More specifically, deciding on a system for electing the
president at times stalled the progress of the proceedings. It was this sticking point that
led one historian to suggest that irrespective of any other “difficulties…encountered…,
13

they paled into insignificance in comparison with the problem…of determining a
satisfactory method of electing the executive…The difficulty now had become greater
because the powers of the executive had been enlarged.”20
Curiously, an office resembling what became the vice presidency would emerge,
in part, as the outline for electing a single, chief executive was taking shape. For it was in
the course of discussing proposals for how best to select the president that a consensus
eventually emerged that selection should not be the responsibility of the nation‟s
legislative branch; instead, the outcome of contests for the presidency should be
determined by a vote of the people. However, a Convention delegate from North
Carolina, Hugh Williamson, argued that popular election of the president worked against
the least populated states and so “each man should vote for” three candidates on the
assumption that one vote would be cast for a candidate from their own state, with the
other two votes split between “a small [state and]…a large one.” 21
In response to Williamson‟s proposal, another delegate, Gouverneur Morris of
Pennsylvania, offered a slight variation on voting for three individuals for president, with
“an amendment that each man should vote for two persons one of whom at least should
not be of his own State.”22 To this, James Madison, the invaluable chronicler of the
proceedings, recorded the sole “objection which occurred was that each Citizen after
having given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen, would throw away his second on
some obscure Citizen of another State, in order to ensure the object of his first choice.” 23
As it turned out, Madison‟s reference to throwing away a vote was an apt turn of phrase;
for ultimately, in the completed Constitution, the recipient of the most “second” votes for
president was awarded the vice presidency.
14

Later, when it had been settled that there would be a vice president elected with a
president, not all the delegates were satisfied. Among those who found the addition of the
second office unnecessary was Hugh Williamson of North Carolina. Williamson
dismissively summarized the opinion of many at the Convention when, according to
Madison, he “observed that such an officer as vice-President was not wanted. He was
introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be
chosen at the same time.” 24
From the start, every development of the vice presidency has been linked to the
presidency. Moreover, apart from those times when the institution has been addressed or
altered in the Constitution, all augmentation of the vice-presidential institution has been
initiated and facilitated by specific presidents. Even with respect to the vice president in
the Constitution: on the two occasions when constitutional amendments directly affected
the vice presidency--those being the Twelfth and the Twenty Fifth Amendments--the
incumbent president at the time, Thomas Jefferson and Lyndon Johnson, respectively,
was an advocate for the amendment.
Jefferson and Johnson both had a connection to the specific amendments, in that
each was linked with what initially necessitated the amendments. The Twelfth and
Twenty-fifth amendments are focused on in the third and seventh chapters of this
narrative; however, a brief summation of what necessitated the amendments is
worthwhile at this stage. Due to the system in place for the first four presidential
elections--and the indefinite nature of casting two votes for president, with the vice
president being the runner-up for the presidency--Thomas Jefferson nearly had the
presidency taken from him by his acknowledged running mate in 1800, Aaron Burr.25
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Although Burr did end up serving as Jefferson‟s vice president, an uneasiness and distrust
colored their relations from that time forward. Jefferson pushed for the Twelfth
Amendment in large part because he wanted to ensure a candidate intended for the vice
presidency--as was Burr--did not land in the presidency, instead. And so, after the
ratification of the Twelfth Amendment, votes cast for presidential and vice-presidential
candidates were unmistakably demarcated.
In Lyndon Johnson‟s case, while he encouraged the creation and adoption of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment when he was president, it was because he came to the office
from the vice presidency that he was motivated to do something about presidential
inability and filling vacancies in the vice presidency. Having succeeded to the presidency
upon the assassination of President John Kennedy, Johnson could appreciate the necessity
of having a ready successor, should something happen to him while he held office.
Because there was no constitutional mechanism for replacing the vice president prior to
the ratification of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, Johnson served one year, one month, and
twenty-eight days without a vice president. Although Johnson was eventually elected to
his own term, and with his own vice president, Hubert Humphrey, the Twenty-fifth
Amendment was not ratified until 1967, two years after Humphrey took office.
Because the vice presidency is inexorably linked to the presidency, then it makes
sense the mechanics for electing the president are germane to the vice president. For that
reason, the original method of selection for the president and the vice president is fixed in
the Constitution in the following, straightforward manner:
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two
Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with
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themselves….The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the
President…In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the
greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President.26

The ramifications of the above passage on the vice presidency were significant.
To start, by constitutional directive, the president and the vice president were expected to
hail from different regions of the United States. Having presidential and vice-presidential
candidates representative of alternate parts of the country would prove to be a balancing
variable that, first, political parties employed; and then later, when the presidential
nominees of the political parties began to select their running mates, has oftentimes been
a central factor in the nominee selection process.27
Furthermore, in directing presidential electors to cast one ballot for a candidate of
another state, electors from any single state were unable to monopolize what continue to
be the only two nationally elected offices in the American system. Besides, casting two
votes for president increased the likelihood, assuming there were more than two
candidates in the running, that at least one candidate an elector preferred, ended up either
president or vice president. To this point, Alexander Hamilton promoted the idea of
casting two votes for president; his argument was it would “establish him in the esteem
and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be
necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of the President
of the United States.”28
What is sometimes overlooked, however, is that by casting two votes for
president, there was a good chance the defeated candidate for president, and therefore
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winner of the vice presidency, was an individual with talents equal to the individual who
had bested them.29 Naturally, the downside to this rationale is that it is quite a stretch to
count on a field of presidential contenders to all be quality candidates, and possessing
great capabilities. Indeed, it is a challenge to even reach consensus on what might be
considered an appropriate means for gauging, let alone what constitutes, high caliber
individuals suited for the presidency.
The most significant outcome from casting two electoral votes for president was
the candidate who landed in the vice presidency was the certified loser of the presidential
contest. Although it might seem an innocuous outcome, it was an outcome that would
inform perceptions of the vice presidency, and of those who held the office, for years to
come. It does not matter that just three individuals landed in the vice presidency as a
result of this electoral method, before it was reformed; nor did it make a difference in the
long term if the three--John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Aaron Burr--were each
remarkable in their own way. Quite simply, coming in second place in the presidential
election may have given the vice presidency an occupant, but it also undeniably marked
the institution as the lesser of the two nationally elected executive offices; and likewise
indicated the holder of the second office in the land was inferior to the winner of the first
office.
Attaching the Vice President to the United States Senate
As noted previously: the shadow of what became the vice presidency was first
apparent when delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 were deciding on how to
choose the nation‟s chief executive. Yet it was not enough to create a post in the
government devoid of functions; to stand merely as a consolation prize for the second
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place finisher in the presidential contest. From the labors of the Federal Convention, in
particular the deliberations on competing proposals for the form the new government
would assume, the position of vice president was established in Article I of the
Constitution, transparently attached to the legislative branch.
Reviewing what debate there was on adding the vice president to the Constitution,
inside as well as outside of the Federal Convention, reveals indifference, as well as
opposition toward such an officer. There was, however, one particularly persuasive
advocate for including the position of vice president in the constitutional arrangement:
Alexander Hamilton. From the outset, it was Hamilton who advanced the notion that
there should be an office resembling what became the vice presidency.
On June 18, 1787, Hamilton published his preferred scheme for the impending,
revised American government in a document he titled plainly: “Plan of Government.” 30
According to Hamilton, “Supreme Executive authority of the United States [was] to be
vested in a governor to be elected to serve during good behaviour.”31 “Governor” was the
title Hamilton applied to the head of the executive branch, presumably in
acknowledgement of the chief executives of the state governments operating at that time.
Clearly Hamilton was an advocate for the addition of an executive to the national
government, but he was also obviously aware of the need to prepare for any
contingencies that might threaten the viability and continuity of the national executive.
For example, Hamilton was prepared for the vagaries of electoral politics when he
recommended the election of the executive “be made by Electors chosen by electors
chosen by the people in the election districts aforesaid or by electors chosen for that
purpose by the respective legislatures--provided that if an election be not made within a
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limited time the President of the Senate shall be the Governor.”32 What is noteworthy
about the preceding lines from Hamilton‟s “Plan of Government” is that in providing a
solution for filling the executive in the event of a delayed or possibly disrupted election,
he was covertly making the case for a secondary, or backup, executive officer to be
available, if the need for one should arise.
Hamilton took the idea of providing for a standby executive even further when he
interjected, though not in these exact words, the notion of having a ready successor to the
chief executive. Although presidential succession is specifically addressed later, it merits
a brief mention at this point that some have argued the vice presidency was not instituted
to “solve the problem of succession.”33 While there is certainly validity in such a claim,
preparing for probable succession scenarios was categorically on Hamilton‟s mind when
he proposed: “On the death resignation or removal of the Governor his authorities [are] to
be exercised by the President of the Senate.”34
In sketching an office of the government that was eventually realized in the form
of the vice presidency, Alexander Hamilton was not merely acting on some epiphany he
had experienced. What Hamilton was doing was taking a state level position--the
lieutenant governor--and integrating that officer into the plan for the national
government. At that time, ten of the states included the position of lieutenant governor in
their system of government, with one state, Pennsylvania, actually giving the lieutenant
governor the title of “Vice-President.”35
If Hamilton initially failed to designate a proposed national lieutenant governor as
the vice president, in every use of that officer advanced in his “Plan of Government,” he
was explicit on the appropriateness of the president of the Senate taking on those
20

functions and responsibilities; and it did not take long before establishing a vicepresidential officer was one of Hamilton‟s primary objectives, as he strove to assure
passage of the Constitution, and thus enhance the presence of the executive in the
document. From Hamilton‟s perspective, the proposed vice president was a suitable
officer of the government, analogous to “a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at
large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in
casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the
authorities and discharge the duties of the President.”36
It was in The Federalist papers, specifically essay No. 68, that Hamilton outlined
the need to include a vice president in the Constitution; it would be the only formal
advocacy for, and defense of, the institution to emerge. To those who argued against
instituting the vice presidency, Hamilton responded in this way:
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been objected
to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have been
preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer
answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the
convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a
definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only
a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to
place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to
the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other
consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute
for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which
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recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not
with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. 37

When Hamilton suggested in The Federalist the necessity of having “the VicePresident…occasionally become a substitute for the President,” he was, just as he had in
his “Plan of Government,” pushing for the vice president, if need be, to take on the duties
and responsibilities of the president. Hamilton‟s proposed use of the vice president in this
capcity matched his consistent view to the president of the Senate being the preferred
substitute for the president.
By the time The Federalist (No. 68) was published, the Federal Convention had
already concluded, and the Constitution was being ratified state-by-state. But making the
vice president the successor to the president, whether it be a temporary or permanent
substitution, had not gone without objection at the Convention. In building the case for
simply using the president of the Senate--a position many of the delegates assumed
would come from among the sitting members of the chamber--for an occasional
substitute for the president, Gouverneur Morris appeared to mock the idea of a distinct
position being created for succession, claiming “the vice president then will be the first
heir apparent that ever loved his father. If there should be no vice president, the President
of the Senate would be temporary successor, which would amount to the same thing.” 38
Although there is no record of why the route Morris suggested failed to carry the
day, there is a plausible explanation for why it is better that it did not. When it came to
succession, be it temporary or permanent, there was a distinct advantage in preserving
continuity in governance. Of course, ensuring continuity in the executive government
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also rested on the assumption the president and vice president were of the same political
persuasion. When, in 1796, John Adams defeated Thomas Jefferson for the presidency,
and Jefferson wound up vice president to Adams, their partisan differences undermined
any notion of a unified executive government. Even though succession prompted by
circumstances other than the 1800 presidential election never came to pass when Adams
and Jefferson served together, if it had, then control of the executive government would
have shifted between opposition political parties.
It would seem, despite the lack of enthusiasm for having a vice president included
in the Constitution, and with no readily apparent use for the officer but as a stand-in for
the president, the vice president was given the added title of president of the Senate;
authorized to preside over the upper chamber of Congress; and given a vote if a tie
amongst the members should occur. Yet, in giving the vice president even a limited role
in the legislative branch, the dichotomous character of the institution was cast.
By virtue of the vice president being elected at the same time and in the same
manner as the president, then presumably the vice president could be counted as part of
the executive branch. Likewise, the expectation for the vice president to, on occasion,
assume the responsibilities of the president, furthered the idea of the vice president as one
of two national executives. And yet, nowhere in the Constitution was a single executive
duty or function delegated to the vice president. Even the implementation of succession
may not be construed as the vice president acting as an executive, since the instant any
vice president succeeds to the presidency, their vice presidency is over and they have
become the chief executive.
Trying to determine exactly which branch of the government the vice president
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genuinely belonged with was problematic. Even Woodrow Wilson, who devoted a fair
share of his academic career to the deconstruction of constitutions and systems of
government, was perplexed by the vice presidency. Wilson depicted the institution and
the ambiguity surrounding it in this way:
It would, doubtless, be considered quite improper to omit from an essay on
the Senate, all mention of the Senate‟s president; and yet there is very little to be
said about the Vice-President of the United States…Apparently he is not, strictly
speaking, a part of the legislature,--he is clearly not a member,--yet neither is he
an officer of the executive. It is one of the remarkable things about him, that it is
hard to find in sketching the government any proper place to discuss him. He
comes in most naturally along with the Senate to which he is tacked; but he…is
simply a judicial officer set to moderate the proceedings of an assembly whose
rules he has had no voice in framing and can have no voice in changing. His
official stature is not to be compared with that of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. So long as he is Vice-President, he is inseparable officially from
the Senate; his importance consists in the fact that he may cease to be VicePresident. His chief dignity, next to presiding over the Senate, lies in the
circumstance that he is awaiting the death or disability of the President. 39

Wilson‟s uncertainty about the status of the vice president was well-founded.
Even though the office was firmly established in the Constitution, it seemed to be an
institution barely anchored to the government. As it is, Wilson‟s brief consideration of
the office of vice president failed to settle any of the questions it raised. So why, when
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the position of vice president was instituted, was the office attached to the Senate? To
start, by pulling from outside the Senate membership for a presiding officer, no state was
expected to give up one of its senators to preside, and therefore lose one of its two votes
in the chamber; it was this deference to the states for which Alexander Hamilton was
arguing in the earlier selection from The Federalist.
If preserving the right of every state to have two consistent votes in the Senate
was the objective of making the vice president the presiding officer, then there was an
unfortunate auxiliary outcome, as well. Again, as was the case for much of the story of
the vice presidency, perceptions about the institution, and whomever held the office,
colored the standing of the vice president within the government. By placing the vice
president in the presiding officer‟s chair, but deprived of a role in the deliberations of the
Senate and with only a limited vote; and in turn, not establishing any tasks for the vice
president in the executive branch, the idea quickly took hold of an officer of the
government who served without power, and with minimal functions. One delegate to the
Federal Convention, Roger Sherman, captured the seeming futility of the vicepresidential institution best when he remarked, “if the vice-President were not to be
President of the Senate, he would be without employment.” 40
Among others, Elbridge Gerry, Govurneur Morris, Edmund Randolph, Hugh
Williamson, and George Mason were opposed to the vice president‟s posting as the
presiding officer of the Senate.41 Their sentiments were in large part influenced by the
matchless character of the institution; for it was, if powerless, the only institution of the
impending new government apparently belonging to two of the three branches being
proposed.
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So if the vice president was attached to the Senate via the role of presiding officer,
in what ways, specifically, was the vice president a part of the executive branch? The
design of the Constitution linked the vice president to the executive branch in four
distinct ways: first, in order to be eligible for the vice presidency, the potential candidate
was expected to match the birth, age, and residency requirements set for those seeking the
presidency. Second, the vice president would be chosen at the same time and in the same
manner as the president. Third, though the language of the Constitution was far from
explicit on this account, the vice president was the designated substitute for the president,
when necessary. And finally, the vice president was included, in Article II of the
Constitution--literally in the company of the nation‟s chief executive. Because of the
preceding four points, it was a fair assumption the vice president should be included in
the executive branch.
Because Article II of the Constitution transparently integrated the vice president
into the executive, while Article I placed the vice president in the Senate, there were
some who interpreted this as an unwelcome intrusion of the executive into the legislative
sphere. For example, George Mason, “thought the office of vice-President an
encroachment on the rights of the Senate; and that it mixed too much the Legislative &
Executive, which as well as the Judiciary departments, ought to be kept as separate as
possible.”42 Similarly, an indignant Elbridge Gerry, who was unequivocally opposed to
the addition of the vice president to the new government, argued if the vice president was
to oversee the proceedings of the Senate, then the delegates “might as well put the
President himself at head of the Legislature. The close intimacy that must subsist between
the President & vice-president makes it absolutely improper.”43
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As it was, Gerry and Mason, along with Edmund Randolph, were the only three
participants at the Convention to refuse to sign the finished document. In an ironic twist,
Gerry later became the nation‟s fifth vice president. And though he was never close to the
president he served, Gerry‟s worries about the vice president‟s presence in the Senate,
tied with his claims of the “close intimacy” that surely must prevail in the president-tovice president arrangement, would prove prophetic. Unknowingly, Gerry had described
what would become the nature of relations between modern presidents and their seconds.
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3 Institutional Development by Constitutional Directive: The Twelfth Amendment
“The amendment will make the Constitution worse than it now is, believing as I do that it
may bring a man into the Presidency, not contemplated by the people for that office.” 44
(Representative James Elliot)
The American vice presidency came to be by way of its inclusion in the
Constitution of the United States. Still, apart from its inception, the vice presidency has
been directly affected by constitutional amendment in just two instances: first, in 1804,
with the addition of the Twelfth Amendment; and then, 163 years later, when the
Twenty-fifth Amendment was ratified in 1967. Each of the preceding amendments
modified the vice-presidential institution with respect to the selection of the vice
president; and both amendments preserved the constitutional arrangement whereby the
president and the vice president are irrefutably linked. In the process, the ratification of
the Twelfth and Twenty-fifth Amendments, though in decidedly different ways, helped to
reform, as well as to reinforce, attitudes about the vice presidency and vice presidents.
Impetus for Altering the Way the President and Vice President Were Elected
The process put in place at the Federal Convention of 1787 for electing the
president and vice president worked perfectly for the first two presidential elections. By
the third presidential election--held in 1796--the way the president and vice president
were chosen revealed a flawed system. And by March of 1801, when the presidential
election of 1800 was finally decided, the process for choosing the president and vice
president had unraveled, and the impetus for change had arrived.
Compelling the need for change in the way in which the president and vice
president were elected was the emergence of political parties. More importantly, the
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intrigues of specific political leaders, acting on behalf of their party‟s interests, would
mark the beginning of candidates ostensibly running for vice president. But political
parties as they exist today were not to be found at the time the vice presidency was
instituted; nor did they overtly influence the first two presidential contests. However,
after John Adams had served for eight years as the nation‟s first vice president; and then
when he became the first of many vice presidents to try to move from the vice presidency
to the presidency, organized political parties were swiftly becoming fixtures on the
burgeoning American political scene.
Although political parties, per se, are not the topic of this project, the importance
of political parties to the vice presidency should not be overlooked and warrant inclusion
in any consideration of the development of the vice-presidential institution. For that
matter, political party elites, and then later the presidential nominees of the two major
political parties in the United States, have been responsible for selecting and nominating
vice-presidential candidates. Moreover, because vice-presidential candidates are not
voted for apart from the presidential candidates, it is reasonable to suggest political
parties and modern presidential nominees have been the arbiters of who ultimately will
be the vice president--and therefore possibly president. For these reasons, political parties
and presidential nominees have been critical to the development of the vice presidency
throughout the history of the institution and, in the case of modern presidential nominees,
continue to determine the occupant of the office.
The political parties of the late eighteenth century were a far cry from what they
soon became, but the idea of associations of the politically active was far from novel.
James Madison, for one, had advised delegates to the Federal Convention to be wary of
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the mischief of factions; describing a faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” 45 Madison, irrespective of the
ominous opinion he held for factions, and despite the havoc he prophesized factions
might incite within the broader political process, had apparently accepted “that the causes
of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of
controlling its effects.”46
Similarly, George Washington apparently felt the need to warn members of
Congress about the machinations of political parties. Offered as a parting shot upon his
retirement, Washington claimed that those “of a party…may now and then answer
popular ends, [but] they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent
engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert
the Power of the People, and to usurp for themselves the reins of Government; destroying
afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.” 47
It was the election of 1796 that set the stage for the first transparent manifestation
of political parties, and the ensuing gamesmanship that has since colored presidential
politics. As continues to be the case in the United States today, two distinct political
associations dominated politics in 1796: one group, commonly denoted as the Federalists;
the other, alternately designated as the Democratic-Republicans or Jeffersonian
Republicans. 48 Initially the Federalists had emerged as a loosely connected group
advocating for the adoption of the Constitution; yet by 1796, the incumbent vice
president, John Adams, was the acknowledged head of a more formal, recognizable party
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of Federalists. Although Adams was the accepted leader of the Federalists, it should be
noted that his domination of the group was not complete, as Alexander Hamilton was
certainly recognized as a rival leader within the party. As it turned out, the Federalists
were not long on the political scene, with their perceptible demise starting with the
election of 1800 and almost complete at the finish of the election of 1804.
As the Federalists weakened and then, in a sense, disbanded, a number of other
minor political factions appeared and disappeared; however, all of these groups failed to
coalesce into permanent associations. Though the Whigs--a conglomeration of opponents
of the policies of President Andrew Jackson--did succeed in intermittently electing
presidents and vice presidents; specifically, the teams of William Henry Harrison and
John Tyler, and Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore. Curiously, both elected Whig vice
presidents succeeded to the presidency upon the death of the elected Whig presidents,
thus making four Whig presidents in all. It would seem that the deaths of Harrison and
Taylor presaged what became of an organized Whig element in American politics.
Conversely, the Democratic-Republicans arose from a fellowship of politicos who
adhered primarily to the words and deeds of Thomas Jefferson; it was an association that,
after 1796, achieved greater success than the Federalists. Eventually most DemocraticRepublicans drifted toward Andrew Jackson as their leader; condensed their name to
simply the Democratic Party; and effectively dominated the national government for all
but eight of the next thirty-two years.
In effect, Jackson‟s Democrats were only occasionally challenged for control of
the national government, and not seriously until the election of 1860. In that year, the
victors came in the form of the Republican Party--a coalition of party regulars, most of
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who had identified with the National Republican Whig Party, just four years prior. By
1860, many of the same National Republican Whigs were instead known as Republicans,
and from their nominating convention they delivered Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal
Hamlin to run for president and vice president, respectively. Lincoln, in 1856, had briefly
been considered for the vice-presidential nomination on the first Republican ticket, but
was, perhaps fortuitously, passed over by the new party.
But in 1796, there were not yet nominating conventions; instead, the political
parties chose their candidates for president, for the first time, by means of the
congressional caucus. 49 In that year, the two party caucuses were merely perfunctory
exercises, for there was no doubt the Democratic-Republicans would nominate President
Washington‟s former secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson, for president; and the
Federalists were sure to nominate Vice President Adams to oppose Jefferson. 50 Both
parties also indicated a preference for vice president--at that time, the runner-up in the
presidential contest--with Aaron Burr the accepted second to Jefferson; and Thomas
Pinckney, to stand with Adams.
Of the four principal candidates, Aaron Burr would prove most like a vicepresidential candidate in a modern presidential campaign. Burr‟s behavior was suggestive
of future vice-presidential candidates, in that he campaigned vigorously for the
Democratic-Republican team for several weeks. 51 Burr‟s activism was in stark contrast to
the behavior of the other three principal candidates, as Jefferson, Adams, and Pinckney
largely avoided overt campaigning. 52 Burr‟s atypical campaigning did not escape notice
and caused unease within his own party, leading many to think his real objective was
winning the presidency, not the vice presidency; it was an accusation against Burr that
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was repeated even more forcefully during the campaign for the presidential election of
1800.53
In addition to the behavior of the Democratic-Republican candidate intended for
the vice presidency, on several counts the election of 1796 may be seen as the precursor
to future political party campaign activities. 54 In no way is this meant to suggest such
tactics parallel entirely those of modern campaigns; however, much of what is now
commonplace in campaigns and elections was apparent in 1796. Some of the tactics
employed were entirely new to the political landscape; some were familiar, but vastly
extended by Aaron Burr in the campaign; and all swiftly became staples of American
political campaigns from that time forward. Ultimately, Democratic-Republican activists
were the more prescient of the two competing groups, as they deliberately cultivated
support for their candidates from the people, apparently recognizing the future of
presidential elections was perhaps outside of the domain of traditional political elites. 55
In 1796 sixteen states sent electors to the Electoral College. Of those sixteen
states: six chose their electors by popular vote; and the remaining ten states formed their
slate of electors by way of their state legislature. As such, in those states choosing
electors via the legislature, the political party that dominated the legislature plainly had
the edge in elector selection. Adding to the potential for political intrigue was, and still is,
this quirk in the design of the Electoral College: electors are in no way required to vote
for specific candidates. And it was this procedural loophole that President Washington‟s
secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton, hoped to exploit to his own political
satisfaction.
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At some point in 1796, Alexander Hamilton decided to try and propel the
accepted Federalist candidate for vice president, Thomas Pinckney, into the presidency. 56
It apparently did not matter to Hamilton that John Adams was his party‟s presidential
candidate, as Hamilton, a long-time adherent of George Washington, could never entirely
accept Adams as the heir apparent to the first president; preferring instead to begrudge
Adams, and his place in the Federalist hierarchy. Furthermore, Hamilton‟s closeness with
President Washington had kept him conveniently near the apex of power and influence
for many years, making Adams more of an irritant than a threat. But with Washington
approaching the threshold of retirement, John Adams seemed a most unlikely conduit to
power for Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton understood that his best chance to maintain
influence in the capital lay in depriving Vice President Adams of ever becoming
President Adams. 57
Setting what was to become the foundation for practically every future vicepresidential selection, Aaron Burr and Thomas Pinckney were chosen for the electoral
advantage each presumably brought to their respective political parties. The attachment
of Burr was expected to make the difference for Jefferson in winning New York‟s highly
coveted electors; and in Pinckney, the Federalists hoped to gain the requisite electors
from the South.58 However, Alexander Hamilton was focused, unlike his Federalist
brethren or the opposition Democratic-Republicans, on a less transparent aim than
regional ticket-balancing. For Hamilton intended to use the Federalist vice-presidential
hopeful in a manner that would be, in the long term, of considerable value to him. Put
simply, Hamilton‟s objective was to divert just enough Federalist electors away from
Adams to elevate the proposed Federalist vice-presidential candidate to the presidency. 59
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When Hamilton‟s plotting was uncovered, concerned members of his own party made
sure it did not come to fruition, leaving Hamilton‟s ambitions unfulfilled, and Pinckney
no closer to the presidency, nor, as it would turn out, any closer to the vice presidency. 60
In the end, John Adams prevailed in the Electoral College by earning seventy-one
votes to Thomas Jefferson‟s sixty-eight votes; next was Thomas Pinckney with fifty-nine
votes; followed by Aaron Burr‟s thirty votes, with the remainder of electoral votes
scattered among nine other individuals. In the short term, Adams‟s victory afforded the
vice presidency greater cachet, for it set an expectation of the sitting vice president being
the logical successor to the president.
The election of Thomas Jefferson to the vice presidency had a further, discernable
effect on both the institution, and on the American political psyche. First, Jefferson‟s
ascension to the second highest office in the land, and even his acceptance of the job,
added further prestige to a position that Adams initially made credible. And second,
Jefferson‟s success as the leader and candidate of the Democratic-Republicans signaled
the transparent arrival of a new and competitive political party; a party poised to contest
the Federalist‟s control of an adolescent American government.
Although the election of 1796 marked the most tangible manifestation of political
parties up to that stage in American history, it likewise served as the starting point for
deliberately indicating a preference for vice-presidential candidates. But apart from the
preceding watershed events, the campaign and election of 1796 was significant for the
ensuing additional reasons: it was one in which a candidate meant for the vice presidency
campaigned in lieu of the active participation of the presidential candidate; specific
individuals were chosen as vice-presidential candidates because of an anticipated
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electoral advantage that might come to the political party from making that choice; and
lastly, in 1796 the assumed vice-presidential candidates were the object of considerable
interest, and even intrigue, but when the votes were tallied, it was the presidency that
mattered most.
The Presidential Election of 1800
Midway through the presidential election year of 1800, America‟s first two
genuine political parties utilized a caucus of their congressional members as the means
for nominating candidates for the national executive. Even if the political parties were
different in form than they are today, the rudimentary outline of political party machinery
was existent in nearly every state, beginning with the election of 1796, and confirmed
during the electoral season of 1800. The vice president, Thomas Jefferson, was the
preferred presidential nominee of Democratic-Republican partisans; and the president,
John Adams, was the choice of most Federalists. It was a contest that pitted, again, two of
the foremost political figures of the era against one another. Moreover, it was a clash
informed by ideological differences that separated the principals; differences underscored
by fundamental disparities on how the practices of the government, the presidency, and
the vice presidency should transpire. From a historical vantage, the real significance of
the election of 1800 lies in its anomalous nature; for never since has the incumbent
president run for reelection against the incumbent vice president, as they did that year.
Not surprisingly, a lesser match-up colored the vice-presidential contest. Aaron
Burr was once more the acknowledged Democratic-Republican choice for vice president;
and this time John Adams would have Thomas Pinckney‟s brother, the Federalist
enthusiast Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, as his intended vice president. Although the
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party nominations were not formalized until after several preliminary state contests, all
four men had been the probable contenders for some time; still, there were certain
obstacles to overcome before the Democratic-Republican caucus settled on Burr.61 And
yet, of more significance than any of the nominees to emerge were the compacts the
parties made within their respective caucuses. While the compacts were rudimentary--a
pledge to cast both electoral votes exclusively for the two, respective nominees of their
party--the minimalism of this strategy belied the decided impact it was to have on the
outcome of the election.62
The election of 1800 brought Aaron Burr to the vice presidency. To better
understand the circumstances by which Burr arrived there, it is necessary to briefly revisit
the political world of New York at the onset of the nineteenth century. At that time,
leadership of New York Democratic-Republicans was under three spheres of influence:
future vice president George Clinton and his family; the close-knit Livingston clan; and
Aaron Burr and his numerous steadfast followers. 63 Of the three groups just cited, just
one vigorously entered into the fray. Hence, in the prelude to New York‟s selection of its
twelve electors to the Electoral College, the Clinton and the Livingston families
acquiesced to Aaron Burr‟s domination of the process. 64 The decision by the two clans to
restrain themselves in the conduct of the campaign and election had consequences none
of them could ever have anticipated.
Burr‟s efforts began with the construction of a slate of capable and attractive
Democratic-Republican candidates for the state legislature. Success in this effort was
crucial, as New York‟s legislature was responsible for selecting the state‟s twelve
presidential electors. As a consequence, the legislature had the power to deliver or to
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deny the partisan composition of electors who then contributed New York‟s vote to the
Electoral College‟s tally for president and vice president.65
More than one biographer has chronicled Burr‟s innovative tactics in 1800;
wherein he organized the drive in New York much like a modern political campaign,
exceeding what he had done for the 1796 election. 66 For example, on top of targeting
specific supporters for financial contributions and setting up ward-level committees, Burr
compiled an inclusive list of New York City‟s eligible voters; delineating such details as
“the voter‟s political preferences, the degree of his zeal in their pursuit, his temperament,
his willingness to serve the cause as a volunteer, his financial standing, etc.” 67 Burr‟s
labors at the local level proved vital to the outcome of a national election.
Of course none of the preceding is meant to imply that Aaron Burr had New York
to himself, as Alexander Hamilton, one of the leading Federalists of that state, functioned
as Burr‟s natural counterpart. To be sure, Hamilton was proactive for the Federalist
cause; piecing together the legislative slate for his party, and coordinating the electoral
ground game in New York City.68 Regardless, when all the campaigning was over and
the votes were tallied, for Hamilton it had all been for naught. As a tactician, Hamilton
proved no match for Burr; he had not sufficiently organized for, nor had he delivered in,
New York‟s preliminary election competition. Therefore, and as a result of Burr‟s
cunning and strategic prowess, Hamilton was prevented from retaining sufficient
Federalist control of the state legislature.
In the main, three of the four major candidates in 1800--John Adams, Thomas
Jefferson, and Charles C. Pinckney--avoided much in the way of overtly campaigning for
the national executive positions. For Adams and Jefferson this meant maintaining
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dignified and, to some extent, removed presidential candidacies. Yet, neither Adams nor
Jefferson was entirely idle in the lead-up to the election. In Adams case this meant
arranging some well-timed travel, no doubt effectively arousing broader awareness of his
candidacy in the upcoming election.69 And for Jefferson, a restrained candidacy was
defined by profusely writing letters brimming with politics, as well as actively overseeing
the written work of others--all of which unmistakably indicated Jefferson was in the race
for the presidency. 70 As to Aaron Burr: in stark contrast with his presumed rival for the
vice presidency, Pinckney, Burr kept a comparatively high profile throughout the year,
focusing on different regions and states when they came into play. 71 Unknowingly, Burr
was creating an activist role in the campaign that would serve as a prototype for future
vice-presidential candidates.
One of the more effective efforts made towards influencing the outcome of the
1800 election came, not from the words or deeds of any of the candidates that year, but
instead from the pen of Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton had chosen to write and publish a
vicious attack on John Adams that cast a dark pall on his character; it no doubt
undermined the Federalist cause broadly, all the while contributing to a further decline in
support for Adams, specifically. 72 As in 1796, Hamilton knew well that his influence in
the next administration was sure to be stymied if Adams or Jefferson won the presidency,
but the ascension of either Pinckney brother might have given him the access to power he
craved. 73
When the outline of the electoral vote was pieced together, state-by-state, it
appeared the incumbent vice president would likely defeat the incumbent president. The
real question then was this: who was to be vice president for the next four years? And
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when, in late December, the Electoral College tally was at last complete, every
Democratic-Republican elector had kept their caucus pledge, casting both electoral votes
exclusively for their party ticket; whereas, Federalist electors fell short in fully honoring
their own comparable vow. As a consequence, the Electoral College voting went as
follows: Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr each received seventy-three votes for
president; John Adams received sixty-five votes; Charles C. Pinckney sixty-four; and
John Jay gained one electoral vote--a single vote from the state of Rhode Island that, had
it been cast for Jefferson or Burr, could have averted what came next. 74
Resolving the Election for President and Vice President in 1800
The tie between Jefferson and Burr presented an extraordinary opportunity to
settle a presidential election, for the first time, in Congress. To begin with, the
Constitution is explicit on the method for resolving those instances when the Electoral
College balloting for president results in a tie: members of the House of Representatives
are left to decide the outcome with each state delegation having a single vote to cast.
Under most circumstances the mechanics for settling the election would proceed in a
fairly seamless manner; however, in place to decide the outcome of the election was a
House membership composed of a polarized, but decidedly Federalist majority.
Clearly then, the tie vote for president was owned entirely by the opposition
political party; hence, the defeated party was poised to select the victors for the offices of
president and vice president, from among the opposition candidates. As it stood, the vote
of the House of Representatives would determine the winner of the presidency, with the
second-place finisher left with the vice presidency. This constitutional edict was
complicated even further when the top two contenders for president were members of the
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same political party, but had run for office, presumably, as a team. What is more, the tie
between Jefferson and Burr meant that the vice-presidential nominee was unexpectedly a
contender for the presidency, thus flipping the intended hierarchy of the ticket.
When the House of Representatives met in early 1801 to decide the fate of the
presidency and vice presidency, sixteen state delegations participated. A modest majority
of nine states was necessary to win; and yet, there was nothing simple about this
particular election, and so the intrigue, accusations, and political maneuvers grew with
each vote taken by the House. What ensued were deadlocks, reports of assassination
plots, and threats of secession.75 In six days, the House voted for president thirty-five
times; each time Thomas Jefferson won eight states, Aaron Burr six, with two
abstentions.
At some point in the process of choosing the next president, Federalist James
Bayard of Delaware, among others, began to seek a compromise for ending the stalemate.
But, unlike his Federalist brethren, Bayard had an unusual advantage in the proceedings:
being the only House member from Delaware, he was in control of a delegation of one. 76
Bayard knew, as did every other Federalist in Congress, that a president had to be chosen,
sooner or later, and the two alternatives for president were members of the opposition
party. What made Bayard finally decide to abstain, which along with other shifts in the
voting gave the election to Jefferson, is unclear. But what is certain is the anxiety most
Federalist members of Congress maintained about a Jefferson presidency was, in the end,
assuaged with the deliverance of Aaron Burr to the vice presidency, instead.
There has long been speculation that Thomas Jefferson agreed to certain
Federalist demands, in an effort to obtain the necessary support in the House that would
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allow him to finally move from the vice presidency to the presidency. 77 It is possible that
Federalist members of Congress, when faced with a choice between Jefferson and Aaron
Burr, could not reconcile themselves to a president with as questionable a character as
Burr was alleged to possess. And perhaps Jefferson was willing to barter with his
Federalist foes, so long as he would not have to serve another term as vice president--this
time under Burr. Either way, it is quite likely that some covert dealings transpired to tip
the election.
To this end, one historian posited that if “Jefferson abandoned any of his original
plans, and in that sense bargained away any of his principles to win the office, [it] is
extremely unlikely; but when he entered the White House it was after satisfying the
Federalists that he and they had come to some kind of understanding.” 78 At any rate,
Thomas Jefferson‟s selection as president and Aaron Burr‟s as vice president was
eventually determined by the House of Representatives, and on the thirty-sixth ballot.
The final tally stood at ten states for Jefferson, four states for Burr, and two states opting
for abstention from the historic electoral contest.
Surely the presidential election of 1800 will be recalled for the anomalous tie
between Thomas Jefferson and his running mate Aaron Burr; yet, the election will be
remembered equally for the political intrigue that marked the entire contest. Much of the
scheming that year can be traced to disgruntled Federalists, particularly Alexander
Hamilton. And, as it turns out, it was the scheming of Hamilton and others which laid the
groundwork for the demise of the Federalists as an organized political party. Nonetheless,
political discord in the Federalist camp did not arise solely from within. When the
opportunity presented itself, Burr, for one, did what he could to stoke the internal quarrels
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of the Federalists.79 Early on, Burr discerned that if events fell into place he might
become the president, instead of the vice president, as was intended.
The complexities to arise in resolving the election of 1800--in stark contrast to the
three prior presidential elections--signaled that something was seriously amiss in the
method used to select the president and vice president of the United States. As Hamilton
presciently observed in 1789: “Every body is aware of that defect in the constitution
which renders it possible that the man intended for Vice President may in fact turn up
President.”80
The Twelfth Amendment
In the immediate aftermath of the election of 1800, Aaron Burr‟s willingness to
usurp Thomas Jefferson‟s claim on the presidency was the impetus for altering how the
president and vice president were selected. Being a leading political figure of the era,
Burr‟s complacency in tying the presidential nominee of his own party in the vote of the
Electoral College was troubling. The predicament the tie vote created, in tandem with
Burr‟s apparent satisfaction if the election went in his favor, heightened concerns about a
system ill equipped for the emergence of political parties. Moreover, that such an
unintended outcome might have occurred so early in the nation‟s history did not bode
well for future presidential elections.
With an individual of Aaron Burr‟s suspect character so dangerously close to
winning the presidency, coupled with the increasingly competitive and partisan nature of
American politics, Congress chose to act. The move Congress made was toward
constructing a new method for formally electing the president and vice president. In order
to affect such a change, however, the Constitution had to be amended. On this account,
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there are just two ways the document may be amended; although, as of this writing, only
one has ever been used. That method is as follows: the vote of two-thirds of both houses
of Congress is necessary to propose an amendment to the document; then, approval of
three-fourths of the state legislatures is required to ratify the amendment the Congress
originally agreed upon.81
Despite competing proposals and the occasional incidence of acrimonious debate,
the amendment to emerge from Congress was uncomplicated in purpose; the chief aim
being the separate election of the president and vice president by the vote of the electors
to the Electoral College. Henceforth, the electors were instructed to cast one of their two
electoral votes explicitly for president; and their second vote specifically for vice
president. After only four presidential elections, the vice presidency would no longer be a
consolation prize for losing presidential candidates; it was to be, at least within the
balloting of the Electoral College, finally a stand-alone elective office.
But reaching consensus on what became the Twelfth Amendment to the
Constitution was not easily achieved and the proposal met with great resistance. In large
part this may be explained by there never having been a great reserve of affection for the
vice presidency. As debate on the Twelfth Amendment progressed, the prime complaints
against the office, initially articulated sixteen years earlier at the Federal Convention,
were revisited. This included discomfort in even establishing the vice president as an
officer of the federal government.
Along these lines, a member of the House of Representatives from Connecticut,
Samuel Dana, reminded his listeners of the historical haphazardness with which the vice
presidency was instituted. Dana professed “that there is no necessity for this office…The
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idea of a Vice President did not suggest itself until the idea of a double ballot was
introduced…Unless some great good result from the office of Vice President, no
argument for its continuance can be deduced from the necessity of having an eventual
successor.”82
Like others in the Congress, Representative Dana did not approach the proposed
amendment to the Constitution solely as a means to improve the manner in which the
president and vice president were chosen. Instead, Dana was seizing on the amendment
as a convenient way to excise the vice presidency from the document and from the
government. As such, a large share of the debate within the Congress focused on the few
places where the vice president fit. From there the debate, based almost entirely on the
irrelevance of the institution, was a systematic argument for the abolishment of the
office.83
One tack taken by those attempting to purge the Constitution of the vice
presidency was to address the core principle of the proposed amendment--that being to
redirect the electors of the Electoral College to cast separate votes for president and vice
president--and then juxtapose that with the original intent of the Framers, which gave the
vice presidency to the second place finisher for president. To the original arrangement,
James Madison had proffered to the Federal Convention that the outcome of casting two
votes for president might very well be “the second best man in this case would probably
be the first, in fact.”84
Ultimately, altering the feature of presidential selection that filled the second spot
in government with individuals of, presumably, presidential caliber, could result in the
vice presidency having even less appeal than was already the case. For this reason, the
45

amendment put the presidency itself at stake. Since the electors to the Electoral College
would be casting separate votes for president and vice president, but the vice president
was still presumed to be the designated successor to the president, a candidate never
intended for the presidency might easily end up there.
It was a plausible outcome that caused concern for many in Congress, and led
one, Vermont‟s James Elliot, to assert that “the amendment will make the Constitution
worse than it now is, believing as I do that it may bring a man into the Presidency, not
contemplated by the people for that office.” 85 Then again, as one representative pointed
out, should “the office of Vice President…be abolished, every Elector will give one vote,
and that vote will be for President.”86
And what of the responsibilities that came with the vice president‟s other title:
president of the Senate? Roger Griswold, another member of Connecticut‟s House
delegation, posed and then answered the bluntest of questions, with respect to the
necessity of the vice president presiding in the Senate. Speaking of the vice president,
Griswold asked: “Will he be wanted to preside in the Senate? That will not be necessary,
for the Senate sit half their time without the Vice President, and I have not understood
that the business is not as well done without as with him.” 87
When it came to the president and the vice president, succession, and altering the
procedures of the Electoral College, Representative Griswold was no less forgiving.
Arguing against passage of the amendment, Griswold claimed the value of the vice
presidency, assuming there was some value there, would be diminished by casting ballots
specifically for president and vice president. Such a method, Griswold suggested, would
cultivate an arrangement whereby the “Vice President will be carried to market to
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purchase the votes of particular States…If it be your desire to consider the Vice President
as heir apparent to the Presidency, elect him not in this manner, for he must be the mere
child of corruption!”88
When the amendment was finally approved by both houses of the Congress, the
ratification process began, and the proposed Twelfth Amendment then went from state to
state. In New York, Alexander Hamilton was the chief advocate for the amendment and
the sole author of the “Proposal for the New York Legislature for Amending the
Constitution.”89 Hamilton argued ratification of the Twelfth Amendment was imperative
“as a necessary safeguard in the choice of a President and Vice President against
pernicious dissensions [and] as the most eligible mode of obtaining a full and fair
expression of the public will in such election.”90 For Hamilton, and others of his ilk, the
best way to steer clear of any disagreeable electoral incidents, akin to what transpired in
the 1800 election, was to ensure that “the persons voted for shall be particularly
designated by declaring which is voted for as President and which as Vice President.” 91
Less than a year after Congress initiated the ratification process, and after ample
deliberation on the merits of the amendment in the state legislatures, thirteen of the
seventeen states then in the Union had agreed to the changes delineated by Congress. In
part, the Twelfth Amendment reads:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President
and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same
State with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as
President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they
shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons
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voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the
United States, directed to the President of the Senate…The person having the
greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President…The person having
the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President.92

Apart from the antiquated language of the Twelfth Amendment, the mechanics of
the amendment were straightforward: instructing the electors of the Electoral College to
isolate their vote for president, and to then do the same with their vote for vice president.
Yet the simplicity of the revised mechanics for electing the president and vice president
did not portend the subsequent, long-term impact the amendment was to have on the vice
presidency.
To begin with, a major consequence of the Twelfth Amendment was that defeated
presidential candidates were unlikely to inhabitant the office of vice president; for having
lost a bid for the presidency, few would ever consent to run expressly for the vice
presidency in a future election. In addition, with the second place finisher for president no
longer relegated to the vice presidency, the initiation of the Twelfth Amendment
effectively tempered genuine interest in the vice presidency for many capable individuals
who might have considered it a stepping stone to the highest office in the land--as it had
been for John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. This then became a contradiction unique to
the Twelfth Amendment: while it provided for the transparent election of a specific
individual for vice president, it also dramatically reduced the pool of high quality
individuals willing to settle for the office.
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The Twelfth Amendment also cemented the pattern of political parties presenting
a team of candidates for the two highest offices; a practice that actually began with the
first contest between Adams and Jefferson. 93 As was already shown, the appearance of
political parties was to have a major impact on the system that had worked so well for the
first two presidential elections. In essence, the intent and integrity of the original system
had been corrupted by the machinations of political parties. And though the men
responsible for constructing the Constitution had prepared for many contingencies, the
document was lacking any reference to political parties. On this account, the Framers
were remiss in not better preparing for the appearance of political parties--or at least
something resembling such groups. Because, as one scholar has pointed out, by 1800 the
political parties had successfully “upset the applecart on the two-votes-for-President
system.”94 And it was reasonable to assume political parties would not stop there.
For a number of years then, the caliber of individuals to assume the vice
presidency fluctuated greatly. This is partly attributable to the absence of any genuinely
attractive powers and responsibilities ever having been affixed to the institution. Still, and
irrespective of the want in functions for the vice president, if many of the individuals to
land in the vice presidency were unremarkable, some of the earlier occupants--such as
Elbridge Gerry and John Calhoun--were gifted political leaders in their own right. While
acknowledging some of earliest vice presidents possessed commendable intellect and
political aptitude does further the narrative of the institution, there was another
unanticipated consequence from the implementation of the Twelfth Amendment that
deserves attention. For after the Twelfth Amendment, there was an undeniable and
striking change in the age of some of the individuals elected to the office. 95
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For instance, whereas Aaron Burr was inaugurated as Thomas Jefferson‟s first
vice president when he was just forty-five; Jefferson took George Clinton, at the age of
sixty-five, for his second vice president. Clinton went on to serve nearly all of a second
term in the vice presidency--in the service of President James Madison--though he
eventually died while in office when he was seventy-three. Similarly, Clinton‟s
immediate successor, Elbridge Gerry, was sworn in to office at the advanced age of sixtynine. Like Clinton, Gerry too died in office, less than two years into his term.
Even if electing elderly vice presidents failed to be a long-term trend, it was
indicative of the value placed at that time on those who were candidates for vice
president. Further contributing to the perception of a dispensable vice president was that,
up to April of 1841, no president had died while in office. It was not until the death of the
ninth president, William Henry Harrison, and the elevation of John Tyler from the vice
presidency to the presidency, that there was any concern for who served as vice
president--and even that concern almost immediately evaporated.
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4 The Vice President as Presidential Successor
“In upwards of half a century, this is the first instance of a Vice-President‟s being called
to act as President of the United States, and brings to the test that provision of the
Constitution which places in the Executive chair a man never thought of for it by
anybody. The day was in every sense gloomy--rain the whole day.”96
(Diary entry of John Quincy Adams, April 4, 1841)
Apart from the vice president‟s role presiding in the Senate, in every way the vice
presidency is attached to the presidency. This holds true when, under specific
circumstances dictated by the Constitution, it becomes necessary for the vice president to
replace the president, and exercise the duties of the higher office. What is remarkable,
however, is that it took over half a century, from the time of the inauguration of the first
president and vice president, before presidential succession was ever put to the test. But
when presidential succession was finally put in practice, being vice president took on an
entirely new meaning.
John Tyler will always be conspicuous among vice presidents. Not because he
was an unusually brilliant or talented vice president; and surely not because he achieved a
great deal when he held the office. For that matter, he barely had time to make a mark,
serving only one month under President William Henry Harrison. What makes Tyler
particularly noteworthy, however, is his place as the first vice president in American
history to succeed to the presidency. This honor landing on Tyler first was obviously a
fluke--at the time, some referred to the newly elevated president as “His Accidency”--but
Harrison‟s demise, and Tyler‟s subsequent rise to the presidency, proved significant in
establishing the vice president as the acknowledged successor to the president.97
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Having never before been confronted with the death of the president while in
office, there was no obvious precedent to follow. Thus, Tyler found himself in
unexplored territory that presented several challenges; paramount among these was
deciphering the intent of the Framers with respect to the Constitution, and to the
replacement of the president. But determining the plan for presidential succession was
not an easy task; nor was the constitutional ambiguity made any clearer by an
examination of the proceedings of the Federal Convention of 1787. As it was, the record
of the Convention on presidential succession plainly added to the uncertainty.
On the matter of succession, historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. observed that the
“Convention did not resort to the Vice Presidency in order to solve the problem of
succession,” and had recommended instead that the President of the Senate--presumably
whomever the Senate had selected for the position at that time--should assume the
powers and duties of the president, but only until the election of a new president. 98
Furthermore, the Convention delegates were inclined to have the legislature choose “what
officer of the U.S. shall act as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability of
the President and Vice-President; and such officer shall act accordingly until the time of
electing a President shall arrive.” 99 And yet, James Madison countered that the foregoing,
“as worded, would prevent a supply of the vacancy by an intermediate election of the
President,” and therefore he recommended modifying the language so as not to prevent
having the successor serve only until a new election for president might feasibly be
held. 100
Clearly there were alternate perspectives on how best to resolve the succession
question; and it is apparent the Framers anticipated that, sooner or later, the nation would
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find itself confronted with the circumstances of 1841. Undoubtedly it is why they
included the death of the president in the list of vacancy-inducing possibilities for the
office. Yet even if the death of the president is a contingency addressed in the
Constitution, how the transfer of power is meant to proceed is only marginally hinted at:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation,
or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall
devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer
shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected.101

This passage from the Constitution is clear as to the power of the Congress to
replace both the president and vice president--on those occasions when there is a double
vacancy--but it is less obvious what is to happen to the vice president, once the president
is no longer in office. In delineating that “the Same shall devolve on the Vice President,”
the Framers embraced nuanced language to convey their intent--whatever that might have
been. As a consequence, it was evident the powers and duties of the president were meant
to “devolve” onto the vice president. But were the devolved powers and duties
temporary, meant only to last until a new election? President Harrison‟s cabinet
apparently took this view, as they had decided in the immediate aftermath of Harrison‟s
death that John Tyler should be addressed as “Vice President, acting as President.”102
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But was President Harrison‟s cabinet misconstruing the plan of the Framers? If
the Framers intended the vice president to assume all of the powers and the duties of the
president, did they expect the arrangement to stand for the remainder of the president‟s
term? Tyler deemed the answer to be yes. His read of the Constitution was fairly simple:
the vice president was not meant to be a transitory replacement for the president. From
Tyler‟s point of view, the death of the president meant the vice president assumed the
presidency and everything that came with it--including the nearly four years remaining in
Harrison‟s term.
What made Tyler‟s approach to presidential succession so successful was the
alacrity with which he acted. Within hours of being notified of President Harrison‟s
death, Tyler made his way to the capital city; once there, he convened a meeting of
Harrison‟s cabinet--all of whom he decided to keep in his own administration--and then
he was sworn in to office, making him the tenth president of the United States. Being
sworn in as the new president was an additional precedent that Tyler reluctantly
established; it was his read of the Constitution that, with the death of the president, it was
preordained the vice president was the new president--sans a second oath.103 Put another
way, because Tyler had previously sworn to defend the Constitution when he took the
vice-presidential oath, he was certain reiterating that pledge was unnecessary. Either way,
Tyler repeated the presidential oath of office, in the words of one historian, “to remove
any doubt about his status.”104
There were two outcomes of John Tyler‟s assumption of the presidency that were
likely overlooked at the time. First, by swiftly taking the helm of the Harrison
administration, Tyler preserved the elected government of the people. This was a logical
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outcome; Tyler was, after all, the vice president and he had been elected with the
president. And second, in affecting a successful and peaceful transition of power, Tyler
helped validate the stability of the relatively young American political system. It is
precisely because of these dual outcomes that one scholar has argued the “existence of an
established institution of succession, is…, a most vital function. It is of the utmost
significance that provision has been made for succession to occur with the least possible
delay so that an hiatus in the functioning of government not occur.” 105
The choices John Tyler made incontrovertibly institutionalized the procedures
that would be followed when filling every subsequent vacancy in the presidency. Had
Tyler been less assertive, and simply acquiesced to being the “Vice President, acting as
President,” then the office of vice president would surely have been more repellant than it
already was. As it stood, with Tyler‟s move to the presidency ultimately going
uncontested, the development of the vice presidency advanced considerably.
The Succession Acts of 1792, 1886, and 1947
John Tyler‟s ascension from vice president to president did more than set the
precedent on presidential succession; it created the fourth vacancy in the history of the
vice presidency. Considering that Tyler was the tenth elected vice president meant,
statistically, that nearly 50 percent of vice presidents, up to that point in time, had either
died while holding office--George Clinton and Elbridge Gerry--resigned--John Calhoun-or succeeded to the presidency, as Tyler did. Notwithstanding, the frequency of vacancies
in the vice presidency, there was no concerted effort to rectify the situation.
Congress was not, however, entirely idle with respect to succession. The three
major congressional acts relating to presidential succession, each named for the year
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enacted, are included here primarily for what the three acts do not address. In no way did
the Succession Acts of 1792, 1886, or 1947 address the absence of any mechanism to
replace the vice president. The failure of Congress to create a means for filling the second
office in the land if the vice president succeeded to the presidency, resigned, was
impeached, or died while in office, indicated the indifference for the institution in the
succession equation. It also furthered the idea of the vice president being unessential to
the day-to-day operation of the national government.
The death of Vice President George Clinton no doubt brought grief to those who
knew him; but it also presented a quandary for which the Framers apparently never spent
a great deal of time preparing for. The quandary was this: who should succeed to the
presidency if both the president and the vice president resigned, were removed from
office, or died? Hence, with Clinton‟s death being the first for a vice president or
president, succession was naturally of concern. Yet in this regard, Clinton‟s
contemporaries were at a loss, for the Framers failed to indicate a preference for
succession, instead leaving these matters for Congress to decide in the future. Therefore,
the Constitution originally directed that “the Congress may by Law provide for the Case
of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”106
Congress did try to rectify the lack of direction on presidential succession-although not vice-presidential succession--crafting and eventually approving the
Presidential Succession Act of 1792. In the prelude to passage of the act, much of the
debate centered on whether the secretary of state should be next in line to the presidency;
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or if the president pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House should be the
designated successors. Aversion to making the secretary of state the successor to the
president came primarily from outside of the Congress, and in the form of Alexander
Hamilton. Hamilton was consumed by inflated fears that his long-time adversary,
Thomas Jefferson, then serving as the nation‟s first secretary of state, might stealthily
enter the presidency by way of succession. 107 And while some members of Congress
were understandably reluctant to designate one of their own for the presidency, since it
could disrupt the separation of powers built into the Constitution, it was not enough of a
concern to dissuade either house of Congress from passing the act.108 Then again,
preserving the separation of powers might not have been as strong an incentive for those
in Congress who wanted to protect their interests if their political party already held
control of the White House.
Congress waited a mere ninety-four years before it again crafted and passed
legislation to deal with presidential succession. In the interim, five vice presidents died
while in office, one resigned, and four had ascended to the presidency upon the death of
the president. But the move by Congress in 1885 to address presidential succession was
not founded on any disquietude with the inadequacies of the original succession provision
of the Constitution. It was driven instead by partisan politics and a perfectly reasonable
unease that control of the executive branch could shift to the opposition party, on those
occasions when the president and vice president were not of the majority political party in
Congress.
The solution Congress devised was straightforward and effective; moving the line
of succession away from itself, and over to the cabinet. Not only did this ensure that
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potential presidential successors were of the same political persuasion as the president; it
also retained the spirit of the Constitution in calling for an officer of the United States to
act as president. This principle had been violated with passage of the Presidential
Succession Act of 1792 and the introduction of members of Congress into the line of
succession. Subsequently, President Grover Cleveland signed the Presidential Succession
Act of 1886, making officers of the cabinet presidential successors upon the death,
resignation, or inability of both the elected president and vice president. 109
Unsurprisingly, the Succession Act of 1886 failed to even consider, let alone devise, a
method for filling vacancies in the vice presidency; it would take another eighty-one
years and a constitutional amendment before that deficiency in the Constitution was
rectified.
Congress next revisited presidential succession in 1945, following the death of
President Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt‟s death made his third vice president, Harry
Truman, president, less than three months from the day of their inauguration. Given that
Truman did not have a vice president for almost four years; it made sense when he called
for revisions to the law on presidential succession. 110 Truman‟s principal objection to the
Presidential Succession Act of 1886 was with the unelected status of cabinet members.
Because the cabinet was composed of individuals nominated by the president, and
approved by the Senate, Truman noted it was at his discretion to nominate a potential
successor; and this, he argued, was undemocratic.111
Ultimately, Truman‟s preferred line of succession prevailed and he signed the
Presidential Succession Act of 1947.112 The 1947 act established a line of succession that
began, after the vice president obviously, with the Speaker of the House; followed by the
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president pro tempore of the Senate; and finally the cabinet. The order of succession from
within the cabinet started with the secretary of state, followed by each cabinet secretary,
with their place determined by when the executive departments had been established.
There was poignancy to President Truman signing the Presidential Succession Act
of 1947. As a former vice president who had made it to the presidency upon the death of
the president, Truman intimately understood the significance of the succession provision
of the Constitution. Moreover, by 1947 Truman was serving his third year as president-the entire time without a vice president. But just as it was with each of the previous
attempts to organize presidential succession, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947
failed to address how vacancies in the vice presidency should be filled. Evidently the
president and the Congress did not consider the vice president as an indispensable officer
of the government.
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5 Precedent by Presidential Prerogative: The Cabinet
“My experience in the Cabinet was of supreme value to me when I became President.”113
(Former vice president Calvin Coolidge)
The influence of any president on the vice presidency should not be
underestimated. When evaluating the institutional development of the vice presidency the
president-to-vice president arrangement is without question the most salient indicator of
what form specific vice presidencies take on. And while this has been the case throughout
the historical arc of the vice presidency, even as the modern president-to-vice president
association has increasingly resembled a governing partnership, the vice-presidential
institution continues to rely on the incumbent president for its ongoing viability.
In a historical context, nowhere did a president have a greater impact on the vice
presidency than in 1921, with the inauguration of President Warren Harding. For that
matter, Harding articulated his view on the form the modern vice presidency might take
well before he and his running mate, then-Governor Calvin Coolidge, took office. For
that era, Harding professed singular notions of what the vice president could be in a
future Harding administration. During the 1920 campaign, Harding put it this way:
I think the Vice-President should be more than a mere substitute in waiting. In
reestablishing coordination between the Executive office and the Senate, the
Vice-President can and ought to play a big part, and I have been telling Governor
Coolidge how much I wish him to be not only a participant in the campaign, but
how much I wish him to be a helpful part of a Republican Administration. The
country needs the counsel and the becoming participation in government of such
men as Governor Coolidge. 114
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Harding‟s suggestion that a prospective vice president should offer counsel to the
president and participate in a future administration was an unusual utterance from a
presidential candidate, coming when it did in the early decades of the twentieth century.
In part, claiming the vice president was well suited for “coordination between” the
executive and legislative branches made sense. The vice presidency had always been a
hybrid institution: elected with the only other national executive; yet having
constitutionally sanctioned responsibilities in the legislative branch, though only in one of
the two chambers of Congress.
Because there was an expectation for the vice president to preside, at least some
of the time, in the Senate, then the utility in having the vice president facilitate relations
between that body and the executive was apparent. But Harding‟s plan for the vice
president in the Senate was not nearly as significant a contribution to the institutional vice
presidency, as was his effort to draw the vice president into the executive. This came
about when Harding--initially before the 1920 election, and then again after winning the
presidency--proposed that Calvin Coolidge, as vice president, be present for meetings of
the executive cabinet.115
But President Harding does not get credit for being the first president to suggest
the vice president attend cabinet meetings. That idea originated with George Washington,
who thought it appropriate for the nation‟s first vice president, John Adams, to attend
cabinet meetings under specific circumstances. The caveat was Washington wanted
Adams to be present at the meetings, and even to preside, but only when he was away. 116
As for Adams: he seemed to view the office of the vice president as belonging strictly to
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the legislative branch; and on those occasions when he accepted Washington‟s offer, he
felt unwelcome at meetings of the heads of the executive departments.117
Naturally, when Adams moved up to the presidency, he never suggested the
incumbent vice president, Thomas Jefferson, should come near a meeting of the cabinet;
though Adams‟s attitude on the matter was surely based more on his vice president being
the head of the opposition political party, than with any concern over the legislativeexecutive divide of the vice presidency. Similarly, when Woodrow Wilson was president,
he too offered a place at the cabinet table to the sitting vice president, Thomas Marshall.
But, like President Washington had before him, Wilson‟s offer was contingent on his
own absence from the meetings, and that Marshall should be present merely to manage
the proceedings.
Woodrow Wilson‟s aversion towards making use of his vice president is not
surprising. Twenty-eight years prior to Wilson‟s move to the White House, the future
president devoted a single paragraph in a comprehensive treatise on the three branches of
the United States government, to a scathing critique of the American vice presidency. 118
In Wilson‟s words, the vice presidency was a position “of anomalous insignificance and
curious uncertainty,” and when all was said and done, “the chief embarrassment in
discussing his office is, that in explaining how little there is to be said about it one has
evidently said all there is to say.” 119
Most likely, Wilson‟s derisiveness was not founded wholly on disdain for what
appeared to be an orphaned institution. Yet in professing puzzlement at where exactly the
vice president belonged in the scheme of the government, Wilson was underscoring a
fundamental paradox of the American vice presidency. The paradox was this: while the
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vice president was one of the two nationally elected executive officers in the United
States political system, there was no expectation for the vice president to participate in
the executive branch; nor was there a single constitutionally sanctioned duty in the
executive realm. And because the vice president did not hold authority or responsibilities
equivalent to the heads of the executive departments, presumably the vice president was
not a necessary addition to cabinet deliberations.
The Framers had been explicit when attaching the vice president to the executive
branch, in tandem with the president, but only in mode of election. Likewise, the Framers
had delimited the functions of the vice presidency by appending the vice president to the
legislative branch in the innocuous role of the president of the Senate. In that role, the
vice president was not to participate in the debates of the chamber, and was given a vote
solely for those occasions when the membership was equally divided. It was the
transparently impotent nature of the institution that led a former assistant to President
Truman to claim--when testifying before a congressional committee on the reorganization
of the executive branch, broadly, and the efficacy of the vice presidency, specifically-that if the Constitution was “the greatest instrument ever struck off by the hand of man,”
when it came the establishment of the vice-presidential institution, the Framers failed to
“come up to the same high standard as they did in other phases of their constitutional
effort.”120
But if Woodrow Wilson seemed at a loss for where the vice president properly
belonged, apparently Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge agreed the answer might lie,
to some extent, in cabinet attendance. While Coolidge was far from an activist when at
meetings of the president‟s cabinet, his presence there meant the vice president could be
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attached, if only symbolically, to the highest councils of the executive government. 121 Put
another way, if Vice President Coolidge, when attending cabinet meetings was--in the
words of Harding‟s attorney general--simply “a wonderful listener” who “never intruded
his views unless asked for them,” it did not matter; what mattered was the vice president
was at the table.122
Harding‟s inclusion of the vice president within the exclusivity of the executive
cabinet was remarkable in that it helped to diminish a measure of the ambiguity
surrounding the vice president‟s place in the executive branch, and from that point
forward marked the vice president as an undeniable presence in the executive
government. Certainly Harding‟s gesture to Coolidge would prove to be among the best
outcomes of his brief time as president; it would also, with one exception, set the
precedent for all successive vice presidents to routinely attend meetings of the cabinet. 123
What is more, when President Harding established what was to become a precedent of
the vice president sitting with the cabinet, he had inadvertently facilitated the arrival of
the modern American vice presidency. 124
As for Calvin Coolidge: if he functioned in the president‟s cabinet principally as a
witness to the deliberations, he was certain that his presence there was an invaluable
experience for him. Writing from the vantage of having already served in both the vice
presidency and the presidency, Coolidge illustrated the utility in having the vice president
in the cabinet in this way:
If the Vice-President is a man of discretion and character, so that he can be relied
upon to act as a subordinate in such position, he should be invited to sit with the
Cabinet…He may not help much in its deliberations, and only on rare occasions
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would he be a useful contact with the Congress, although his advice on the
sentiment of the Senate is of much value, but he should be in the Cabinet because
he might become President and ought to be informed on the policies of the
administration...But he will hear much and learn how to find out more if it ever
becomes necessary. My experience in the Cabinet was of supreme value to me
when I became President.125

Ironically, the sole exception to the vice president regularly sitting with the
cabinet was Coolidge‟s own vice president, Charles Dawes. Dawes did not believe the
vice president belonged in the cabinet; he claimed “the official relations of the President
and Vice President lend themselves to the encouragement of misapprehensions which are
easy to create. I have always sensed the inherent embarrassments involved in the plan of
having the Vice President sit in the Cabinet, as Coolidge did under the Harding
administration.”126
Despite the objections of Charles Dawes to the vice president‟s presence at
cabinet meetings, the practice resumed with the next executive pairing of President
Herbert Hoover and Vice President Charles Curtis in 1929, and it has continued
uninterrupted ever since. 127 Therefore, as of this writing incumbent vice presidents have
been included in meetings of the cabinet for over ninety years. To this point, it has been
suggested that “shifts in authority for a half-century, in the same polity, and with some
broader context of years, without getting reversed or deflected, are, prima facie, durable
in a way that shifts that hold for a decade or less are not.”128 The significance of this is
the permanence with which the vice president has now been linked, in a fashion, to the
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executive branch.
Although the vice president does not have constitutionally defined “authority”
apart from presiding in the Senate, the notion that presidents have consistently included
their vice presidents in meeting of the heads of the executive departments implies the vice
president has authority on par with others who sit with the cabinet. The continuity of this
arrangement is the most prominent indicator of a “durable” shift in the vice presidency
from being principally an institution of the national legislature; to an institution more
closely identified with, and indeed integrated into, the executive branch. More
importantly, when a president added the vice president to the cabinet, and then successive
presidents maintained the arrangement, the structure was in place for the ongoing
augmentation of the vice-presidential institution by presidential fiat.
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6 Institutional Development by Portfolio and Statute
“The question should be asked whether the President could not profitably avail himself of
a Vice President who, while informing himself of duties that he may at any time be called
upon to fulfill, would execute a kind of roving commission for the Chief Executive,
lending a hand wherever possible.”129
(Assistant secretary of the Navy and 1920 Democratic Party candidate for vice president,
Franklin Roosevelt)
Certainly the development of the American vice presidency has been influenced
by formal, concrete measures; most obviously with the initial inclusion of the office in
the Constitution, as well as subsequent constitutional amendments. Yet there are
institutional markers that are less formal, and do not require alterations to the existent
charter for the United States government, but nonetheless have transparently added to and
accelerated the development of the institution. Included among the latter institutional
markers is the assignment by a president of specific policy portfolios; and the
advancement of statutes and executive orders by a president that purposively enhance the
stature and visibility of the vice presidency.
The Vice President as Bureau Chief
Because the only work the vice president was expected to do was to preside in the
Senate, and even that chore has been easily turned over to a president pro tempore chosen
by the members of the chamber, it made sense to make better use of the incumbent vice
president. Even so, there had been a peculiar reluctance to give the vice president much
to do outside of the Senate; and though there were exceptions throughout the history of
the institution, whereby certain presidents had consulted and depended on their vice
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president to a greater extent than is widely known, by and large, it was the nature of the
office to be left alone. 130
On occasion vice presidents were given assignments by their president; however,
these varied and there was no certainty that successive vice presidents would be similarly
tasked. The earliest exception to this was when the vice president, regardless of who held
the office, was designated a permanent regent of the Smithsonian Institution. If a regent
posting at the Smithsonian was perfunctory, it was nonetheless a concrete and formal
addition to the institutional profile of the vice presidency. Additionally, including the vice
president to the Smithsonian‟s board of regents may be framed as the precursor to
modern presidents assigning their vice presidents to assorted executive commissions and
councils; it was a practice which became the norm and further augmented the vicepresidential institution.
It was the opinion of the twenty-eighth vice president, however, that making the
second officer of the government a regent of the Smithsonian was simply a ruse used to
prevent that officer from doing any harm. Thomas Marshall was the vice president in
question. Even though Marshall‟s tenure is fittingly overlooked today, his observations
on the vice presidency are worthwhile because he was intimately familiar with the
institution, having served in the post for eight years. Furthermore, his recollections,
juxtaposed with the state of the modern vice presidency, underscore just how far the
institution has come since he committed his thoughts to paper, eighty-six years ago.
Marshall claimed:
Since the days of John Adams there has been a dread and fear that some
vice-president of the United States would break loose and raise hell…with the
68

administration. Everything that can be done, therefore, is done to furnish him with
some innocuous occupation. They seek to put him where he can do no harm.
Among the other nameless, unremembered things given him to do is the making
of him a regent of the Smithsonian Institution. There, if anywhere, he has an
opportunity to compare his fossilized life with the fossils of all ages. 131

Irrespective of the dim view Thomas Marshall took toward the vice president‟s
obligations outside of the Senate, beginning in 1941, every president began to increase
the workload of their vice president with the assignment of specific policy portfolios. By
giving the vice president various policy portfolios, the potential utility of the office was
further underscored and, in turn, the development of the institution was extended in new
and different ways.
In 1941 Franklin Roosevelt was beginning his third term as president. Roosevelt
had first run for national office in 1920, when he was the vice-presidential nominee of the
Democratic Party. At that time, Roosevelt composed an article in which he argued the
vice president could be a more useful figure in the government.132 No doubt Roosevelt
had himself in mind when he wrote the article, in the hopes of winning the vice
presidency and then assuming his running mate, the candidate for president, Governor
James Cox, would follow his recommendations for an improved second office. The CoxRoosevelt ticket lost the election, but when Roosevelt later became the president, he
implemented elements of his earlier plan to develop the vice presidency.
Franklin Roosevelt was unique among presidents on a number of accounts. It is
therefore not surprising that when it came to the vice presidency, he left his imprint on
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that institution, as well. To start, Roosevelt, unlike any other president, would be elected
to the presidency four times; he would also be the only president in history to serve
alongside three different vice presidents: John Nance Garner, Henry Wallace, and Harry
Truman.
As president, Roosevelt expanded the responsibilities of the vice president; as a
result, he raised expectations for the office, and for whoever might hold it. In his first
vice president, John Garner, Roosevelt had the liaison to Congress that he had proposed
when writing of the office in 1920; although he and Garner eventually parted ways, and
scarcely communicated with one another in the last two years of their service together.133
And with regard to his third vice president, Harry Truman: Roosevelt hardly knew
Truman before the latter man made it onto the Democratic ticket in 1944; and then
Roosevelt died, just eighty-three days into the Truman vice presidency. How Roosevelt
might have used Truman will never be known.
What is known is how Roosevelt‟s choice of Henry Wallace for his second vice
president laid the groundwork for the future, more substantial, vice-presidential
institution. As it happens, Roosevelt had an impact on the vice presidency in an
unanticipated way when, at the 1940 Democratic nominating convention, he insisted on
Wallace for his running mate; even going so far as to suggest he would not accept the
nomination for president if Wallace was not the nominee for vice president.134 According
to Wallace, “Roosevelt had been completely for me in 1940, when for the only time in
history a presidential candidate had named precisely the man he wanted to run with
him.”135
From that time forward, the initial selection of the vice-presidential nominee
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became, for both major political parties in the United States, the prerogative of the
nominee for president. In this, Roosevelt had set a precedent which solidified the
connection between presidents and vice presidents, making victorious vice-presidential
nominees indebted to the president who was responsible for their selection.
In Wallace, Roosevelt had gained a confidant and vice president who could be
placed wherever needed; what is more, Wallace would prove to be an exceptionally
cerebral philosopher for the Roosevelt administration.136 Wallace had served as the
secretary of agriculture for the first eight years of Roosevelt‟s presidency; in that time he
emerged as the most effective department head in the executive branch. It was no surprise
then, as the Wallace vice presidency moved forward, that Wallace personified the vice
president as public administrator.
It was as the chief administrator of the Economic Defense Board (EDB), and later
for the expanded and renamed Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), that Wallace was put
to work by Roosevelt in a way that no vice president before him ever had. In particular,
in the time period leading to the Second World War, and then after the United States
formally entered the conflict, Wallace efficiently managed several government entities
with myriad responsibilities, and nearly all of which fell under the umbrella of either the
EDB or the BEW. Among the agencies Wallace commanded was the Office of Exports;
the Office of Imports; and the Office of Warfare Analysis. The latter of the preceding
three agencies was especially vital in the war effort; its principal mission being the
determination of which foreign targets should be bombed, based on the economic value
to enemy nations of those targets.
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Wallace succeeded on many levels during his tenure running the BEW; at the
same time, his objectives were oftentimes undercut by the enmity and competitiveness
that frequently arises amongst competing bureaucratic organizations. Most notably,
Roosevelt‟s secretary of the commerce, Jesse Jones, was an ideological adversary of
Wallace and would prove to be a habitual antagonist to him for most of the four years he
was vice president.137 Jones had controlled the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(RFC) since the Hoover administration; it was a federal corporation mandated to borrow
and disburse money to other federal agencies. Much of Wallace‟s far-reaching vision for
the United States and for the world, once the war was won, and which he hoped to
implement via the work of the BEW and its sub agencies, depended on the cooperation
and largesse of the RFC--but only if Jones approved funding.
Today the specifics of the conflict between Wallace and Jones are not relevant;
many times their disputes were petty, fueled primarily by stubbornness and political
gamesmanship. What is important is the episodic infighting Wallace and Jones engaged
in threatened to destabilize the domestic wartime objectives that President Roosevelt had
set for the two men, their subordinates, and the government agencies they oversaw.
Roosevelt was known to loathe when administration infighting went public; so as the
Wallace-Jones clash was increasingly waged in the press, Roosevelt found himself in an
untenable position.
Because Jones was a member of the cabinet, he was utterly dependent on the
president for his employment; on the other hand, Wallace was an elected officer of the
government and was not as easily dismissed. But Wallace and Jones relied on the
authority conveyed on them by the president; therefore, Roosevelt could exercise his
72

prerogative to withdraw the authority he had given each man. As such, Roosevelt
abolished the BEW; left a shell of the RFC; and simply vested power in a new wartime
agency to manage the most vital functions of the BEW and RFC.
By giving his vice president control of a bureaucratic agency, President Roosevelt
had marked the office of vice president as one with greater utility than what was provided
for in the Constitution. In the process, Roosevelt demonstrated that he could, as the
president, influence the expansion of an institution of the government, and do so without
having the concurrence of either the legislative or the judiciary branches. Conversely,
Roosevelt showed that presidents may retract of their own volition any authority or
assignments given to vice presidents. It was a phenomenon unique to the president-tovice president association in that, in the American system of government, there is no
other pair of institutions whereby one may so decidedly determine the form and the
function of the other. Vice President Hubert Humphrey later encapsulated this
phenomenon in what he called “Humphrey‟s law”: “He who giveth can taketh away and
often does.”138 Plainly he had his relationship with President Lyndon Johnson in mind,
but “Humphrey‟s law” is applicable to every president-to-vice president association to
precede, as well as to follow, that of Johnson and Humphrey.
Notwithstanding the demise of the BEW, specifically, Franklin Roosevelt had set
precedent where it concerned the vice presidency. Just as he had done when forcing his
personal selection for the vice-presidential nomination in 1940, Roosevelt had acted
unilaterally in granting Vice President Wallace authority to oversee an agency of the
executive branch. By his actions on this front, Roosevelt helped foster the visibility of the
office of vice president, while giving the vice president authority commensurate to that of
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a cabinet secretary. This put Wallace in a unique position: he was an officer of the
government whose purview equaled executive department heads, but his election with the
president ranked him higher than those he sat with in the cabinet. 139
There was an auxiliary outcome of Roosevelt‟s placement of Wallace at the head
of an executive agency. By authorizing his vice president to direct a wartime agency, one
that was competitive with other agencies of the government, Roosevelt had drawn the
vice president further into the political infighting which sometimes characterizes the
pursuit of divergent policy goals within an administration. While the intersection of
government and politics is frequented by many institutions, the vice president, being
essentially a powerless officer of the government, is associated most with the politics of
elections, and not the politics of policy advancement. And yet, as vice president and
board chief, Wallace‟s talents as public administrator, economist, and advocate for social
justice increasingly brought him into the political realm. Unfortunately, it was the
political jockeying between Wallace and Jessie Jones that ultimately led to the dissolution
of the first government agency ever headed by a vice president.
Henry Wallace understood the depth of his usefulness to President Roosevelt, but
he was equally aware he was moving in a direction unfamiliar to the vice presidency. It
was perhaps for this reason that in some quarters Wallace‟s tenure was considered a
failed experiment in reforming the vice presidency. But in focusing on where politics
impeded Wallace‟s efforts, the long-term effect of Roosevelt‟s use of the vice president is
easily overlooked. By harnessing the unique talents of his second vice president,
Roosevelt accelerated the development of the vice presidency more than he could have
anticipated. In making the vice president a thoroughly utilitarian officer of the executive
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branch, Roosevelt had put in motion much of what he had proposed in 1920 for the vice
presidency. Of more importance to the development of the vice-presidential institution,
however, was that every president to follow Franklin Roosevelt in office built on what he
had started. For these reasons, moving toward the middle of the twentieth century, the
vice presidency had become a more valuable and visible institution of the government
and, as a consequence, a more attractive office for ambitious political figures to seek and
to hold.
Assigning the Vice President to Councils and Commissions
President Franklin Roosevelt‟s elevation of the vice presidency to a meaningful
office of the government was achieved by his having the vice president administer an
agency of the executive government for the first time in the nation‟s history, and
therefore assigning a specific policy portfolio to the vice president. By initiating the
preceding, Roosevelt built on the paradigm for the modern vice presidency, the
foundation for which had been set by President Warren Harding with his invitation to
Vice President Calving Coolidge to sit with the cabinet. Even with Roosevelt‟s
disbanding of the administrative sphere he had created for Vice President Henry Wallace,
the precedent had been set.
As noted previously, Harry Truman succeeded Henry Wallace in the vice
presidency. It is common knowledge that in the time Truman was the vice president he
was never informed of the existence of the atomic bomb; nor was he apprised of much
else about the workings of the executive branch. Wallace, who Roosevelt brought back
into the cabinet as the commerce secretary, after Wallace had been dropped from the
Democratic ticket in 1944, noted in his diary that Truman “felt that during the time when
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he was Vice President, President Roosevelt had not taken him into his confidence about
anything. He said rather plaintively, „They didn‟t tell me anything about what was going
on.‟”140 Therefore, when Vice President Truman became President Truman he made
certain his own vice president was thoroughly integrated into the executive government,
especially in the area of national security. As expected, because there was no prescribed
method for filling the vacancy in the vice presidency brought on by Truman‟s ascension
to the presidency, President Truman had to wait nearly four years, after he was elected to
his own term as president, to implement any enhancements to the vice presidency.
Elected with Truman in 1944 was Alben Barkley, a United States senator from
Kentucky. According to Barkley, “Truman knew how little opportunity had been given in
the past for Vice Presidents…to acquaint themselves with the job they might have to take
over, and he wisely set out to rectify this situation.”141 To this end, Truman continued the
tradition of the vice president regularly attending meetings of the cabinet. But of greater
significance to the development of the institutional vice presidency, Truman advanced the
notion that the vice president should be consistently informed and included in the highest
councils of the military and national security. Because of Truman‟s advocacy on this
front, Congress passed, and Truman signed, the National Security Act of 1947.
In terms of the institutional markers of the development of the vice presidency,
passage of the National Security Act of 1947 should be recognized for being one of the
more prominent; in that it made the vice president a statutory member of the National
Security Council (NSC). This was a remarkable boost to the vice presidency, coming just
two years after an admittedly uninformed Harry Truman had succeeded to the presidency.
In addition, there were three fundamental outcomes from making the vice president a
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member of the NSC. First, in constructing and enacting legislation making the vice
president a member of the NSC, the Congress was finally acknowledging the vice
president mattered. Second, by signing the National Security Act of 1947, President
Truman had affixed the vice president to the executive branch by law. And third, similar
to cabinet inclusion, by virtue of NSC membership, the vice president had an undeniable
place at the side of the president.
Four years after their election together, Truman and Barkley were succeeded by
Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. In terms of sustaining and expanding the
portfolio of the vice president, Eisenhower too built on what his immediate predecessors
had initiated. Naturally this included Vice President Nixon‟s place in the cabinet and the
National Security Council. Nixon was also assigned the chairmanship of an assortment of
policy groups and commissions, all of which were established by President Eisenhower.
Nixon headed the President‟s Committee on Government Contracts--aimed at excising
racial and religious discrimination by businesses receiving federal contracts--as well as
the Cabinet Committee on Economic Growth and Price Stability--from which Nixon
helped to coordinate the administration‟s proactive and reactive economic policies.
Ultimately, the expansive administrative tasks assigned to Nixon made his tenure one of
substance; helped meet the specific needs of President Eisenhower; and furthered the
concept of a utilitarian vice-presidential institution.142
After eight years as vice president, Richard Nixon sought and gained the
presidential nomination of the Republican Party. Although he failed to win the 1960
presidential election, Nixon unknowingly launched the pattern of incumbent or former
vice presidents seeking the presidency. In large part, this came about because of the
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ratification of the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution and its imposition of
presidential term limits. Although the Twenty-second Amendment, curiously, does not
delimit the length of time an individual may serve as vice president; it is, nonetheless, an
institutional marker for the vice presidency. By constitutionally constraining the length of
tenure of a president, the Twenty-second Amendment inadvertently created an
expectation for the incumbent vice president to seek the presidency, when the president
they served had no choice but to retire. Again, though Vice President Nixon was
unsuccessful in his 1960 quest for the presidency, the dye had been cast.
Richard Nixon and his vice-presidential running mate, Henry Cabot Lodge, were
defeated by John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. President Kennedy accorded his vice
president a relatively meaningful role in his administration. Adding to Johnson‟s
attachment to the cabinet and the National Security Council, Kennedy assigned his vice
president the chairmanship of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and the
President‟s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. The preceding presidential
commissions were just two of several Kennedy gave Johnson a role in; it was all part of
the president‟s effort to make the vice president useful.
Of course, making the vice president useful to Kennedy did not include making
Johnson an integral part of the president‟s inner circle. Nor did it mean, according to the
chief administrator of NASA during the 1960s, that President Kennedy, by giving the
vice president leadership of the space program, would not retain for himself “control [of]
the agenda of the council, [and furthermore] that he wanted to determine those items on
which he would seek and would accept advice.” 143 There are certainly limits to how
much control over a policy sphere any president will cede to the vice president.
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With the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, Lyndon Johnson became
the eighth vice president to move up to the presidency because of the constitutional
provision for succession. Slightly more than a year later, President Johnson and Hubert
Humphrey, the man Johnson selected to run for vice president with him in 1964, were
inaugurated. From the outset of his own term as president, Johnson continued what was
by then precedent: conferring substantive domestic policy assignments to the vice
president. This included making Vice President Humphrey chairman of the National
Aeronautics and Space Council; the Peace Corps Advisory Council; the Cabinet
Committee on Employment, and the Antipoverty Program Advisory Council. If that were
not enough, Johnson had Humphrey lead the President‟s Council on Economic
Opportunity, on Youth Opportunity, on Indian Opportunity, on Marine Sciences, and on
Recreation and Natural Beauty.
The variety of tasks assigned to Humphrey when he was vice president was
impressive; moreover, the scope of responsibilities was emblematic of how far the vice
presidency had come in the twenty years since Henry Wallace held the office. Indeed, in
the years separating Wallace from Humphrey, considerable change had come to the vice
presidency; as a result, by Humphrey‟s time in office, the vice president was no longer
viewed as an interloper in the administration of the executive government. For this
reason, Humphrey could meet the obligations assigned to him by the president in a way
that Wallace could not. Put another way, Humphrey held a degree of leverage based on
the accumulative development of the vice-presidential institution which had occurred in
the intervening years, and at the behest of several presidents. By Humphrey‟s estimation:
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I learned that a Vice President can, through his various coordinating roles, push
public policy as a gadfly or a conciliator. So many federal programs cut across
cabinet lines that it is imperative that disparate but related parts of government
work together. While cabinet members resent others‟ (including their cabinet
colleagues as well as the Vice President) interfering in their departments and are
jealous of their own domains, the Vice president at least is elected--and is, in a
sense, half a step up.144

Lyndon Johnson was a complex individual, and a demanding president to work
for: one day he would praise Humphrey for his work on a presidential commission; and
the next day, reclaim any authority Vice President Humphrey held over a presidential
task force, giving responsibility for formulation and implementation of the specific policy
to an another individual or administration entity, instead. Humphrey later summarized the
difficulties he had in being Johnson‟s vice president, stating: “Part of our problems came
from the institutions of President and Vice President, part from the uneasy juxtaposition
of our two personalities.” 145 Either way, it is the president who determines the
effectiveness of the vice president; it is an axiom that holds to this day.
Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey were followed in office by Richard Nixon
and Spiro Agnew. Nixon‟s motives for choosing Agnew are not relevant to this study,
other than to note it was an odd choice and for a brief time the vice presidency, as an
effective institution of the government, regressed.146 Humphrey, fittingly, encapsulated
Agnew‟s tenure, by juxtaposing it with his own; noting that “whatever the miseries and
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inadequacies of the vice presidency, I had considered it an honored position, and to have
been succeeded by Spiro Agnew did not please me.”147
Certainly, as vice president, Agnew attended meetings of the cabinet and the
National Security Council, and he likewise chaired a variety of commissions President
Nixon offered him. Nixon likewise used Agnew as a liaison between the federal
government and the city and state governments. But on the whole, Nixon opted to keep
his first vice president at a distance; it was an ironic arrangement, in light of Nixon
having been one of the earliest practitioners of the modern, utilitarian vice presidency.
Spiro Agnew‟s resignation from office brought the first use of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment. The Twenty-fifth Amendment--detailed in the next chapter--provided a
much needed provision for replacing the vice president when a vacancy occurs in the
office. To fill the vacancy, President Nixon nominated Gerald Ford for vice president; the
formal nomination was then followed by congressional hearings; with the process
concluding after Ford was approved by a vote of both chambers of Congress. In sum, the
entire process unfolded without the input of the Electoral College; and Ford‟s nomination
was not voted on by the nation‟s electorate. Ultimately, when evaluating the institutional
development of the vice presidency, reviewing Ford‟s tenure is of limited value. In other
words, though Ford took office under extraordinary circumstances, his time as second to
Nixon was unremarkable. As it was, Ford was treated with indifference by the president,
and his usefulness to Nixon was marginal; he would spend the entirety of his time as vice
president in a holding pattern for the presidency.
Obviously, only Richard Nixon knew precisely the extent of his involvement in
the Watergate affair. It was therefore impossible to predict how he would respond to the
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pressures of Watergate. But there was one certainty: Nixon‟s presidency was indisputably
doomed in the weeks and months following the onset of the Ford vice presidency. Ford
endeavored to balance loyalty to the president who picked him, while making certain he
was ready to take over for Nixon if the outcome of Watergate compelled a move to the
White House.
To prepare for his probable ascent to the presidency, Ford regularly conferred
with Nixon‟s national security team; he met with members of the Nixon cabinet; and he
was kept abreast of the economic and budgeting policies of the administration. 148 As a
consequence, on August 9, 1974, when Richard Nixon became the first president in
American history to resign from the nation‟s highest elective office, Gerald Ford was
standing by and set to take the reins of government. Even though the transition of power
was seamless, the circumstances under which the transition took place were wholly
anomalous. For unlike every other vice president to have made it to the top spot in the
United States government, Ford was the first individual in history to make it to the vice
presidency, and then to the presidency, without the nation‟s electorate ever having had an
opportunity to vote for or against him.
It was oddly appropriate that among the myriad critical tasks facing President
Ford, the first order of business was the selection of a nominee for vice president. Ford
committed himself to nominating an individual “fully qualified to step into my shoes
should something happen to me.”149 To meet this goal, aides to Ford reviewed potential
nominees for “their national stature, executive experience and ability to
broaden…[Ford‟s] political base, [then] assigned them points and ranked them
numerically.”150 He was then presented with the names of five individuals and their total
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scores. Of those five--including George H.W. Bush and Senator William Brock--Ford
eventually settled on Nelson Rockefeller.
Rockefeller was an established national political figure when he was nominated
and confirmed by Congress as only the second vice president selected by way of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment. It was not manifestly clear why Rockefeller would settle for
the vice presidency, but surely the incremental expansion in the scope of power, and in
direct responsibilities, of the office of the vice president made the institution of enough
substance and significance that Rockefeller was willing to take the job. Quite possibly,
Rockefeller was swayed by the development of the institution throughout the twentieth
century.151
Rockefeller also must have been encouraged that by 1974 the institution had
become transparently integrated into the broader operations of the executive branch.
Hence, Rockefeller could count on a seat in the cabinet; membership in the National
Security Council; chairmanships of a number of high profile commissions, should he so
desire; inclusion in the decisional framework for foreign policy and national security
concerns; and, initially with Ford‟s concurrence, as vice president Rockefeller was
determined to formulate and implement the administration‟s domestic policy agenda. 152
For a time, Vice President Rockefeller was active in the principal policymaking
unit in the White House: the Domestic Council. Initially, despite strong opposition from
Ford‟s chief of staff, Donald Rumsfeld, Rockefeller successfully placed one of his own
advisers to manage the council, and subsequently claimed the vice-chairmanship for
himself. 153 Yet Rockefeller‟s triumph essentially ended there. He did put forward a
number of ambitious domestic proposals--including a national health care plan and a
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proposal for massive outlays in government loans for independent energy initiatives--but
none of the preceding projects was ever implemented. In the main, Rockefeller‟s efforts
leading the Domestic Council were stymied by competitive, and often belligerent,
presidential advisers--such as Rumsfeld and, ironically, his assistant Dick Cheney--and
therefore it did not take long before Rockefeller‟s position became untenable, and he
eventually chose to resign from the Domestic Council. 154
President Ford facilitated the development of the vice presidency on several
fronts. This included less formal ways than permitting attendance at cabinet meetings by
the vice president or assigning the vice president to chair various presidential
commissions. During their service together, Ford and Rockefeller commenced the
practice of meeting privately each week in the Oval Office; it is a custom every president
and vice president to follow Ford and Rockefeller have imitated.155 The weekly meetings
were initially suggested by Rockefeller, and agreed to by Ford, when they first discussed
Rockefeller‟s expected role in the administration. It was unprecedented to set aside time
for the president and vice president to meet alone and the practice gave Rockefeller
exclusive and unparalleled access to Ford.
Rockefeller was also appointed by the president to head a commission tasked with
comprehensively reviewing the clandestine activities of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), specifically on the domestic front. Founded in a similar vein to the numerous
commissions and councils typically assigned to modern vice presidents, the Rockefeller
Commission had the potential to generate favorable attention for Rockefeller, and it was
likewise perfectly suited to the vice president‟s considerable skills as a public
administrator.
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Unfortunately for the vice president, during much of the time the Rockefeller
Commission spent fulfilling its charter, there were two ongoing congressional inquiries
into the CIA, as well. The Church Committee in the Senate, and the Pike Committee in
the House, not only matched the Rockefeller Commission‟s mission, but both of the
congressional panels were afforded sweeping investigatory powers that went well beyond
those given to the vice president. After devoting considerable time, as well as conducting
a specific and comprehensive analysis of the CIA, the Rockefeller Commission released
its final report to negligible effect.156 Still, having the president confer authority to the
vice president to lead such a high profile endeavor reinforced the perception of an office
of the executive branch that could no longer be ignored. More specifically, if
Rockefeller‟s work on this front was to a certain extent outdone by the dual congressional
investigations into the CIA, the notion of the vice president having a charter on par with
the national legislature spoke volumes.
Even if Rockefeller failed to fully realize his vision of a vice president charged
with formulating and advancing domestic policy, at the end of the day he could take
consolation in his role as a respected confidant to the president. Besides his regular
private meetings with the president, Rockefeller was integrated into all national security
deliberations, and Ford valued the vice president‟s advice on a number of critical
problems he faced while in office. 157
When Gerald Ford decided to try and get elected to the presidency, he moved
forward without Nelson Rockefeller. The reasons Ford opted to select Senator Bob Dole,
instead of Rockefeller, are complicated and not germane to this study. 158 It should suffice
to state here that Ford later described his own behavior as “cowardly,” and Henry
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Kissinger stated categorically that “dropping Rockefeller still strikes me as the single
worst decision of Ford‟s presidency.” 159 Regardless, the Ford-Dole ticket went down to
defeat and Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale were installed in the presidency and vice
presidency, respectively.
In every respect, President Carter was responsible for allowing the significant
form the Mondale vice presidency eventually took. But befitting the nature of the
partnership Carter and Mondale forged from the outset; Mondale too was responsible for
engineering the direction in which the institution moved. To this end, and at Carter‟s
request, in the days after their victory, Mondale prepared a set of proposals for making
the vice presidency meaningful. 160 According to Mondale, the proposal he offered Carter
was “historic…Nothing like it had ever been done before, and it led to a redefinition of
the vice president in modern American government.”161
In trying to rectify many of the inadequacies that plagued the vice presidency
since its inception, Carter and Mondale first had to confront the principal, intrinsic
contradiction of the institution. As Mondale described it, “the only role the Constitution
assigns the vice president is to preside over the Senate and break a tie when necessary. In
a strange way, since the vice presidents were in both branches, they historically had been
treated as though they were in neither.”162
Induced by the strength of Mondale‟s blueprint, Carter was resolute on the vice
president being “truly…the second in command, involved in every aspect of
governing.”163 This, by Carter‟s interpretation, meant Mondale “received the same
security briefings…was automatically invited to participate in all…official meetings, and
helped to plan strategy for domestic programs, diplomacy, and defense.”164
86

On the whole, Mondale did not encounter challenges to his authority from within
the White House. Carter let Mondale select personnel for several key positions; including
prime postings on the National Security Council and the Domestic Council, as well as in
the Office of Management and Budget. Mondale‟s success on this front is noteworthy; as
it then became a reasonable expectation that vice presidents would bring a fair share of
staffers whose loyalties lay more with the vice president than with the president.
Additionally, Carter facilitated the assimilation of Mondale‟s staff with his own; making
the vice president‟s staff, both in theory and in practice, equal to the White House staff.
There was a caveat, as Mondale pointed out, in that “all of this would merely have been
symbolic if I didn‟t have a concrete role backed by the president.” 165
Because presidential elections have always been most about the candidates for
president, and not the candidates for vice president, the transformative success of the
Mondale vice presidency was not enough to reelect the Carter-Mondale team. Instead,
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were elected. Reagan, having served as a
governor, came to the presidency with state executive experience; whereas, Bush brought
an array of government experience to the vice presidency: congressional representative;
ambassador to the United Nations; chairman of the Republican National Committee;
chief of the Liaison Office in Beijing, China; and director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
After the election, and following the example set by Walter Mondale, Bush
played a role in staffing, naturally, the office of the vice president; but he also weighed in
on several key postings at the White House. Among the first placements Bush engineered
was the appointment of his close friend and adviser, James Baker, as Reagan‟s first chief
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of staff. With Baker situated atop the White House staff, Bush had an individual he
implicitly trusted, probably more than any other when it came to politics, as overseer of
the very people who might otherwise undercut the vice president. Baker‟s presence,
coupled with the vice president‟s private office near the Oval Office, gave Bush a solid
foothold inside the White House.
Beyond the assignment of key administration staff, Bush had an added edge when
he took office. Since Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale had worked so diligently at
enhancing the vice-presidential institution, Reagan and Bush inherited a changed
executive dynamic; the question then became whether they would replicate some, all, or
nothing of the Carter-Mondale model. But with the evident dichotomy in Reagan and
Bush‟s strengths and weaknesses, it was prudent to capitalize on the strides already taken
by Carter and Mondale. Surely Reagan benefited from following Carter‟s lead since he,
like Carter, lacked experience in the national government. In making his vice president a
utilitarian figure in the administration, as Carter had done before him, then Reagan could
relieve, to a certain extent, some of the burdens of leading the executive branch.
Along these lines, Reagan insisted Bush chair meetings of the National Security
Council when he was absent. And, by continuing what President Carter started, he helped
to institutionalize the placement of the vice president as the second in the military chain
of command. Each of the practices just listed transparently signified the vice president‟s
presence in the executive branch. Furthermore, there was a genuine value in confirming
that the vice president was prepared to step in for the president whenever, and wherever,
necessary.
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Reagan also sanctioned a broad portfolio of substantive duties for Bush; including
his use of the vice president as coordinator of different federal organizations
simultaneously combating the importation of illegal drugs into the country. This was a
way to use the office of the vice president to manage disparate bureaucracies, all which
were engaged in a similar mission, but with no synchronization between the groups. In
this area, Reagan used the visibility of the modern vice presidency to emphasize the
importance he placed on fighting the drug war, as well as to centralize command of the
project. In doing so, Reagan was using the vice president in a similar fashion to that of
Franklin Roosevelt and his use of Henry Wallace during the Second World War.
Bush was also put in charge of two distinct task forces: one was meant to oversee
the deregulation of an assortment of programs administered by the federal government;
the other was tasked with minimizing government regulation of business and industry.
With the latter, Bush was subsequently given high marks for his work in this area, and in
a telling gesture of the value he derived from the project, he later assigned the same
mission to his own vice president. Likewise, in a move that appeared perfectly in line
with conventional notions of the modern vice presidency, President Reagan resolved to
further extend Bush‟s presence in the affairs of national intelligence and security.
Appended to his original decision on the vice president chairing meetings of the National
Security Council when he could not be present, Reagan installed Bush as the head of a
newly formed crisis management team--in essence, an extension of the National Security
Council.
For the sum of his vice presidency, George Bush epitomized the administrator as
vice president, going about his work, generally unnoticed. In his effort to move from the
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second executive to the chief executive, he ran as the most experienced and therefore,
presumably, the most qualified candidate for president. With his eight years as the vice
president being the longest he had stayed in any government job, Bush could justly point
to his own activist tenure, in the service of an often disengaged president, as the
necessary preparation for him to have the top job. Bush‟s argument was simple: since his
was a meaningful vice presidency, then he was better prepared for the presidency than
any opponent of any political party. This argument worked: first, within the Republican
Party, and despite the lingering reservations many conservatives held toward him; and
then later, in the general election against the Democratic nominee for president. It also
worked irrespective of his choice for vice president: Senator Dan Quayle.
The travails of Dan Quayle in the campaign of 1988 are better dealt with in other
studies.166 It is enough to note here that a series of verbal gaffes, and a less than stellar
performance in the single televised debate of the vice-presidential candidates, colored
popular opinion of Quayle for the entirety of his vice presidency, and beyond. But if
Quayle misspoke on too many occasions, when he was the vice president he was never
derelict in the conduct of his duties or in fulfilling specific assignments given to him by
President Bush.
In retrospect, Quayle would cite his work chairing the Council on
Competitiveness and the National Space Council as especially noteworthy facets of his
vice presidency. 167 For the Council on Competitiveness, Quayle managed a federal task
force charged with minimizing, and whenever possible eliminating, government
regulation of business. To do this, Quayle was given authority to intercede before federal
regulations were issued, modifying the regulations to suit the agenda of the
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administration. According to some, this method violated the law requiring standard
procedures, including the availability of a forum for public comment for all proposed
federal regulations. 168
The advantage for Quayle was the outcome of the work of the Council on
Competitiveness, by-and-large, was a boon for the business community--not
coincidentally, a traditional constituency of the Republican Party. As a consequence,
Quayle was able to foment increased deregulation of industries and businesses that could
potentially underwrite a future presidential run by the vice president. In this way, the
accumulation of executive, administrative authority and functions established within the
institution over time, provided the vice president, irrespective of who held the office, the
framework from which to build a substantive record that stood somewhat apart from the
incumbent president. And of greater consequence to those who held the second office: the
expectation for vice presidents to administer various presidential commissions and
councils, furthered the notion of the vice president as heir apparent.
The prospect for earning political capital was a bit less promising with the Space
Council than it was with the Council on Competitiveness, but undeniably there were
opportunities to profit from the American public‟s long-time infatuation with space
exploration. Hence, Quayle eagerly approached the government‟s space program,
attempting to streamline the bureaucracy of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), thus making it more economical in the process. In this vein,
Quayle directed, via the recommendations of the Space Council, a change in the top
echelon of administrators at NASA, which subsequently led to a fundamental
rededication of the agency‟s intuitional mission.
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Regardless of the broadly held view that Quayle was ill suited to serve as vice
president, let alone president if circumstances called for his ascension to the presidency,
he benefited from the many precedents established during the vice presidencies of Nelson
Rockefeller, Walter Mondale and George H.W. Bush. Recognizing that his job was much
easier because his immediate predecessor was Bush, Quayle later remarked that he “had
the good fortune to work with a former vice president.”169 As such, Quayle‟s experience
was relatively unique: in the two hundred years preceding his tenure, only eleven of the
forty-three individuals to precede him in office could say the same. And of that eleven,
few if any could have honestly claimed, as Quayle could, to have been treated with a
modicum of respect by the president under whom they served.
Shifts in the President-to-Vice President Arrangement
The American electorate turned President Bush and Vice President Quayle out of
office in 1992. For Bush it meant that even though he was the first vice president since
Martin Van Buren to go directly from the vice presidency to the presidency; he had
merely matched Van Buren, again, in not winning a second term in the White House. As
for Quayle, even if the vice presidency represented both the apex and the end of his
political career, from his first day in office he was the beneficiary of years of precedents,
as well as increased visibility for the vice presidency which, in turn, had made for a more
stable and substantial political institution. It was appropriate then, that the candidates who
defeated Bush and Quayle--Bill Clinton and Al Gore--would bring a new approach to
executive governance that thoroughly integrated the office of the vice president with that
of the president.
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Accordingly, as the last decade of the twentieth century unfolded, Al Gore took
the helm of a vice-presidential office unmatched by prior manifestations of the office--in
stature, resources, and influence--and then, with the acquiescence of President Clinton,
Gore proceeded to bring the vice presidency nearer to equipoise with the presidency. On
the whole, this came about as a result of the shift in the way Clinton and Gore worked
together, and which was so blatantly dissimilar from the working relationships of
presidents and vice presidents to have come before. For as the vice presidency developed
over time, and regardless of how accommodating the incumbent president was, there was
one constant: the president-to-vice president relationship was a vertical, hierarchical
arrangement--transparently oriented from the president down to the vice president.
With the commencement of the Clinton-Gore era, the traditional arrangement
flipped; instead structuring it closer to a horizontal, hierarchical setup. It should be
understood, however, in no way was there any blurring of the line of final authority--that
would come, arguably, with the president and vice president who followed Clinton and
Gore--but the consensus was that Clinton would have the final say, contingent on the vice
president having weighed in, as well. To this point, it has been suggested President
Clinton never made a “major policy decision…without discussing it with the vice
president.”170
When taken together, the outcome of the Clinton-Gore partnership was a modern
vice-presidential institution, actualized beyond any notions the Framers of the
Constitution may have held for the second office of the land. Besides, it is unlikely any of
the Framers could have envisioned a president and vice president maintaining the degree
of equilibrium in their association, as Clinton and Gore did. And yet, in light of the
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exponential growth of the American presidency over the course of the twentieth century,
it made sense for the vice presidency to approximate keeping pace with the higher office.
On every account, Gore was the appropriate fit for the vice presidency at that
juncture in the trajectory of the institution‟s development. Of course, he benefited
immensely by serving a president who chose to extend, and not retract, the prerogatives
the office had accrued. To his credit, Gore sustained the required balance of deference
and influence with President Clinton, consistently making his political and policy
ambitions secondary to those of the president. On any number of occasions he avowed to
heed an unassuming, yet straightforward credo: do whatever necessary to achieve the
goals of the president and, in the process, help to ensure Clinton was, in Gore‟s words,
“the best” president.171
Warren Christopher, who conducted the vice-presidential nominee search for
Clinton, and afterwards served as secretary of state for the first term of the Clinton
administration, offered one of the better observations on the shared Clinton-Gore tenure:
The partnership that began so auspiciously continued throughout my time in
office. The way they worked together raised the office of vice president to a new
level of public awareness. Gore became a full partner, not because Clinton made a
formal commitment to make it so but because the president genuinely respected
Gore‟s views and talents. They enjoyed each other‟s company, teasing and
laughing in a natural way that bespoke friendship rather than a number
one/number two relationship. Time and again, I found that the president made his
most important decisions only after talking privately with the vice president.
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Clinton‟s mantra--„It‟s all right with me, but let‟s talk it over with Al before we
decide‟--became familiar to every member of the cabinet. 172

The effect of the Clinton-Gore association went well beyond the immediacy of
their two terms in office; instead, the model Clinton and Gore established would extend
the president-to-vice president construct. The result of this was, depending on one‟s point
of view, positive; however, a feasible argument could also be advanced that, ultimately,
what Clinton and Gore initiated went too far--in setting precedents, while creating an
opening for potentially unwanted outcomes for the vice-presidential institution, as well as
to the model for executive governance. The advantage in how Clinton and Gore operated
together was realized by the way executive responsibilities, as well as lines of authority,
was shared. The answer to why this matters is deceptively simple: the American
presidency of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has become, without doubt, too
much for one individual to manage.
Although there are myriad examples of Al Gore‟s involvement in the
administration of the executive branch, in the eight years he was vice president there was
no project that defined his tenure to the extent the reinventing government initiative did.
Formally instituted in March of 1993 by President Clinton, the National Performance
Review was led by Gore and commissioned to identify ways to streamline the federal
government; specifically with regard to management, personnel, procurement and
budgeting. And though the project was clearly not as contentious as others advanced by
the Clinton administration, it proved to be a success on several accounts.173
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Gore was the best choice for this assignment for a number of reasons, not the least
of which was because the project was intended to be a prominent feature of the Clinton
administration‟s maiden agenda. By signing on to the initiative, Gore was set to increase
his own political capital, as well as that of the administration; moreover, in the process he
would broaden the portfolio of the vice president. This latter point is especially salient in
that each instance when the purview or resources of the vice presidency have increased,
each then becomes an established prerogative for the institution, and consequently moves
forward to the advantage of the next occupant of the office.
Naturally, any new president may decide not to extend the same responsibilities
and assignments to the vice president they came to office with; and the president could
even retract all the duties of the preceding vice president, apart from those prescribed by
the Constitution. For that matter, the president could prompt, with the collaboration of
willing members of Congress, legislation aimed at repealing earlier statutes granting the
vice president specific prerogatives--like the vice president‟s permanent place on the
board of the Smithsonian Institution or membership on the National Security Council-although pursuing such a course would be highly irregular, and somewhat suspect. In
addition, when presidents have facilitated an expanded vice-presidential institution, the
fundamental dynamic of the president-to-vice president relationship has been profoundly,
and maybe even permanently, altered.
Returning to the National Performance Review initiative and Vice President Gore,
specifically, of the many pledges made by the Clinton-Gore ticket during the 1992
campaign, prominent among these was a commitment to reducing the size and
inefficiency of the federal government. To reconfigure the federal bureaucracy, per se, is
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a daunting proposition, though it is unlikely to raise the ire of most observers, and thus it
could be viewed as an attractive undertaking for a rising political figure. Furthermore,
having one half of the victorious electoral ticket spearhead the initiative lent distinction to
a project that in all likelihood would be a boon to the Clinton administration, as well as to
the vice president.
There was no uncertainty about Gore‟s suitability for the project. On the whole,
he was atypical for a politician, in that he had always been comfortable immersing
himself in the minutiae of politics and policy; it was no different for him when it came to
reorganizing the federal bureaucracy. Gore was fine with non-glamorous tasks, working
in the shadows, as it were; ironically, it was a rare trait he shared with his immediate
successor, Dick Cheney. Nonetheless, on a tangible level, and in pursuit of the agenda of
the National Performance Review, Gore took the vice presidency further into the cabinet
by his interaction with, and dictates to, each cabinet secretary. This entailed the vice
president‟s coordination of every department and agency in the federal government--from
the leadership, to countless midlevel public administrators--all with the intent of microevaluating, and then overhauling, every organization therein.
The outcome of Gore‟s effort was impressive: 100,000 federal government jobs
were eliminated; federal regulations which had taken 16,000 pages of the Federal
Register to delineate were made obsolete; and 10,000 pages from manuals for federal
employees were discontinued. 174 And there were additional, equally noteworthy results.
Later, Bill Clinton lauded the work of the vice president on this front; claiming the
reinventing government project was “developed according to a simple credo: protect
people, not bureaucracy; promote results, not rules; get action, not rhetoric. Al Gore‟s
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highly successful initiative confounded our adversaries, elated our allies, and escaped the
notice of most of the public for the reason that it was neither sensational nor
controversial.”175
From an institutional perspective, President Clinton‟s selection of Vice President
Gore to lead the initiative reaffirmed the standing of the vice presidency at that point in
its history. In choosing the vice president to oversee the reorganization of the federal
bureaucracy, of which the president is the chief executive, the place of the vice president
was established squarely in the executive branch, thus lessening the ambiguity on what
branch of the government the institution belonged to. Furthermore, the vice president‟s
connection to the executive has been strengthened, to a certain extent, because the link
between the vice president and the legislative branch has been weakened over time. Quite
simply, this has transpired because the Constitution assigns two specific functions for the
vice president to carry out--preside in the Senate and cast a vote in the chamber on those
occasions when there is a tie vote amongst the members of that body--and yet, the vice
president rarely does either.
With regard to the vice president breaking ties in the Senate, the data indicates
there is rarely cause for its use. For example, during their terms as vice president, modern
occupants of the office--such as Calvin Coolidge, Lyndon Johnson, Gerald Ford, Nelson
Rockefeller, and Dan Quayle--were never called upon to cast a tie-breaking vote.176 And
while John Adams broke twenty-nine ties in his eight years as vice president; Dick
Cheney was called on just eight times to do the same. 177 To be certain, the broader
political environment, coupled with the partisan composition of the Senate influences the
frequency for which the vote of the vice president is needed. Then again, a plausible
98

explanation might be that the modern American vice presidency is an institution which
has outgrown its constitutional place in the government.
The inference here is not of the vice president‟s role in the legislative branch
being incrementally erased by a commensurate increase in responsibilities in the
executive government; nor could it, as presiding in the Senate was precisely where the
Constitution sanctioned the vice president to be. But giving the vice president vast
administrative oversight--which certainly was the case with Vice President Gore and the
National Performance Review--confirmed the standing the office held within the
executive branch.
In the long term, the specifics of the National Performance Review are not nearly
as important as was the act of assigning the vice president to lead it. For on top of the
accolades Gore‟s leadership accrued, his work in this area expanded on the concept of the
vice president as public administrator. This was an auxiliary, but vital, outcome of Gore‟s
success with the reinventing government project, as it contributed considerably to the
form and substance of the vice-presidential institution. Why this mattered was simple: the
imprint Gore left on the institution was sure to carry forward. Therefore, if history was
indeed a reliable indicator, and previous augmentations to the institution did not occur in
a vacuum, Gore‟s successors were bound to take over a substantial, multi-layered vice
presidency.
Al Gore‟s achievements as vice president have scarcely been recounted here; but
for the purposes of this study, why Gore matters is the influence he exerted on the vice
presidency as an institution of the executive government. It was not that he was remiss in
fulfilling the constitutional duties of the vice president--presiding over the Senate, and
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voting in the event of a tie in the chamber--because when he presided, he did so ably. But
in eight years he was called on to cast just four tie breaking votes; so it is a fair
assumption his presence was not essential in the day-to-day working of the Senate, nor
was it ever expected to be.178
Yet in making the institution better and more complete, Gore helped make it
indispensible. He had, by President Clinton‟s estimation, “a larger role substantively and
more influence than any” of his predecessors ever had. 179 Working in unison, Clinton and
Gore found a way to build on the template for a substantial president-to-vice president
arrangement, the outline for which was first suggested by President Ford and Vice
President Rockefeller; extended and practiced by President Carter and Vice President
Mondale; and then facilitated by each succeeding president, thus making it the norm for
every president-vice president team to follow.
All things being equal, Al Gore very well may have been the ideal vice president;
yet, the source of his power and prestige--President Clinton--may have hampered Gore‟s
own rise to the presidency. The predicament Gore found himself in was neatly framed,
nearly forty years earlier, when President Johnson had told an eager Hubert Humphrey
that, by taking on the position of Johnson‟s vice president, their relationship would be
analogous to “marriage with no chance of divorce.”180 Johnson may have been
overstating his case, but, short of resignation, impeachment, or death, Humphrey really
had no way out; he would forever be Johnson‟s vice president. In much the same way,
Gore was bound to Clinton--for better or for worse.
When accounts of the Clinton era are written, it will always be in the context of
President Clinton and his successes and his failings. The irony here is this: as the vice
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president for eight years, Al Gore will share the burden of Clinton‟s legacy, good and
bad, but the partnership he forged with Clinton, and the contributions both made to the
institutional vice presidency, will be largely overlooked. For Gore, it is an unfortunate
outcome of his never having made it to the presidency; for it is the presidency that is
remembered, rarely the vice presidency. Perhaps of most consequence, though, is that
Gore‟s concerted elevation of the office of vice president prepared the foundation for the
ascension of perhaps the most powerful vice president to date.
The anomalous presidential election of 2000 resulted in Al Gore‟s failure to move
from the presidency to the vice presidency. The dynamics informing that outcome will
undoubtedly be debated well into the future. Certainly serving as vice president for eight
years had established Gore as a national political figure, and his service was likely a
factor in his gaining the presidential nomination of his party. Apart from the extenuating
electoral machinations of the 2000 election, however, there was no precedent that serving
in the modern vice presidency was an assured path to the presidency. Perhaps what is
most ironic about an election beset by irony is that, in not winning the presidency, Gore
was succeeded in the vice presidency by an individual determined to take the institution
further into the executive branch than ever before.
The Vice Presidency Reaches A Measure of Symmetry With the Presidency
After George W. Bush and Dick Cheney defeated Vice President Gore and his
running mate, Senator Joe Lieberman, Cheney followed the course set by his most recent
predecessors and helped set what form the new administration would take. Cheney,
however, took this role a step further than had any other vice president-elect, becoming
the chief coordinator of the transition of power from the Clinton administration to an
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impending Bush administration. This was unprecedented on two accounts: never before
had a vice-presidential candidate, in the throes of a contested election, assumed to be the
victor before the Electoral College had met and voted. And second, it was anomalous for
a candidate for vice president to oversee an enterprise as vast as the transition from one
government to another. Cheney‟s assumption of control, and his subsequent vigorous
exercise of authority, eventually distinguished all dimensions of his vice-presidential
tenure.
It was in the midst of the transition period that Cheney shrewdly set in motion the
assimilation of the vice presidency into the presidency. This was a different product of
the Bush-Cheney association than has been suggested elsewhere. For instance, recently it
has been argued that what Bush and Cheney implemented was analogous to a “copresidency.”181 This proposition is problematic because the term co-presidency implies
presidential powers are divisible and shared executive governance is feasible. For that
matter, where political systems are concerned, examples of legitimately shared, or
collegial, executive arrangements are few, nor enduring. 182 Of necessity, all plural
executive arrangements are characterized by countervailing dynamics with one executive
having a modicum of an advantage over the other; were it not so, definitiveness on policy
questions would routinely be elusive.
As a practical matter, hierarchical arrangements are just that--hierarchical--and
thus top-down arrangements are necessary to reach, if not consensus, conclusion.
Granted, in a presidential system, like the one found in the United States, and which has a
trifold balance of power, the executive is subject to specific veto options delegated to the
legislative and judiciary by the Constitution. 183 The caveat here is that over time the
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American presidency has unquestionably gained strength at the expense of the legislative
and judicial branches of the government; thereby, diminishing some of the efficacy of the
checks the two countervailing branches hold on the executive branch. Then again, in
acknowledging the checks of the national legislature, and of the judiciary, with no less
than the Supreme Court atop the latter branch, the president has commensurate checks on
each, compounded by the legitimacy of being elected nationally--a claim no other officer
in the system, besides the vice president, is justified in making.
Yet, in the midst of a transition of his making, Dick Cheney did claim to be
legitimately elected, if not by a majority of the nation, then with enough evidence to
satisfy him. And when the outcome of the Supreme Court‟s intervention in the 2000
election was announced in his and George W. Bush‟s favor, Cheney worked the
opportunity he was given, taking his new executive position past notions of a shared
presidency. In retrospect, it appears Cheney was bent on absorbing control of the
transition from the president-elect--specifically in terms of filling cabinet posts, as well as
top-level positions responsible for formulating the domestic and foreign policy agenda of
the impending administration--all the while knowing it would set the tenor of the ensuing
four year term.184
In deconstructing the outcome of Cheney‟s plan, it is immediately clear that what
he had achieved was remarkable. He had succeeded in blurring the divide between the
president and the vice president, as well as the respective formal organizations that
heretofore separated the two institutions. Hence, the vice-presidential and presidential
institutions coalesced and took the form of a single political institution with, in theory,
two executive officers elected concurrently.
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When evaluating Cheney‟s actions on this front, it is important to recognize the
vice presidency continues to be viewed by the broader electorate as a sinecure filled by
politicians who were not of presidential caliber, but who would be fine as the vice
president. What Cheney accomplished, with Bush‟s compliance, was to take an
institution like the vice presidency--which had benefited from precedent and statute and
likewise had acquired abundant institutional resources--and integrate that institution into
the presidency, while making himself fairly indispensible to the president he was elected
to serve under.
Dick Cheney‟s influence on the policies of the Bush administration should not be
understated; his influence was vast and crossed into all policy genres. In order to narrow
the scope of inquiry for the purposes of this study, evaluation of Cheney‟s role in one
specific realm of policy is most efficient and likewise indicative of his influence across
the board. When Cheney arrived in the vice presidency, he was incontrovertibly
determined to initiate new government policies; yet his drive towards new policies was
consistently in conjunction with vigorous movement towards deregulation of the existing
practices of the government. And more times than not, there was an ancillary goal of
clearing the way for unfettered commerce. In no policy sphere was this more apparent
than with Cheney‟s consistent intercession on behalf of those corporate interests
impacted by the environmental policies of the federal government, in particular, the
regulation of energy resources.
For the most part, Cheney‟s involvement in formulating a national energy policy
escaped the attention of the public. Perhaps Americans were simply becoming
accustomed to activist vice presidents. All three of Cheney‟s immediate predecessors had
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been engaged on multiple fronts, although they had more impact in certain areas than
they did in others: Walter Mondale in foreign affairs; Dan Quayle with the
Competitiveness Council; and Al Gore and the reinventing government initiative, as well
as an activist role in foreign policy. But Cheney exercised greater and wider influence on
the formulation of government policy than any vice president before him. The difference,
however, was Cheney never appeared to relish the spotlight, as had Mondale, Quayle and
to a lesser extent, Gore. Frankly, it seemed that Cheney preferred to work in the shadows.
In many ways this was fitting, since from its inception the vice presidency always seemed
a shadow institution, with the presidency forever the more tangible of the two.
When Dick Cheney first ran for vice president, he bemoaned the lack of a national
energy policy. He liked to lay blame on the Clinton-Gore administration for what he saw
as too much restraint, specifically when it came to expanding the domestic production of
oil; it was a point he made repeatedly on the campaign trail, as well in his debut
appearance in a vice-presidential debate. Although Cheney preferred to deliver speeches
to friendly audiences, in out-of-the-way venues, the two vice-presidential debates he
participated in--one in 2000; the other in 2004--provide scattered, yet invaluable glimpses
of his beliefs and of his attitude. Simply put, since the single debate held for vicepresidential candidates has become a staple of presidential campaigns, Cheney had little
choice but to participate. The debates therefore represent the two times in eight years that
he was compelled to abandon his steadfast reticence and, in turn, publicly answer
questions.
Throughout the first vice-presidential debate, Cheney exhibited the singlemindedness that would characterize his behavior for the whole of his tenure; offering
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curt, unequivocal responses on complex topics. For instance, when asked about the
fluctuations in oil, natural gas and electric prices, and how the government, in allowing
market instability, was not doing enough to protect the American people, Cheney briefly
delineated the failure of the Clinton administration to foster energy production in the
United States, and then concluded by suggesting “it‟s important that senior citizens don‟t
suffer this winter, but we need to get on to the business of having a plan to develop our
domestic energy resources in producing more supplies.” 185 It was a terse and not too
subtle indication that expanding the business of energy production was a priority for the
prospective vice president--irrespective of the impact on senior citizens.
In retrospect, Cheney‟s comments in the vice-presidential debate do not seem
especially noteworthy, since his subsequent actions on energy policy--specifically his
chairmanship of the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG)--are now, in
part, public record. Fittingly, the task force devoted to creating the Bush administration‟s
energy policy came to symbolize the Cheney vice presidency in its entirety: the
expansion of executive power; the collusion of government and business; and the
complete, imposing, and unprecedented presence of the vice president.
Nine days after Dick Cheney took the vice-presidential oath of office, NEPDG
was established by President Bush. Almost immediately referred to as Cheney‟s task
force on energy, the group was instructed to formulate “a national energy policy designed
to help the private sector, and government at all levels, promote dependable, affordable,
and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy for the future.”186 In
addition to the vice president, the task force included four senior officials of the Bush
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administration; nine cabinet-level officials; assorted support staff; an interagency
working group; and public administrators from various federal agencies. 187
There was a parallel group of individuals who met with Cheney about the
direction of the administration‟s energy policy, and who were never accounted for in any
organizational chart. The composition of these unofficial counselors to the vice president,
and the extent of their influence in the formation of the administration‟s energy policy
would in time become one of the more mysterious elements of the inner workings of the
Cheney vice presidency. For the vice president to meet with a group of energy industry
leaders, along with other government officials, was not surprising, nor unusual. After all,
Cheney had been a chief executive of a major corporation immersed in the business of
energy. The president too had worked in the same industry, though the vice president was
markedly more successful when he was in the business world, than was his boss.
Poles apart from his mid-1970s approach to policy formulation in the executive
branch--when he worked with Donald Rumsfeld to undercut Vice President Nelson
Rockefeller and the Domestic Council, and to obstruct the vice president in the
formulation of public policy for the Ford administration--by 2001, Dick Cheney was
determined to keep matters of policy within the vice president‟s office. There was no
need for a Domestic Council, per se, as the vice president, and those working closest to
him, kept their own counsel. And because President Bush by most accounts appeared
disengaged with the details of governance, Cheney had no need to wrest control of the
public policy agenda from the president.188
But what made Cheney‟s actions with the energy task force apropos to a broad
review of his vice presidency was that all the components underlying his theory of
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executive preeminence coalesced. This included the vice president holding meetings on
the nation‟s energy policy in secret and with anonymous attendees; the assertion of
executive privilege for the vice president, thus setting precedent; the cooptation of
cabinet secretaries, in this case affecting those individuals heading the Department of
Interior and the Department of Energy; and challenging the principle of congressional
oversight, therefore repudiating the system of checks and balances implicit in the United
States Constitution. 189
In the end, Dick Cheney managed to build on the precedent of presidents tasking
vice presidents with policy portfolios; he then made that particular institutional marker
more germane to executive governance. Indeed, with the National Energy Policy
Development Group, Cheney achieved the outcome which had informed his every move
when he was vice president: he had helped to reinvigorate the power and preeminence of
the executive in the American constitutional system. 190 More importantly, he had
achieved this from his place in the office of the vice president.
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7 Institutional Development by Constitutional Directive: The Twenty-fifth
Amendment
“No second-rater ever ought to be nominated for Vice-President.”191
(Vice President John Nance Garner)
Unquestionably, presidential succession and those instances of the incapacitation
of the incumbent president were problematic, and had been since the establishment of the
nation. At the same time, vacancies in the vice presidency were consistently an auxiliary
concern; although, concern is too strong of a descriptor for the reaction to those occasions
when the second office fell vacant. As was demonstrated by the earlier review of the
string of succession laws, the Congress, in tandem with specific presidents, repeatedly
confronted the equivocation they found on the subject within the Constitution. And
though the Constitution did offer some direction for filling presidential vacancies--and
Vice President John Tyler seized on the first opportunity to test it--the Constitution
offered no guidance for replacing the vice president, should the vice president die, resign,
be impeached, or succeed to the presidency. Naturally, the main worry was not about
filling the vice presidency so that the duties of the office could be satisfied; instead, the
anxiety came from the absence of a ready successor, should a vacancy in the presidency
occur.
With the deaths of Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy within eighteen years of
one another--making the pair the seventh and eighth incumbent presidents to die-presidential succession was becoming an inescapable facet of the American political
system. Moreover, with Roosevelt‟s death occurring when the United States was
involved in a world war; and with Kennedy‟s assassination happening suddenly and
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violently, and in the shadow of a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union, the necessity
in having a vice president in place to succeed to the presidency could not have been
clearer. The vice presidency could no longer be neglected, nor could the office be left
vacant for years at a time.
It was therefore in a climate of fear and uncertainty when the first steps were
taken toward the enumeration of an orderly, constitutional method for managing
presidential succession, as well as for handling scenarios when the president is
incapacitated; and finally, for filling vacancies in the vice presidency. This all came about
when Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana introduced Senate Joint Resolution 139, just twenty
days after Kennedy was killed; it was the precursor for what eventually became the
Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 192
After countless hours of congressional debate; obtaining the support of two-thirds
of both chambers of Congress; and gaining passage by three-fourths of all the state
legislatures in the nation; the Twenty-fifth Amendment was ratified on February 23,
1967. The Twenty-fifth Amendment unequivocally demarcates presidential succession,
declaring in the first section that should the president be removed from office, die, or
resign, “the Vice President shall become President.”193 Finally, any residual ambiguity on
the vice president rightfully succeeding to the presidency was put to rest.
In the third and fourth sections of the amendment, the framework for handling
presidential inability is delineated; including provisions for when the president may
declare an inability exists, or the vice president and a majority of the cabinet asserts the
same about the president‟s condition. Under either circumstance, the vice president
assumes the presidency and “the powers and duties of the office as Acting President”
110

until it is confirmed by the president, vice president, and the cabinet, that an inability no
longer stands.
One scenario the succession provision of the Twenty-fifth Amendment does not
directly address is managing the remote possibility of a double-vacancy in the executive
offices--though the absence of direction made sense. If it should occur, the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947 would take effect. Under the Succession Act, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives is the first in the line of succession, meant to discharge the
duties and responsibilities of the president, for the remainder of the current presidential
term, and until an election is held. 194
It was the second section of the Twenty-fifth Amendment which was put in
practice twice in the 1970s. That section defines how vice-presidential vacancies are to be
filled, giving the president the power to “nominate a Vice President who shall take office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.” Obviously this gave
the president a strong hand in choosing a potential successor and, assuming the vice
president served ably and without scandal, aided that individual in gaining a future
presidential nomination.
Additionally, by granting the president the means for choosing a replacement vice
president, the political party in control of the executive branch had a better chance for
maintaining control. Without fail, the earlier debates on the different succession laws
gravitated to an unwelcome prospect. If the vice president was to succeed to the
presidency and then die, resign, or be removed from office, and the opposition party was
in control of Congress, then the will of the majority of the voters would be overturned.
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More challenging than having the political party that lost the presidential election
taking over the executive branch via succession, however, was the selection of a
replacement vice president, essentially by presidential fiat, and devoid of the direct
consent of the voters. Such a process created, as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. once noted, “a
unilateral presidential appointment subject to congressional confirmation.” 195 Hence, if
the Twenty-fifth Amendment solved, among other concerns, the quandary of filling
vacancies in the vice presidency, it does so by a method that is outwardly contradictory to
the spirit of democratic ideals. Then again, the argument is not easily made that
presidential selection has ever been dictated by democratic ideals. Either way, in order to
rectify that flaw in the amendment, again turning to Schlesinger, the simplest way would
be to “adopt a constitutional amendment abolishing the Vice Presidency, an office that
has become both more superfluous and more mischievous than Hamilton could have
imagined…and then provide for the succession…through a congressional statute
reestablishing the principle of special presidential elections.” 196
The alternative to vice-presidential succession--special presidential elections-would provide a valuable dose of direct participation by the electorate; yet, this method
does not account for the immediacy of succession. In other words, succession by the vice
president to the presidency has occurred--eight out of nine times--because of death. The
ninth instance of succession came about when President Richard Nixon resigned from
office, following a protracted struggle by Nixon to remain in office. Aside from the
Nixon case, as well as the lengthy death watch following the shooting of President James
Garfield, the circumstances prompting succession have been abrupt. What matters then is
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that each instance when the vice president has succeeded to the presidency, regardless of
the alacrity of events, the transition of power has been seamless.
Here too the sagacity of the Framers is evident in that succession was provided for
at all, even if imprecisely. The powers of the presidency, absent a president, were meant
to devolve to the vice president, and such powers were to rest with the vice president,
until an election for president was held. It was James Madison who, at one point at the
Federal Convention, suggested drafting alternate wording for how and when to fill such
vacancies. Madison‟s disquiet was based on the absence of any provision for “an
intermediate election” to choose a new president. Madison won his point, but the wording
of that part of the Constitution was indefinite. Was the vice president meant to serve as
president until the traditional quadrennial election was held? Or was Congress meant to
determine a date and time for an intermediate presidential election? Over the years, when
presidential succession was prompted, and the vice president was compelled to fulfill the
remainder of the president‟s term of office--thus avoiding a rushed, intermediate election-propinquity, continuity, and stability have underscored the entire process.
Finally, the effectiveness of the Twenty-fifth Amendment is patently manifest in
the reduction in time the vice presidency remains unoccupied after the office becomes
vacant. As supported by the data in Table 1.1, prior to the adoption of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment, in 1967, the vice presidency fell vacant on sixteen occasions; and since
1967, the office has been unoccupied just twice. Of the first sixteen vacancies, seven
were due to the vice president dying in office; one vacancy came about with the
resignation of the vice president; and eight of the vacancies were initiated when the vice
president succeeded to the presidency. And of the two vacancies since the Twenty-fifth
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Amendment was adopted, one occurred when the vice president resigned; and the second
vacancy was prompted by the resignation of the president, and the subsequent succession
to the presidency by the first appointed vice president in history.
Remarkably, prior to the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the vice presidency was
regularly left unoccupied for lengthy periods of time. For example, in the nineteenth
century the vice presidency was vacated eleven times. Of those eleven vacancies, on five
occasions the office remained unoccupied for three years, and of those five cases, three
times the office was vacant for almost four years. In addition, two of the vacancies to
occur in the twentieth century--both pre-1967, and both due to the vice president
succeeding to the presidency--the office went unoccupied for well over three years.
Since the Twenty-fifth Amendment was incorporated into the Constitution, thus
providing a methodical means for filling vacancies in the vice presidency, the amount of
time the office was left unoccupied diminished precipitously. For instance, when Vice
President Spiro Agnew resigned in 1973, merely one month and twenty-six days elapsed
from the time President Richard Nixon submitted his choice to succeed Agnew, Gerald
Ford, and Ford‟s confirmation by Congress. Subsequently, when Ford moved from the
vice presidency to the presidency, and then named his own successor to the second office,
Nelson Rockefeller, there was a vacancy gap of just four months and eight days.
By every measure the Twenty-fifth Amendment has been a success. The time that
the office stands vacant has been lessened because the president now has the authority to
locate, nominate, and replace the vice president within a brief period. This is important
because modern vice presidents are much more utilitarian than vice presidents in earlier
eras; indeed, throughout the course of the twentieth century, expectations for the
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executive in the American system have become much greater. The view that both
executives of the national government may exercise greater authority and responsibilities
is therefore compatible with the idea of extending, by direction of the president, the role
of the vice president in executive governance. The outcome of this arrangement is the
vice president is of more value to the president, to the administration, and to the nation,
than ever before.
The Twenty-fifth Amendment, however, has not escaped criticism. In the mid1970s, one scholar went so far as to claim the “flaws” of the Twenty-fifth Amendment
“lurk in every corner, in every clause.”197 It has been suggested that in allowing the
president to choose a replacement vice president, the president is doing much more than
filling a vacancy in an otherwise elective position. 198 Instead, when selecting a nominee
for vice president, the president does so without the practical input of the electorate. In
theory, this then gives a single individual the authority to choose the second highest
ranking officer of the United States government.199 Even when acknowledging the
validity of the preceding objections to the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the more practical
and significant outcome is this: on those occasions when there is divided government, the
amendment reduces the probability of overturning the mandate of the electorate, as would
happen if circumstances dictated, and the Succession Act of 1947 was initiated.
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8 The Vice Presidency Augmented: By Resources, Institutional Identifiers, and
Access
“If you close your left eye and turn your head just right, the great seal of the vice
president reads: President of the United States of America.” 200
(Vice President Al Gore)
The history and development of the vice presidency has been infused by
perceptions about the institution, perhaps to a greater degree than any other institution in
the American system of government. Unquestionably, perceptions about the vice
presidency have been informed, in equal parts, by disregard for, and misunderstanding of,
the institution. Either way, the perception of an underutilized, and even unwanted,
appendage to the government has persisted for much of the history of the institution. It is
a view that James Monroe captured well when he pointedly asserted: “The Vice-President
is an unnecessary office. I can see no reason for such an office.” 201
And yet the vice presidency has developed despite the insolence Monroe
evidenced toward the institution, and which many others shared with him. Perhaps this is
explained by the inherent authority the vice presidency derives from having been
sanctioned in the Constitution. In this vein, the authors of the foremost exposition on
political development have posited that “authority works through perceptions. It is
strengthened by legitimacy, by the perceptions of all concerned that those formally in
control are acting appropriately.” 202 In other words, the vice president‟s place in the
scheme of government is reinforced by the legitimacy afforded it by inclusion in the
Constitution, which subsequently furthers the perception that the office belongs there.
While the Constitution confers authority to the vice president to act as presiding
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officer of the Senate; and similarly the National Security Act of 1947 granted statutory
membership for the vice president in the National Security Council; by and large, the vice
presidency has developed and thrived by perceptions of what makes the institution whole.
Put another way: if, at the Federal Convention of 1787, the office of the vice president
was delimited in scope of responsibilities; and to some degree its essentialness to the then
nascent American government was not readily apparent; the office has gained a measure
of stature and presumed authority from the accumulation of institutional identifiers and
tangible resources.
There were no formal identifiers of the office of the vice president for the first
147 years the office existed. Like so much of the development of the vice presidency, it
was a president who signaled when and how the institutional vice presidency would
expand. While institutional identifiers might seem an insubstantial or even trivial feature
of institutions, such identifiers are tangible markers of the institution‟s permanence. In
the case of the American vice presidency, the institutional identifiers attached to the
office of the vice president have accumulated incrementally and are a transparent
acknowledgment of the institution‟s development and, of greater consequence, relevance.
Apart from gaining a designated office in the Senate wing of the Capitol in 1857,
the first tangible identifier of the office of the vice president was the order for a distinct
vice-presidential flag. This came about on February 7, 1936 when President Franklin
Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 7285--Prescribing the Official Flag of the Vice
President of the United States. Although it was purely a symbolic representation of the
vice president‟s office, Roosevelt‟s gesture indicated the second office in the land was
worthy of the type of accoutrements that were affixed to all other institutions of the
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government.
Later, President Harry Truman issued an executive order for a coat of arms and
seal for the office of vice president, as well as a new version of the vice-presidential
flag.203 Perhaps because he was once vice president, Truman decided to personally
oversee the redesign of the flag initially conferred on the office by Franklin Roosevelt.
The coat of arms and seal, along with the vice-presidential flag, were then the principal
institutional identifiers attached to the office of vice president. Even if such adornments
were mainly of aesthetic value, it is a plausible assertion that such visible signs of the
office contributed to the further institutionalization of the vice presidency.
The aforementioned Capitol office space for the vice president was a development
that President James Buchanan‟s vice president, John Breckinridge, was the first to
benefit from. Breckinridge was destined to serve as a neglected and forgotten vice
president, set apart by virtue of being the youngest elected vice president in history.
However, prior to Breckinridge‟s service, the office of vice president was never accorded
office space--anywhere. As it happens, what office space the vice president was allowed
to use was in the Capitol building and had to be shared with the president.204 Hence,
when the Capitol was expanded in the 1850s, the Senate membership finally recognized
its presiding officer by designating “The Vice President‟s Room,” as a distinct location
where the vice president could be found.
The preceding arrangement existed until 1953. Soon after Richard Nixon was
elected and inaugurated the thirty-fifth vice president, he was given a cluster of offices in
the building housing the Department of State, now named the Harry S. Truman Building.
Prompting the expanded office space was a much larger staff for the vice president, at
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least in comparison to earlier vice presidents. Prior to Nixon, vice presidents were
allowed minimal staff. For instance, apart from a secretary, it was assumed the vice
president was so lacking in tasks that there was no need for support staff, and so none
were provided for. And at the turn of the twentieth century, when the vice president was
allocated a car and a driver, the incumbent vice president was expected to pay for gas and
maintenance.
Harry Truman was the first vice president to have a military aide included among
the nominal staff then accorded to the office. Since the United States was thoroughly
involved in the Second World War, it made sense to link the vice president, by some
means, to the military establishment of the nation. Also, during Truman‟s brief tenure, for
the first time in the history of the second office, the vice president was deemed worthy of
the protection of a single Secret Service agent. This was in sharp contrast to four years
earlier when then vice president-elect, Henry Wallace, had traveled to Mexico in a
caravan of two cars; his entourage included his wife, a driver, two aides, and no security
detail.
As for Richard Nixon, after his election to the vice presidency, he was allotted
$47, 970 for an initial staff of nine. Poignantly, this was a considerable drop from when
he served as a United States senator and his budget for staff totaled $70,000.205
Nevertheless, the idea that Nixon, as vice president, had need for a staff of nine and a
budget was emblematic of the undeniable increase in institutional resources then being
made available to the vice president. Twenty-one years later, when Nixon‟s long time
political rival Nelson Rockefeller was appointed to the vice presidency, he was allocated
over two million dollars for a staff of more than seventy.
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By 2011, the office of the vice president was included in the federal budget as part
of the Executive Office of the President, under the heading: “Special Assistance to the
President and the Official Residence of the Vice President.” The vice president‟s salary
continues to be paid by the Senate, as are the salaries of vice-presidential assistants
assigned primarily to the vice president‟s offices in the Capitol; otherwise, per the federal
budget, allocations for staff salaries, carrying out the various functions of the formal
Office of the Vice President, maintenance of the vice president‟s residence, and “$90,000
[to be provided] for official entertainment expenses for the Vice President,” totals well
over 25 million, per annum. 206
Perhaps of greater significance than the financial outlays just noted, of the nearly
100 staffers who support Vice President Joe Biden in his work, six of his top assistants,
including the chief of staff, are designated an “assistant,” “deputy assistant,” or “special
assistant” to the president--in addition to their formal title within the vice president‟s
office. In a town where perception matters, having high level vice-presidential staffers
simultaneously identified with the president and the vice president indicates, in terms of
stature, considerable institutional growth for the vice presidency.
Returning to Richard Nixon, in the eight years Nixon was vice president, his staff
and Secret Service detail incrementally increased. As was the pattern for the modern vice
presidency, every instance of augmentation to the institution paved the way for
successive vice presidents to benefit from the expanded institutional resources made
available to their predecessors. Therefore, what Nixon had gained, largely via the
initiative and support of President Dwight Eisenhower, moved forward to Nixon‟s
successor, Lyndon Johnson. And because the president Johnson served under was
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amenable to continuing what Eisenhower had sanctioned for Nixon, then Johnson started
his vice-presidential tenure in a better position than had Nixon.
Yet when Johnson was inaugurated as the number two executive of the nation, he
struggled with relinquishing the immense power he possessed as the Senate majority
leader. Initially, and to the consternation of many senators, Johnson tried to have it both
ways. First, he wanted to lead the Senate Democratic caucus; and then he fought to keep
the expansive offices in the Capitol that were reserved for the majority leader. 207 When
both endeavors failed, Johnson had to settle for the presiding officer‟s chair, and a
sprawling suite of offices in what was then known as the Old Executive Office
Building.208 Indubitably, even being the first vice president to have offices in the historic
building--adjacent to the West Wing of the White House--was a minor consolation for a
man with Johnson‟s outsized ego.
Every vice president since Lyndon Johnson has maintained a suite of offices in
what is now called the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, as well as the vice
president‟s office in the Senate wing of the Capitol. The move toward expanded office
and staff resources that began with Richard Nixon continued and built with each vice
president to follow him. When Nixon finally won the presidency in 1968, he seemed to
be trending again toward making the vice president a more substantial player in the
government. To this end, Nixon gave Spiro Agnew an office in the White House, making
him the first vice president in history to have an office there. 209 Although Nixon‟s gesture
turned out to be purely symbolic, meant only to make the vice president appear integrated
within the executive operation, it did allow Agnew, for a time, to get closer to the locus
of power than many of his predecessors ever did.
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Although Agnew was forced to relinquish the space, ostensibly to make room for
Nixon‟s staff, the idea of the vice president working from the White House had been
made credible.210 Therefore, when Jimmy Carter won the presidency, he made sure the
vice president was given a private office in the West Wing of the White House--just a
few doors down the hall from the Oval Office. It was the earlier arrangement, with the
vice president‟s staff and offices scattered around the capital city, that led Walter
Mondale to claim “the vice president…was usually uninformed, uninvited, and often
unwanted by the White House.”211 As it stood, the location and retention of the vice
president‟s office space in the White House was important to Mondale, and for the
institution, because the proximity of the vice president to the president indicated access to
the power and resources of the presidency, as well. It also meant the vice president was
more likely to be included, and therefore influence, deliberations within the president‟s
office, and with the president‟s staff.
There is probably no better identifier of the American presidency than the White
House. Not only does the president work there, the president lives there. The vice
presidency, however, not only wanted for distinct office space for the first sixty-eight
years the institution was in place, vice presidents were without, in the words of Vice
President Calvin Coolidge, “an official residence.” 212 It was Coolidge‟s view that “the
great office should have a settled and permanent habitation and a place, irrespective of
the financial ability of its temporary occupant…It would be much more in harmony with
our theory of equality if each Vice-President held the same position in the Capital
City.”213
Coolidge‟s dream for a vice-presidential residence would not be realized in his
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lifetime. Nor was housing for the vice president a concern of just Coolidge; instead, it
had been a consideration for every vice president since John Adams first held the office;
and, as it would turn out, an official residence would be lacking for thirty-eight of the
vice presidents who came to office after Adams. It was not until Gerald Ford was
appointed and confirmed to the vice presidency that Congress finally appropriated the
funds to acquire a permanent residence for the vice president.214 Ford‟s timely elevation
to the presidency, however, did not permit his ever staying in the vice president‟s house;
and so it was the forty-first vice president, Nelson Rockefeller, who had sufficient time to
move into the vice president‟s home on Observatory Hill. Poignantly, Rockefeller
possessed ample financial resources; therefore, he could afford to decline public housing.
He subsequently opted not to stay in the vice president‟s residence and used the house
solely for social events.
After years of wanting for a permanent residence for the vice president, it would
be the third vice president given the opportunity to stay there, Walter Mondale, who
finally did. Even though Mondale‟s vice-presidential record stands on its own, it is still of
some meaning that Mondale and his family were the first to live in the official residence
provided for the vice president. The house located at the United States Naval Observatory
was, in his view, the best house his family had ever inhabited. 215 Finally, and after only
188 years, the vice president of the United States resided in government housing.
Granting that official flags and seals, and even an official residence, are more
symbolic than substantive, there is still value to the vice-presidential institution in
possessing such identifiable symbols. As it stands, the perceptible manifestation of
institutional resources--such as access to government jets, an extensive staff, and an
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ample office budget--symbolize authority and influence. Whether authority and influence
are realized is of course another story, depending entirely on the level of either feature a
specific president permits. But of significance, the accumulation of institutional
identifiers, in tandem with the increase in tangible resources accorded the vice
presidency, have paralleled the expanded policy portfolio that modern vice presidents
have incrementally accrued. It is the transformative, accumulative effect of all the
preceding institutional markers that have made for the changed vice presidency which
stands today.
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9 Conclusion: The Vice Presidency Today
“What the Vice President will do or is permitted to do, in the main, is determined by what
the President assigns to him or permits him to do and the power and authority that he is
willing to share with him. The President can bestow assignments and authority and can
remove that authority and power at will.” 216
(Vice President Hubert Humphrey)
The American vice presidency of the twenty-first century is a decidedly
transformed political institution from the one established by the Framers in 1787. As an
officer of the national government, meant only to preside in one chamber of the
Congress--with no vote except to break a tie among the members of that body, and
intended to substitute for the president under certain circumstances, though for a time that
was a disputed notion--the vice president is now an officer of the national government,
genuinely second only to the president. And yet, “the grotesqueness of the predicament”
of the American vice presidency--as Franklin Roosevelt aptly characterized it in 1920-continues to escape the collective consciousness of the nation; it is, again turning to
Roosevelt, as if the vice presidency has been accepted as it stands, and taken purely “as a
matter of course.”217
Contrary to the attitude of indifference assumed by most Americans toward the
vice presidency, the vice presidency is a more substantial institution today, than it was
when it was first considered at the Federal Convention of 1787. But how could such a
transformation have happened? The vice presidency became a government institution by
virtue of its establishment in the United States Constitution; yet, the Constitution has not
been amended for the purpose of granting additional functions and duties for the vice
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president, beyond those already prescribed. And the two constitutional amendments with
a direct bearing on the institution were concerned with ancillary matters, and were not
duty related. The first of these, the Twelfth Amendment, was intended to sort out the
election process for choosing the president and the vice president. And the second, the
Twenty-fifth Amendment, was generated to solidify vice-presidential succession; provide
a method for selecting a replacement vice president for those occasions when the second
office fell vacant; and managing presidential inability and the procedures for installing
the vice president in the capacity of a temporary, acting president.
Other than making the vice president a permanent member of the National
Security Council, the institutional framework for the vice presidency has stood as it was
created, and perchance just as it was intended. Hence, as an institution of the government,
essentially in name only, the vice presidency incrementally and subtly became much
more. Twenty-one years into the twentieth century, the inclusion of the vice president in
the president‟s cabinet fostered a more concrete attachment to the executive branch for
the vice presidency; it was an attachment previously defined only by the shared election
of the top two offices of the national government. However, by mid-century, vice
presidents were becoming indispensible deputies to the presidents they served--most
notably Henry Wallace and Richard Nixon.
By the 1970s, the growth of the presidency, in tandem with the accumulation of
institutional resources available to the president, as well as to the vice president, fostered
an expanded reach and presence for the vice president within the executive branch. In
conjunction with increased resources came a corresponding level of vice-presidential
influence. Even if the nature of such influence was colored by each specific vice
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president and president, a sizable measure of influence was exercised by every vice
president, beginning in 1974 with Nelson Rockefeller. The growth of the institution was
indisputable by that point and it is a trend that is most likely irreversible. In addition, over
time the formal Office of the Vice President began to match, though clearly not in
density, the composition of the Executive Office of the President. In light of the
preceding, and taken in the aggregate, the American vice presidency had finally arrived;
in the process, it had become a fully realized institution of the government.
At the time of this writing, Joe Biden is the vice president of the United States.
Based on the example set by his most recent predecessors--Al Gore and Dick Cheney-Biden arrived in office confident that he would be taking on an enhanced political
institution. More importantly, he could be certain that Gore and Cheney, by their relations
with their respective presidents, had further established the indispensability of the vice
president to the president. During the 2008 campaign, Biden framed his then hypothetical
vice presidency precisely along these lines, stating:
I would be the point person for the legislative initiatives in the United States
Congress for our administration. I would also, when asked if I wanted a portfolio,
my response was, no. But Barack Obama indicated to me he wanted me with him
to help him govern. So every major decision he‟ll be making, I‟ll be sitting in the
room to give him my best advice. He‟s president, not me, I‟ll give my best
advice. 218

Once inaugurated, Vice President Biden became an unceasing presence by the
side of President Barack Obama. And just as Gore and Cheney did before him, Biden was
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equally involved in the post-election and transition activities. This included the placement
of key personnel, ensuring he continues to exercise influence on the president, even on
those occasions when he is not nearby. Where Biden has transparently differed from Gore
and Cheney, however, is in his aversion to the prime ministerial portfolios which helped
define the tenures of his predecessors. Although it would be a mischaracterization to
claim Biden has escaped entirely the tradition of the vice president leading any number of
commissions established by the president, with the most prominent of these being his
chairmanship of the Middle Class Task Force. Overall, Biden appears to be involved with
President Obama in determining the priorities of the administration, while forging a
productive partnership with his president.219
It was appropriate that after thirty-six years of service in the United States Senate,
Joe Biden was elected vice president and therefore became the president of the Senate.
His lengthy service in Congress allowed him to build a network of alliances, Democratic
and Republican, which continues to be of considerable value to the Obama
administration. And because he possesses a legislative background his president could
not begin to approach, of necessity Biden has affected a reemphasis on the vice president
in the national legislature. In many respects, this is a return to form and was reflected in
the modern era vice presidencies of John Nance Garner, Alben Barkley, Lyndon Johnson,
and Hubert Humphrey; all of whom--like Biden--were creatures of the legislative branch.
Indeed, Barkley and Humphrey were so at home there that they returned to the Senate
after four years of service in the vice presidency.
Yet where Biden differs most from his recent predecessors is the consistency with
which he is in the Capitol building. He regularly exercises in the Senate gymnasium and
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when Congress is in session he frequently works in the ceremonial office of the vice
president.220 Paradoxically, Biden rarely presides, in a sense dodging the principal
constitutionally sanctioned function of the position he holds. For the most part, Biden is
adhering to what is now a ritual of the vice presidency; tending to the deliberations of the
Senate only when it is obvious the vice president‟s tie breaking vote will be necessary.
Still, Biden‟s activism in and around the Congress extends past presiding and is grounded
by his interactions with individual members and, of course, the Democratic caucuses of
both chambers.
In the coming years, Vice President Biden‟s role on Capitol Hill is bound to grow.
Moreover, because the vice presidency has developed so much since its inception, over
time becoming a highly formidable institution, then by extension the presence of the vice
president in Congress is of more significance. Naturally, the extent of Biden‟s
involvement in the legislative branch will be driven in equal parts by fluctuations in the
partisan makeup and tenor of the Congress; the cohesiveness of the Democratic Party;
and the future political fortunes of both major political parties. But it is the capacity of
modern vice presidents to shift their focus from the executive to the legislative realm-and back again, if need be--that makes the hybrid form of the institution so vital. And it is
the flexibility of the institution which further compounds the utility of the vice president
to the president.
What makes the vice presidency such a fascinating study in institutional
development is the ongoing paradox of the office; that being, vice presidents will forever
be at the mercy of the president they serve. Apart from where the Constitution addresses
the vice president, every other function, identifier, and portfolio affixed to the office of
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vice president exists at the discretion of the incumbent president. It is, in the words of
former vice president Dan Quayle, “up to the vice president to do what the president
wants.”221
Over time the institutional markers identified here have coalesced, making for a
fully formed political institution. These institutional markers have reinforced the
permanence of the institutional vice presidency; and while the president-to-vice president
arrangement is still essential to the efficacy of any vice president‟s tenure, modern vice
presidents find themselves inhabiting an office dissimilar from their eighteenth and
nineteenth century predecessors. For those who were or would be vice president in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries are not easily dismissed. In large part this is because
the institutional markers that pinpoint the institution‟s growth have broadly paralleled an
increase in public awareness of the office.
But has greater public awareness of the vice presidency resulted in the
development of a constituency specific to vice presidents? Along these lines, in the
second year of the Clinton presidency, Al Gore characterized his experience as vice
president as one wherein he was routinely exposed to the rigors of the presidency. Gore
maintained that since Bill Clinton was “so generous in his definition of our partnership, I
have gotten a pretty good taste of what that [the presidency] is really like. And on a daily
basis.”222 Around the same time, Jack Quinn, the vice president‟s chief of staff, stressed
the robustness of the Clinton-Gore association. Quinn anticipated an atypical outcome of
the president-to-vice president arrangement Clinton and Gore maintained; predicting that
if Gore sought the presidency again, he would “do so with a very real record on which he
will be judged, as opposed to” any of his predecessors in the second office. 223
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The preceding comments from Gore and his chief of staff raise some questions. If
Gore worked in as close proximity to the president as all the evidence indicates, then how
would he, as a candidate for president, distinguish himself from Clinton? Or could Gore,
if his chief of staff was the more prescient, and if he was unlike previous vice presidents,
run for the higher office on a record that stood apart from that of the incumbent
president? In other words, is it possible for any vice president to develop a record
separate from that of the president, which in turn could facilitate the growth of a
constituency specific to the vice president? Using Gore‟s run for the presidency in 2000
as a benchmark, the argument could be made that, despite eight years of a productive,
highly visible vice presidency, Vice President Gore never developed a record, nor a
constituency, which was entirely free from a connection to President Clinton and the
Clinton administration.
Yet even if the public continues to focus foremost on the presidency, the
attachment of the vice presidency, constitutionally and figuratively, to the presidency
makes the second office matter. By and large, this is because the vice presidency is
insuperably linked to the presidency. This continues despite the transparent augmentation
of the vice-presidential institution, and in the face of the, generally, improved caliber of
individuals who are willing to run for the job. On the whole, it is an appropriate
connection; for were it not for certain presidents, the vice presidency would surely still be
identified, as one political scientist described it in the 1950s, as “a hollow shell of an
office” occupied by “no one we should like to see” in the presidency. 224 And yet, while
the presidency has made the vice presidency matter, today the modern American vice
presidency is no longer entirely in the shadow of the first office of the land.
131

Endnotes
1

Maclay, Journal, p. 3.

2

See Appendix C for the text of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of

America.
3

For an in-depth examination of Calvin Coolidge‟s life-long battle with depression and how the disease

affected Coolidge‟s life and presidency, see Robert Gilbert‟s excellent text, The Tormented President:
Calvin Coolidge, Death, and Clinical Depression.
4

Ibid., passim.

5

See the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, sec. 3, sec. 4.

6

Learned, “Some Aspects of the Vice-Presidency,” pp. 162-177.

7

Ibid., p. 172.

8

Humphrey, “Changes in the Vice Presidency,” p. 58.

9

See Appendix B for the text of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947.

10

Haig, Inner Circles, p. 353.

11

For one example of Marie Natoli‟s brief studies of particular vice presidents see her article “The Vice

Presidency: Gerald Ford as Healer.” In addition, see Natoli‟s pair of articles dealing with concerns specific
to the viability of the institution: “The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Opening a Pandora‟s Box” and “Abolish
the Vice Presidency?”
12

See At the President’s Side: The Vice Presidency in the Twentieth Century, edited by Timothy Walch.

13

Among others, for vice-presidential nominations see William Mayer‟s useful essay “A Brief History of

Vice Presidential Selection,” pp. 313-374. And for public opinion polling and vice presidents, see Jeffrey
Cohen‟s pair of articles: “„The Polls‟: Popular Views of the Vice President and Vice Presidential
Approval,” pp. 142-149; and “„The Polls‟: Popular Views of the Vice President and Vice Presidential
Favorability.” Finally, for policy portfolios and vice presidents, specifically the foreign policy portfolio, see
the following two articles by Paul Kengor: “The Foreign Policy Role of Vice President Al Gore,” pp. 1438; and “The Vice President, Secretary of State, and Foreign Policy,” pp. 175-199.

132

14

The book referenced is Jack Lechelt‟s The Vice Presidency in Foreign Policy: From Mondale to Cheney.

It should be noted: only a minimal, cursory examination of the Lechelt text was made by the author, and the
conclusions Lechelt makes are not significantly revisited.
15

Ibid., p. 13.

16

Mondale, “Sideman,” p. 7. The manuscript provided to the author by Walter Mondale of his lecture is

capitalized in its entirety; therefore, for all direct quotations from the lecture, capitalization choices have
been made at the author‟s discretion.
17

Wilson, Constitutional Government, p. 14.

18

Feerick, From Failing Hands, p. 68.

19

See Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 368.

20

Farrand, Framing of the Constitution, p. 160.

21

Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 368.

22

Ibid.

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid., p. 596.

25

See John Ferling‟s Adams vs. Jefferson, passim for a concise retelling of the 1800 presidential election.

Also, Bruce Ackerman and David Fontana‟s article “Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the
Presidency” gives additional details on the resolution of the 1800 presidential contest.
26

U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 1.

27

For a detailed consideration of balancing variables used in making vice-presidential nominations,

including region of the country candidates hail from, see Hite, Second Best, Chapter 4, passim.
28

Hamilton, Federalist (No. 68), p. 444.

29

On the merits of choosing two candidates for president at the same time, among others see Waugh,

Second Consul, p. 26; and Schlesinger‟s “On the Presidential Succession,” p. 490.
30

Hamilton, Writings, pp. 149-150.

31

Ibid., p. 149.

133

32

Ibid.

33

Schlesinger, Jr., “On the Presidential Succession,” p. 488.

34

Hamilton, Writings, p. 149.

35

In Williams, Rise of the Vice Presidency, p. 16.

36

Hamilton, Federalist, p. 445.

37

Ibid., pp. 444-445.

38

Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 596.

39

Wilson, Congressional Government, p. 162.

40

Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 596.

41

Ibid.

42

Ibid.

43

Ibid.

44

Annals of the Congress, 8th Cong., 1st sess., p. 693. James Elliot was a member of the House of

Representatives from Vermont.
45

Hamilton, Federalist, (No. 10) p. 54.

46

Ibid., p. 57.

47

Washington, Writings, p. 225.

48

Although Thomas Jefferson and his adherents--including James Madison and James Monroe--often

described themselves as Republicans, they and their associates were also described as DemocraticRepublicans. Since the association of Democratic-Republicans later became the Democratic Party, and was
never identified with what became the Republican Party, when describing the former group in this project,
only the label of Democratic-Republicans is used.
49

Thompson, Essay, p. 22. Both the Democratic-Republicans and the Federalists held a caucus of their

congressional member in 1796, but there are no official records of either; it is therefore uncertain how
formally organized either gathering was.

134

50

Among others, see Thompson‟s Essay, with regard to the presumptive nominees for president and vice

president of the two competing congressional caucuses of 1796, p. 22.
51

See Smith, “Election of 1796,” p. 71; and Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, p. 85.

52

Ibid.

53

There are countless references to Aaron Burr‟s alleged designs in the elections of 1796 and 1800. One

such example is historian John Ferling, who notes the “suspicions among some” that Aaron Burr was
aiming more for the presidency than for the vice presidency; in Adams vs. Jefferson, p. 85.
54

Smith, “Election of 1796,” p. 71.

55

Page Smith makes the point that Jefferson‟s followers “had hit upon the strategy of the future by working

to create…grass-roots sentiment for their party and their candidate,” in “Election of 1796,” p. 71.
56

See Smith, “Election of 1796,” p. 71; and Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, pp. 87-89.

57

Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, pp. 87-88.

58

See Smith, “Election of 1796,” pp. 70-71; also, Cohen, etc., note the choice of Burr for vice president in

1796 and 1800 specifically because of his connection to New York, which would serve as an effective
counter to Thomas Jefferson hailing from Virginia, in Party Decides, p. 63.
59

Smith, “Election of 1796,” p. 71; and Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, pp. 87-94.

60

Smith, “Election of 1796,” pp. 71-72.

61

See Lomask‟s Aaron Burr, pp. 247-255, for a retelling of the machinations and obstructions preceding

Burr‟s eventual selection. Also, in Adams vs. Jefferson, Ferling points out that the Democratic-Republican
caucus, unlike the Federalists caucus, expressly “stipulated a choice for president. Their electors were told
that Jefferson was the party‟s first choice,” p. 132.
62

Lomask, Aaron Burr, pp. 254-255.

63

Ibid., p. 242.

64

For a comprehensive description of Burr‟s role in the New York election see Nathan Schachner‟s early,

definitive text Aaron Burr: A Biography, pp. 167-187. For a similar delineation of Burr‟s activities in New
York that year, see Lomask, Aaron Burr, pp.238-247.

135

65

Lomask comments on how critical it was to obtain New York‟s twelve electoral votes, in Aaron Burr, p.

237. Also, in Ferling‟s Adams vs. Jefferson, the author notes John Adams was “stunned” when he
discovered that the Democratic-Republicans had captured the state assembly; Adams knew that meant New
York‟s electors were destined to go for the opposition, p. 127.
66

See Cunningham, “Election of 1800,” pp. 108-109; Lomask, Aaron Burr, pp. 237-240; and Ferling,

Adams vs. Jefferson, p. 130.
67

Lomask, Aaron Burr, p. 240.

68

Ibid., pp. 240, 244.

69

For a description of John Adams ostensible campaign travels, see Cunningham, “Election of 1800,” pp.

115-116. Interestingly, in Adams vs. Jefferson, Ferling delineates Adams‟s itinerary, as well; however he
does not characterize Adams‟s trip as particularly political or successful, p. 139.
70

Cunningham, “Election of 1800,” p. 115; and Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, p. 140.

71

For reference to Burr‟s campaign activities after the New York contest, see Schachner, Aaron Burr, pp.

183-184.
72

The complete text of the letter is reprinted in Hamilton, Writings, “Letter from Alexander Hamilton,

Concerning the Public Conduct and Character of John Adams, Esq. President of the United States,” pp.
934-971.
73

For an assessment of Alexander Hamilton‟s derogatory letter about John Adams and the probable

ramifications of it, see Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, pp. 140-143. Also, a review of Aaron Burr‟s success in
obtaining and further circulating Hamilton‟s letter may be found in Lomask, Aaron Burr, pp. 257-259.
74

For a useful and interesting take on the Electoral College vote of 1800, see Ackerman and Fontana‟s

“Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency,” passim.
75

According to John Ferling, in Adams vs. Jefferson, there were rumors “of a Federalist conspiracy to

assassinate Jefferson,” p. 180; as well as indications “Virginia would secede if Jefferson was not elected,”
p. 188; and for a detailed exposition of the machinations the 1800 election when it went to the House of
Representatives for resolution, review pp. 175-196.

136

76

Ferling examines the role played by James Bayard in Adams vs. Jefferson, pp. 189-195.

77

The idea that Thomas Jefferson struck a deal with Federalists is based on letters written by Aaron Burr

and James Bayard, as well from depositions made by Bayard and Samuel Smith; in Ferling, Adams vs.
Jefferson, p. 193.
78

Hofstadter, American Political Tradition, p. 44.

79

For a retelling of Aaron Burr‟s role in obtaining and distributing copies of Alexander Hamilton‟s

damning letter about John Adams, see Lomask‟s Aaron Burr, pp. 257-258.
80

Hamilton, Writings, p. 514.

81

One alternative for amending the Constitution stipulates two-thirds of the state legislatures must ask

Congress to call a national convention to propose amendments; however, this method has never been
utilized. In addition, another method for ratifying a proposed amendment is if ratifying conventions in
three-fourths of the states approve the proposed amendment; but so far this method has been utilized for
only one amendment.
82

Annals of the Congress, 8th Cong., 1st sess., p. 673. Also, part of Samuel Dana‟s speech in the House of

Representatives is included in Feerick‟s From Failing Hands, p. 73.
83

For a brief summation of the Twelfth Amendment, including the debate in Congress indicating some

sentiment for abolishing the vice presidency, see Feerick, From Failing Hands, pp. 72-75.
84

Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 368.

85

Annals of the Congress, 8th Cong., 1st sess., p. 693. James Elliot was a member of the House of

Representatives.
86

Quote from Representative Roger Griswold is recorded in Annals of the Congress, 8th Cong., 1st sess., p.

674.
87

Annals of the Congress, 8th Cong., 1st sess., p. 674.

88

Ibid.

89

The text of Alexander Hamilton‟s “Proposal for the New York Legislature for Amending the

Constitution” is included in Hamilton‟s Writings, p. 982.

137

90

Hamilton, Writings, p. 982.

91

Ibid.

92

Appendix A is the text of the Twelfth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

93

The Twelfth Amendment cementing the pattern of political parties offering a team of candidates for

president and vice president is fairly obvious, and has been noted elsewhere; for one early reference to this
pattern, see Waugh, Second Consul, p. 50.
94

Ibid., p. 48.

95

The tendency for selecting elderly vice presidents is noted by Waugh in Second Consul, pp. 56-58.

96

Adams, Diary, pp. 520-521.

97

Tyler was described as “His Accidency” by any number of his contemporaries, and later biographers,

though the originator of the unfortunate moniker remains unknown. Among others, Peterson notes the
preceding descriptor for Tyler in Presidencies of William Henry Harrison & John Tyler, p. 50.
98

Schlesinger, Jr., “On the Presidential Succession,” p. 488.

99

Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 594.

100

Ibid., p. 594.

101

Article II, Section 1, paragraph 6.

102

Peterson, Presidencies of William Henry Harrison & John Tyler, p. 45. Peterson also offers a broad

consideration of some of the questions to arise about the vice president and presidential succession on pp.
45-50.
103

Ibid., p. 48. Also see Dan Monroe‟s Republican Vision of John Tyler and his claim that Tyler‟s decision

to retain the Harrison cabinet was one he would regret, p. 81
104

Monroe, Republican Vision of John Tyler, p. 81.

105

Natoli, “Abolish the Vice Presidency?” p. 203.

106

U.S. Constitution, Article 2, sec. 1.

107

Feerick, From Failing Hands, pp. 60-61.

108

Ibid., pp. 61-62.

138

109

For a broad treatment of the Succession Act of 1886, see Feerick, From Failing Hands, pp. 140-146.

110

In President Truman‟s June 19, 1945 message to Congress, Truman argued “the office of the President

should be filled by an elective officer,” and not individuals nominated by the president.
111

Feerick, From Failing Hands, p. 205.

112

Appendix B contains the complete text of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947.

113

Coolidge, Autobiography, p. 164.

114

Hatch, History of the Vice-Presidency, p. 378.

115

President Harding‟s attorney general, Harry Daugherty, wrote in his memoirs, The Inside Story of the

Harding Tragedy, that he came up with the idea of inviting Calvin Coolidge to meetings of the cabinet, pp.
277-278.
116

Interview with Francis J. Attig, United States Senate Historical Office--Oral History Project, April 5,

1978, p. 73. Interview conducted by Donald A. Ritchie.
117

Ibid.

118

For the paragraph Woodrow Wilson devoted to the vice presidency, see Congressional Government, p.

162.
119

Ibid.

120

Testimony of Clark Clifford, U.S. Congress, Senate, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., January 16, 24, and 25, 1956.

Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Committee on Government Operations: Proposal to Create
Position of Administrative Vice President, p. 56.
121

In the biography, Calvin Coolidge: The Man From Vermont, Claude Fuess asserts that “Harding had

great confidence in Coolidge, consulted him frequently, and was influenced by him to a marked degree,”
but when it came to the cabinet Fuess claims Coolidge “seldom participated in the cabinet discussions,” p.
288 and p. 289.
122

Daugherty, Inside Story of the Harding Tragedy, p. 278.

139

123

The one exception to the vice president sitting with the cabinet was Charles Dawes, vice president to

Calvin Coolidge. Dawes gave his opinion of why the vice president should not attend meetings of the
cabinet in his Notes as Vice President, pp. 33-34.
124

The demarcation of the modern American vice presidency commencing with Vice President Coolidge‟s

inclusion in the cabinet was first made by the author in the fifth chapter of Second Best.
125

Coolidge, Autobiography, pp. 163-164.

126

Dawes, Notes as Vice President, p. 33.

127

In a curious oversight, political scientist Joel Goldstein claims John Garner was the first vice president

to regularly attend cabinet meetings; then later, in the same text, he identifies Calvin Coolidge as the first
vice president to meet with the cabinet, only to follow that by incorrectly asserting, on the same page, that
Herbert Hoover never invited Charles Curtis to attend cabinet meetings; in Modern American, p. 8 and p.
136.
128

Orren, Search for American Political Development, p. 129.

129

Roosevelt, “Can the Vice President be Useful?” p. 81.

130

For a comprehensive evaluation of several of the more substantial president-to-vice president

relationships that have historically gone unrecognized, see Hite, Second Best, specifically Chapter 3,
passim.
131

Marshall, Recollections, pp. 16-17.

132

For Franklin Roosevelt‟s early thoughts on the American vice presidency, see his article from 1920,

“Can the Vice President be Useful?”
133

Franklin Roosevelt offers a succinct delineation of how and why the vice president could be used as a

liaison between the executive and legislative branches in “Can the Vice President be Useful?”, p. 8. And
for a detailed review of the Roosevelt-Garner association, including the specific differences which led to
their parting of ways, see Hite, Second Best, Chapter 5, subsection: “Back In the Cabinet (1929-1941).”
134

For a thorough review of Franklin Roosevelt and the choice of Henry Wallace for his running mate in

1940, see Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace of Iowa, pp. 265-273.

140

135

Wallace, “How a Vice President is Picked--Inside Look at U.S. Politics,” p. 88.

136

Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace of Iowa, p. 269.

137

For a useful review of the Wallace-Jones conflict, see the chapter devoted exclusively to it in

Schapsmeier, Prophet in Politics, pp. 50-71.
138

Humphrey, “Changes in the Vice Presidency,” p. 59.

139

Ibid. Though not in reference to Henry Wallace specifically, Hubert Humphrey makes the same point

about the vice president “outranking” other members of the cabinet.
140

Wallace, Price of Vision, p. 452.

141

Barkley, That Reminds Me, p. 207.

142

Ambrose discusses President Eisenhower‟s assignment of administrative tasks to Vice President Nixon,

in Nixon, p. 30.
143

Transcript, James E. Webb Oral History Interview I, April 29, 1969, by T.H. Baker, Internet Copy, LBJ

Library, p. 7.
144

Humphrey, Education of a Public Man, p. 407.

145

Ibid., p. 356.

146

For a detailed exposition on the Agnew vice presidency, including Richard Nixon‟s motives for

choosing Spiro Agnew for his vice-presidential running mate, see Hite, Second Best, Chapter 6, subsection:
“The Vice Presidency Served: By Resignation and Presidential Selection (1969-1977).”
147

Humphrey, Education of a Public Man, p. 437.

148

Ford notes his preparation for the presidency, while still vice president, in Time to Heal, p. 121; as does

Cannon, in “Gerald R. Ford and Nelson A. Rockefeller,” p. 136.
149

Ford, Time to Heal, p. 142.

150

Ibid.

151

According to James Cannon‟s account: when it became apparent Vice President Agnew would have to

resign, Nelson Rockefeller considered actively campaigning for the spot, on the assumption the vice

141

presidency was his best chance to finally gain the presidency; in “Gerald R. Ford and Nelson A.
Rockefeller,” pp. 137-138.
152

Gerald Ford briefly summarizes the responsibilities he discussed with Rockefeller when the latter man

agreed to have his name put forward for vice president; in Time to Heal, p. 145. For an extensive review of
what Rockefeller expected versus what he got once he was confirmed as vice president, see Turner,
“Finding a Policy Role,” passim, and specifically, pp. 262-271. In addition, Light refers to Rockefeller‟s
expectations for a role in domestic policy, as conveyed to him by Ford, in Vice-Presidential Power, p. 179.
153

In Cannon, “Gerald R. Ford and Nelson A. Rockefeller,” p. 139; and Light, Vice-Presidential Power, p.

179.
154

For a detailed summation of the obstructionism Vice President Nelson Rockefeller experienced when he

was leading the Domestic Council, see Hite, Second Best, Chapter 6, subsection: “The Vice Presidency
Served: By Resignation and Presidential Selection (1969-1977).” In addition, there is copious anecdotal
evidence of Rockefeller‟s troubles President Ford‟s aides, including from Henry Kissinger who asserted:
“the White House staff systematically undercut Rockefeller‟s role as vice chairman of the Domestic
Council, to which Ford had appointed him,” in Years of Renewal, p. 188.
155

The practice of weekly private meetings between the president and vice president is typically credited to

President Jimmy Carter and Vice President Walter Mondale; however, it was actually Ford and Rockefeller
who began the ritual of weekly meetings. Among others, see Ford on his meetings with the vice president,
in Time to Heal, p. 327.
156

For a concise, though skeptical review of the various investigations into the Central Intelligence Agency

during the 1970s, see Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pp. 310-343.
157

Ibid., p. 188.

158

For some brief points about Senator Bob Dole‟s vice-presidential candidacy in 1976, see Hite, Second

Best, Chapter 4; and in the same text, see Chapter 6 for a detailed account of Vice President Nelson
Rockefeller not being retained for the ticket with President Ford.
159

Ford, Time to Heal, p. 328; and Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 837.

142

160

See Mondale, “The Role of the Vice President in the Carter Administration,” December 9, 1976. A copy

of Vice President-elect Walter Mondale‟s memo to President-elect Jimmy Carter is available at the website
of the Minnesota Historical Society, Walter F. Mondale Collection.
161

Mondale, “Sideman,” pp. 6-7.

162

Ibid., p. 7.

163

Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 39.

164

Ibid.

165

Mondale, “Sideman,” p. 8.

166

For a cursory account of Senator Dan Quayle on the campaign trail, and the impact his performance

there had on his political future, see Hite, Second Best, Chapter 4, subsection: “Vice-Presidential Nominees
and Debates,” and Chapter 6, subsection: “The Vice Presidency Served: A Caricature Restored (19891993).”
167

Quayle, phone interview with the author, March 4, 2009.

168

Broder, Man Who Would Be President, p. 130.

169

Quayle, phone interview with the author, March 4, 2009.

170

Mark Gearan quoted in Ann Devroy and Stephen Barr‟s, “Gore Bucks Tradition in Vice President‟s

Role,” The Washington Post, February 18, 1995. In addition, George Stephanopoulos is quoted as saying
nearly the same as does Gearan, in Elaine Sciolino and Todd S. Purdum‟s article, “Al Gore, One Vice
President Who is Eluding the Shadows.” The New York Times, February 19, 1995.
171

Al Gore is quoted in Elaine Sciolino and Todd S. Purdum‟s article: “Al Gore, One Vice President Who

is Eluding the Shadows.” The New York Times, February 19, 1995.
172

Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, pp. 155-156.

173

There are numerous evaluations of the National Performance Review; for just two, see J.R. Thompson‟s

article “Reinvention as Reform: Assessing the National Performance Review,” Public Administration
Review, Vol. 60, no. 6, (November-December, 2000), pp. 508-520; and L. Lenkowky and J.L. Perry‟s
article “Reinventing Government: the Case for National Service,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 60,

143

no. 4, (July-August, 2000), pp. 298-307. And for Al Gore‟s personal assessment of specific outcomes of the
National Performance Review, as applied to the executive in the federal bureaucracy, see his article “The
New Job of the Federal Executive,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 54, no. 4, (July-August, 1994), pp.
317-321.
174

Clinton, My Life, p. 647.

175

Ibid., p. 648.

176

Based on data verified by the Senate Historical Office; included in the document: “Occasions When

Vice Presidents Have Voted to Break Tie Votes in the Senate,” March 13, 2008.
177

Ibid.

178

Ibid.

179

President Clinton is quoted in Richard L. Berke‟s “The Good Son,” The New York Times, February 20,

1994.
180

President Johnson‟s remarks are recounted in Humphrey, Education of a Public Man, p. 301.

181

Although it is uncertain if the original suggestion that Bush and Cheney shared a “co-presidency”

originated with Shirley Warshaw, for a book-length treatment of the idea, see her text The Co-Presidency
of Bush and Cheney, passim.
182

For a consideration of collegial executives see Shugart, Presidents and Assemblies, pp. 20-11, 95-105,

219, 285.
183

In a presidential system the veto is broadly recognized for being “the primary check of the president on

congressional power,” in Shugart, Presidents and Assemblies, p. 134.
184

For a consideration of Dick Cheney as vice president, see Hite, Second Best, Chapter 8, “The Vice

Presidency Unbounded: The Case of Cheney.” And for Cheney and the transition, specifically, see Chapter
8, subsection: “Dick Cheney and the Assimilation of the Vice Presidency into the Presidency.”
185

Transcript, Lieberman-Cheney Vice-Presidential Debate, October 5, 2000, p. 11.

186

Presidential memorandum, George W. Bush, January 29, 2001.

144

187

For the composition of the National Energy Policy Development Group, see the hierarchical

representation of the group in the United States General Accounting Office report, “Energy Task Force,”
GAO-03-894, p. 7.
188

Among the better accounts of the consistent disengagement of President George W. Bush during his first

years in office is Ron Suskind‟s entertaining book, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White
House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill.
189

Among the accounts of the anonymity of participants in the Cheney energy force meetings, as well as

efforts to discover who was actually at the meetings, The New York Times article of April 25, 2004,
“Administration Says a „Zone of Autonomy‟ Justifies Its Secrecy on Energy Task Force,” by Linda
Greenhouse, is one of the more concise. Also, for a more scholarly treatment of the same topic, see
Halstead‟s „“The Law: Walker v. Cheney”: Legal Insulation of the Vice President from GAO
Investigations,” pp. 635-648. And for the Bush administration‟s assertion of executive privilege for the vice
president, see Cheney v. United States District Court, No. 03-475.
190

For Dick Cheney‟s view on executive power and the presidency, see his article: “The Significance of

Campaign ‟84,” passim.
191

Timmons, Garner of Texas, p. 205.

192

In his book, One Heartbeat Away: Presidential Disability and Succession, Senator Birch Bayh

documents the arduous task of initiating, drafting, and passing the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, passim.
193

For the entire text of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Appendix C.

194

For the text of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, see Appendix B.

195

Schlesinger, “On the Presidential Succession,” p. 500.

196

Ibid.

197

Natoli, “The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Opening a Pandora‟s Box,” p. 50.

198

In addition to Schlesinger‟s criticism of the part the president plays in choosing a replacement vice

president, in “On the Presidential Succession,” see Natoli‟s “The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Opening a

145

Pandora‟s Box,” for her broad concerns with the amendment, in particular that part of the amendment
which deals with presidential inability.
199

Schlesinger, “On the Presidential Succession,” p. 500.

200

Al Gore made the joke first when he appeared on “The Late Show with David Letterman,” which aired

on September 6, 1993. Gore later used a slightly altered version of the same joke in an address before the
Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association Conference on February 13, 1996.
201

James Monroe is quoted, without attribution, in Barkley, “The Vice-Presidency,” p. 4.

202

Orren, Search for American Political Development, p. 125.

203

Executive Order No. 10016--Coat of Arms, Seal, and Flag of the Vice President of the United States,

November 10, 1948, President Harry S. Truman. Truman‟s executive order revoked Executive Order No.
7285--Prescribing the Official Flag of the Vice President of the United States, February 7, 1936, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
204

According to the pamphlet, “The Vice President‟s Room,” produced by the Office of Senate Curator:

“Due to lack of space in the Capitol‟s old Senate wing, early vice presidents often shared their room with
the president. Following the 1850s extension of the building, the Senate formally set aside a room for the
vice president‟s exclusive use.”
205

Ambrose, Nixon, p. 303.

206

Data on the budget allocations for the Office of the Vice President are derived from the Federal

Government Manual, “Special Assistance to the President and the Official Residence of the Vice
President,” p. 1147.
207

Interview with George A. Smathers, “Interview #4: Kennedy and Johnson,” United States Senate

Historical Office--Oral History Project, September 5, 1989, pp. 88-89. Interview conducted by Donald A.
Ritchie. In addition, for Lyndon Johnson‟s attempt to lead the Senate Democratic caucus as vice president,
see Transcript, Hubert H. Humphrey Oral History Interview I, August 17, 1971, by Joe B. Frantz, Internet
Copy, LBJ Library, p. 21.

146

208

Katherine Scott, United States Senate Historical Office, personal communication with the author, June

11, 2010. What was commonly referred to as the Old Executive Office Building (OEOB) was renamed the
Eisenhower Executive Office Building.
209

Agnew, Go Quietly, p. 36.

210

Ibid.

211

Mondale, “Sideman,” p. 7.

212

Coolidge, Autobiography, p. 159.

213

Ibid., pp. 159-160.

214

Gail S. Cleere‟s text, The House on Observatory Hill: Home of the Vice President of the United States,

offers an informative history of “Admirals House,” located at the Naval Observatory in Washington, DC.
215

Mondale is quoted without attribution in Lewis, Mondale, p. 231.

216

Humphrey, “Changes in the Vice Presidency,” p. 59.

217

Both quotes are from Roosevelt, “Can the Vice President be Useful?” p. 8.

218

Transcript, Biden-Palin Vice-Presidential Debate, October 2, 2008, p. 34.

219

For an assessment of Vice President Joe Biden and his role in the Obama administration, see the

October 19, 2009 edition of Newsweek, with Holly Bailey and Evan Thomas‟s accompanying article about
Biden, “An Inconvenient Truth Teller.”
220

See Helene Cooper‟s article, “As the Ground Shifts, Biden Plays a Bigger Role,” The New York Times,

December 11, 2010.
221

Quayle, phone interview with the author, March 4, 2009.

222

Richard L. Berke, “The Good Son,” The New York Times, February 20, 1994.

223

Ibid.

224

Rossiter, American Presidency, p. 100.

147

Bibliography
Ackerman, Bruce and David Fontana. “Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the
Presidency.” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, no. 2, (April, 2004), pp. 551-643.
Adams, John Q. The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845, edited by Allan Nevins.
New York: Fredrick Ungar Publishing Co., 1969. First published in 1951 by
Fredrick Ungar Publishing Co. Page references are to the 1969 edition.
Agnew, Spiro T. Go Quietly…or Else. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.,
1980.
Ambrose, Stephen E. Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913-1962. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1987.
Barkley, Alben W. “The Vice-Presidency.” May, 1952, unpublished. Box 164, Alben W.
Barkley Collection, University of Kentucky, Special Collections Library.
Barkley, Alben W. That Reminds Me. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954. A
facsimile of the first edition. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1970.
Bayh, Birch. One Heartbeat Away: Presidential Disability and Succession. New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1968.
Broder, David S. and Bob Woodward. The Man Who Would Be President: Dan Quayle.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.
Cannon, James. “Gerald R. Ford and Nelson A. Rockefeller: A Vice-Presidential
Memoir.” In At the President’s Side: The Vice Presidency in the Twentieth
Century, edited by Timothy Walch, pp. 135-143. Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 1997.

148

Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.
Cheney, Richard B. “The Significance of Campaign ‟84.” Presidential Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 14, no. 3, Campaign ‟84: The Contest for National Leadership (Part Three)
(Summer, 1984), pp. 335-340.
Christopher, Warren. Chances of a Lifetime. New York: Scribner, 2001.
Cleere, Gail S. The House on Observatory Hill: Home of the Vice President of the United
States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.
Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.
Cohen, Jeffrey E. “„The Polls‟: Popular Views of the Vice President and Vice
Presidential Approval.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, no. 1, (March,
2001), pp. 142-149.
Cohen, Jeffrey E. “„The Polls‟: Popular Views of the Vice President and Vice
Presidential Favorability.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, no. 2, (June,
2001), pp. 349-357.
Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. The Party Decides: Presidential
Nominations Before and After Reform. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2008.
Coolidge, Calvin J. The Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge. New York: Cosmopolitan
Book Corporation, 1929.
Cunningham, Noble E., Jr. “Election of 1800.” In History of American Presidential
Elections, 1789-1968, edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Fred L. Israel, and

149

William P. Hansen, Vol. 1, pp. 101-134. New York: Chelsea House Publishers,
1971.
Daugherty, Harry M. The Inside Story of the Harding Tragedy. New York: The Churchill
Company, 1932.
Dawes, Charles G. Notes as Vice President 1922-1929. Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1935.
Farrand, Max. The Framing of the Constitution of the United States. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1913.
Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential Succession. New York:
Fordham University Press, 1965.
Ferling, John. Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004.
Ford, Gerald R. A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford. New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1979.
Timmons, Bascom N. Garner of Texas: A Personal History. New York: Harper &
Brothers Publishers, 1948.
Gilbert, Robert E. The Tormented President: Calvin Coolidge, Death, and Clinical
Depression. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003.
Haig, Alexander M. Jr. Inner Circles: How America Changed the World, A Memoir. New
York: Warner Books, Inc., 1992.
Hamilton, Alexander. Writings. New York: The Library of America, 2001.

150

Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, and James Madison. The Federalist: A Commentary on
the Constitution of the United States. New York: The Modern Library, 1941.
Hite, James E. Second Best: The History and Development of the American Vice
Presidency, forthcoming.
Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made It. New
York: Vintage Books, 1989. First published 1948 by Alfred Knopf, Inc. Page
references are to the 1989 edition.
Humphrey, Hubert H. “Changes in the Vice Presidency.” Current History, 67 (August
1974), pp. 58-59, 89-90.
Humphrey, Hubert H. The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics, edited by
Norman Sherman. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976.
Kengor, Paul. “The Foreign Policy Role of Vice President Al Gore.” Presidential Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 27, no. 1, Bill Clinton and Al Gore: Retrospect and Prospect
(Winter, 1997), pp. 14-38.
Kengor, Paul. “The Vice President, Secretary of State, and Foreign Policy.” Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, no. 2, (Summer, 2000), pp. 175-199.
Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.
Learned, H.B. “Some Aspects of the Vice-Presidency.” Proceedings of the American
Political Science Association, Vol. 9, Ninth Annual Meeting, (1912), pp. 162-177.
Lechelt, Jack. The Vice Presidency in Foreign Policy: From Mondale to Cheney. El Paso:
TX: LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2009.

151

Lewis, Finlay. Mondale: Portrait of an American Politician. New York: Perennial
Library, 1984. First published 1980 by Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., hardcover
edition. Page references are to the 1984 edition.
Light, Paul C. Vice-Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White House.
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.
Lomask, Milton. Aaron Burr: The Years From Princeton to Vice President, 1756-1805.
New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1979.
Maclay, William and Edgar Stanton Maclay. Journal of William Maclay: United States
Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-1791. New York: D.A. Appleton and Co., 1890.
Madison, James. Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1966.
Marshall, Thomas R. Recollections of Thomas R. Marshall: A Hoosier Salad.
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1925.
Mayer, William G. “A Brief History of Vice Presidential Selection.” In Pursuit of the
White House 2000: How We Choose Our Presidential Nominees, edited by
William G. Mayer, pp. 313-374. New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000.
Mondale, Walter F. “Sideman: Reflections on the Vice Presidency.” Lecture at
Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota, May 6, 2002. Page references are to the
manuscript copy provided to the author by Walter F. Mondale.
Monroe, Dan. The Republican Vision of John Tyler. College Station: Texas A & M
University Press, 2003.

152

Natoli, Marie D. “The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Opening a Pandora‟s Box.”
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, no. 4, (Fall, 1976), pp. 48-50.
Natoli, Marie D. “Abolish the Vice Presidency?” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 9,
no. 2, Leadership and Reform (Spring, 1979), pp. 202-206.
Natoli, Marie D. “The Vice Presidency: Gerald Ford as Healer.” Presidential Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 10, no. 4, (Fall, 1980), pp. 662-664.
Natoli, Marie D. “The Humphrey Vice Presidency in Retrospect.” Presidential Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 12, no. 4, Perceptions on the Presidency, Leadership, and
Statesmanship, (Fall, 1982), pp. 603-609.
Orren, Karen and Stephen Skowronek. The Search for American Political Development.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Peterson, Norma Lois. The Presidencies of William Henry Harrison & John Tyler.
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989.
Quayle, Dan. Phone interview with the author, March 4, 2009.
Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Can the Vice President be Useful?” The Saturday Evening Post,
October 16, 1920, pp. 8, 81-82.
Rossiter, Clinton L. “The Reform of the Vice Presidency,” Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. 63, no. 3, (September, 1948), pp. 383-404.
Schachner, Nathan. Aaron Burr: A Biography. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company,
1937.
Schapsmeier, Edward L. and Fredrick H. Schapsmeier. Henry A. Wallace of Iowa: The
Agrarian Years, 1910-1940. Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1968.

153

Schapsmeier, Edward L. and Fredrick H. Schapsmeier. Prophet in Politics: Henry A.
Wallace and the War Years, 1940-1965. Ames: The Iowa State University Press,
1970.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. “On the Presidential Succession.” Political Science Quarterly,
89, no. 3, (Autumn 1974), pp. 475-505.
Smith, Page. “Election of 1796.” In History of American Presidential Elections, 17891968, edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Fred L. Israel, and William P.
Hansen,Vol. 1, pp. 59-80. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971.
Suskind, Ron. The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the
Education of Paul O’Neill. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.
Thompson, Charles S. An Essay On: The Rise and Fall of the Congressional Caucus as a
Machine for Nominating. New Jersey: Yale University, 1902. A facsimile of the
first edition. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1971.
Turner, Michael. “Finding a Policy Role for the Vice President: The Case of Nelson A.
Rockefeller.” PhD diss., State University of New York, 1978.
U.S. Congress. Annals of the Congress of the United States, 1789-1824. 42 vols.
Washington, DC, 1834-56.
Wallace, Henry A. “How a Vice President is Picked--Inside Look at U.S. Politics.” U.S.
News & World Report, April 6, 1956, pp. 86-89. Full text of an address delivered
to the Harvard Law School Forum, March 30, 1956.
Wallace, Henry A. The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946,
edited by John Morton Blum. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973.

154

Warshaw, Shirley A. The Co-Presidency of Bush and Cheney. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2009.
Washington, George. The Writings of George Washington: From the Original
Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, edited by John C. Fitzpatrick. Vol. 35, March
30, 1796-July 31, 1797. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1970. First
published 1940 by the United States Government Printing Office. Page references
are to the 1970 edition.
Waugh, Edgar W. Second Consul: The Vice Presidency: Our Greatest Political Problem.
New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956.
Williams, Irving G. The Rise of the Vice Presidency. Washington, DC: Public Affairs
Press, 1956.
Wilson, Woodrow. Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. New
York: Riverside Press, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1885. Reprinted with
introduction by Walter Lippmann. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. Reprinted
2006 by Dover Publications, paperback edition. Page references are to the 2006
edition.
Wilson, Woodrow. Constitutional Government in the United States. New York: The
Columbia University Press, 1908.

155

Appendix A
The Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
Proposed by resolution of the Congress on December 9, 1803; declared ratified by three
fourths of the States on September 25, 1804.
Article [XII]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President
and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state
with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists
of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and
of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the
Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;--The person
having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number
be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such
majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the
list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose
immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be
taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a
majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. [And if the House of
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Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve
upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall
act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the
President.] The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the
Vice-President, if such a number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of
two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President
shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
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Appendix B
The Presidential Succession Act of 1947
An act to provide for the performance of the duties of the office of President in case of
the removal, resignation, death, or inability both of the President and Vice President.
July 18, 1947
61 U.S. Stat. 380
“Be it enacted, etc., That (a) (1) if, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office,
inability, or failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge
the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representative in Congress,
act as President.
“(2) The same rule shall apply in case of the death, resignation, removal from
office, or inability of an individual acting as President under this subsection.
“(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) a Speaker is to begin the discharge
of the powers and duties of the office of President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker
fails to qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate shall,
upon his resignation as President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President.
“(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection (b) shall
continue to act until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, except that-(1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in whole or in
part on the failure of both the President-elect and the Vice President-elect to qualify, then
he shall act only until a President or Vice President qualifies; and
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(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in whole or in
part on the inability of the President or Vice President, then he shall act only until the
removal of the disability of one such individuals.
“(d) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President under subsection
(b), then the officer of the United States who is highest on the following list, and who is
not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act
as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of War, Attorney
General, Postmaster General, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary
of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor.
“(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue so to
do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not after a qualified and
prior-entitled individual is able to act, except that the removal of the disability of an
individual higher on the list contained in paragraph (1) or the ability to qualify on the part
of an individual higher on such list shall not terminate his service.
“(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in
paragraph (1) shall be held to constitute his resignation from the office by virtue of the
holding of which he qualifies to act as President.
“(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to
the office of President under the Constitution. Subsection (d) shall apply only to officers
appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the
death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the President
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pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the House of
Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of President devolve upon
them.
“(f) During the period that any individual acts as President under this Act, his
compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the case of the President.
“(g) Sections 1 and 2 of the Act entitled „An Act to provide for the performance
of the duties of the office of President in case of the removal, death, resignation, or
inability both of the President and Vice President‟, approved January 19, 1886 (24 Stat.
1; U.S.C., 1940 edition, title 3, secs. 21 and 22), are repealed.”
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Appendix C
The Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
Proposed by resolution of the Congress on July 6, 1965; declared ratified by the
legislatures of thirty-nine of the fifty States on February 23, 1967.
Article [XXV]
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or
resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
Sec. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a
majority of vote of both Houses of Congress.
Sec. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice President as Acting President.
Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers
of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
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Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no
inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice
President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight
hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after
receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twentyone days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
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